On Point blog, page 74 of 485

Error in jury instruction on substantive crime was waived and not prejudicial, but Machner hearing required on handling of self defense issue

State v. Theophilous Ruffin, 2019AP1046-CR, District 1, 3/9/21 (not recommended for publication), state’s petition for review granted 9/17/21; reversed, 2022 WI 34; case activity (including briefs)

Ruffin raises three challenges to how the jury was instructed at his trial. Two are rejected in all respects, but one—regarding trial counsel’s decision to withdraw a self defense instruction—gets him a Machner hearing.

Read full article >

Immediate police investigation, testimony not a prerequisite to OWI prosecution

City of Cedarburg v. Katherine D. Young, 2020AP1848, District 2, 3/17/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Young was prosecuted for an OWI 1st offense that did not arise out of a traffic stop or involve police collecting blood or breath samples or even testifying at trial. Can that be done? Sure, it can. And the evidence that was presented at trial was sufficient to convict her, too.

Read full article >

Failure to protest defense strategy through “most” of trial doomed McCoy claim

State v. Kenyon D. Grant, 2020AP785, 3/9/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) held that trial counsel cannot concede guilt over his client’s express objection. This would deny the client his 6th Amendment right to determine the objective of his defense and require an automatic new trial. Grant raised a McCoy claim in this case. It failed because trial counsel testified that Grant did not oppose his concession strategy and objected only after hearing the State’s evidence against him.

Read full article >

COA creates exception to deadline for holding ch. 51 probable cause hearings

Jefferson County v. S.M.S., 2020AP814, 3/11/21, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

It is blackletter law that the probable cause hearing for a Chapter 51 commitment must be held within a statutorily-prescribed time from the subject individual’s detention or the circuit court must dismiss the proceeding for lack of competency to adjudicate it. See §51.20(7)(a) and Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, ¶5, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592. In this case, the court of appeals held that the Ryan E.M. rule did not apply because the individual’s conduct (he was pro se) made it necessary for the circuit court to adjourn the probable cause hearing beyond the 72-hour period expired.

Read full article >

Defense win: Evidence about sexual activity with children too general to support many of the convictions

State v. Donald P. Coughlin, 2019AP1876-CR, District 4, 3/4/21 (not recommended for publication), state’s petition for review granted 9/14/21; case activity (including briefs)

In 2010 Coughlin was charged with over 20 counts of having sexual contact with three different children during various periods between 1989 and 1994. The court of appeals holds the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the counts involving  two of the children.

Read full article >

Evidence supported inference defendant didn’t start fire to keep himself warm

State v. Greg Douglas Griswold, 2020AP1598, District 4, 3/4/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Griswold was convicted of violating § 26.12(5)(b) by starting a fire in an “extensive forest protection area” without a permit. The statute excepts fires started for warmth, and Griswold claimed that’s what he was doing. When evidence supports more than one reasonable inference, the reviewing court accepts the inference drawn by the trier of fact, see, e.g., State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 504, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990), and under that standard the trial court reasonably rejected Griswold’s defense.

Read full article >

COA: Confrontation Clause doesn’t apply to statements by reporters of child abuse

State v. Patrick A. Keller, 2021 WI App 22; case activity (including briefs)

Keller was convicted of causing mental harm, as a party to a crime, to his stepdaughter, who has autism. During his trial, the circuit court admitted statements made by non-testifying confidential reporters to Child Protective Services access workers. In a published decision, the court of appeals holds that these statements were not made for the primary purpose of gathering evidence to prosecute Keller, so the Confrontation Clause does not apply.

Read full article >

BIG defense win on treatment to competency under §971.14

State v. Joseph G. Green, 2021 WI App 18; case activity (including briefs)

SCOW recently declared parts of §971.14 unconstitutional. See State v. Fitzgerald,  2019 WI 69, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165 and our post here. The statute allowed the government to administer unwanted antipsychotic medication to a defendant to render him competent for trial in violation of  Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). Here in Green’s case the court of appeals describes the evidence the State must present, and the findings the circuit court must make, before ordering involuntary medication. It also clarifies the procedures involved in appealing an involuntary medication order.

Read full article >

Defendant forfeited competency challenge to second OWI 1st

County of Green Lake v. Lori Melchert, 2020AP473, District 2, 2/24/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Melchert’s challenge to a prior OWI that was improperly treated as a first offense comes way too late under City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738, and City of Cedarburg v. Hansen, 2020 WI 11, 390 Wis. 2d 109, 938 N.W.2d 463.

Read full article >

Even if objectionable, testimony doesn’t merit new TPR trial

S.K. v. S.S., 2020AP277, District 3, 2/26/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (briefs not made available)

S.S. (or “Susan,” to use the court’s pseudonym) isn’t entitled to a new TPR grounds trial based on her trial attorney’s failure to object to the admission of testimony she argues was irrelevant “other-acts” evidence. Even if trial counsel was deficient for failing to object (and the court doesn’t necessarily agree that’s the case (¶16 n.4),

Read full article >