On Point blog, page 85 of 493
Evidence sufficient to support commitment under 51.20(1)(a)2.c
Outagamie Countyv. G.S., 2019AP1950, 1/20/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
“George” called law enforcement claiming to be a federal authority who wanted to make a citizen’s arrest of some duck hunters. When a deputy arrived at the lake he saw George in a boat with 2 encased firearms about 100 yards from shore where a group of duck hunters were upset about George’s verbal encounter with them. George never pointed a gun at anyone. Based on this evidence, a doctor’s report, and substantial hearsay evidence, the circuit court committed Geoge under the 3rd standard of dangerousness, which requires a pattern of recent acts demonstrating a substantial probability that he would injure himself or others.
Maximum length of NGI commitment equals maximum terms of confinement for all cases, added together
State v. Christopher W. Yakich, 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR, District 4, 1/14/21 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 6/16/21; affirmed, 2022 WI 8; case activity (including briefs)
A defendant who is found not guilty by reasons of mental disease or defect (NGI) of a crime may be committed under § 971.17 for the maximum term of confinement (for felonies under Truth-in-Sentencing II, § 971.17(1)(b)) or two-thirds the maximum term of imprisonment (for misdemeanors or pre-TIS II felonies, § 971.17(1)(a) and (d)). The court of appeals holds that if a defendant is found NGI for more than one offense, the maximum term of commitment is determined by adding together the maximum terms on each offense, as if they were consecutive.
COA splits on prejudice caused by counsel’s ineffective presentation of Denny defense
State v. General Grant Wilson, 2018AP183-CR, 1/12/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This marks the 3rd time the court of appeals has addressed Wilson’s case. In this appeal, the sole question is whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court found deficient performance but not prejudice. Two judges, White and Blanchard affirm. Brash filed an 18-page dissent arguing that the cumulative effect of several deficiencies warrants a new trial.
What circuit courts must explain before accepting plea in TPR case
State v. J.T., 2020AP1151, 1/5/21, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
E.W. was placed in foster care shortly after birth. Her dad, J.T., was incarcerated then. He remained so a year later when the State filed a TPR petition against him on the grounds that he failed to establish a substantial relationship with E.W. and failed to exercise significant responsibility for her. According to the State, J.T. failed to attend E.W.’s medical appointments and participate in decisions about her education. He pled no contest, and the circuit court terminated his parental rights.
December 2020 publication list
On December 23, 2020, the court of appeals ordered publication of the following criminal law related case:
State v. Jack B. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81 (mandatory minimum for OWI trumps SAP early release requirement)
Ch. 51 recommitment pleadings and evidence both sufficient
Winnebago County v. D.D.A., 2020AP1351, District 2, 12/23/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects D.D.A.’s challenges to the sufficiency of the petition to extend his ch. 51 commitment and to the evidence presented at the extension hearing.
Medication order supported by sufficient evidence
Calumet County v. J.M.K., 2020AP1183-FT, District 2, 12/23/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence proved J.M.K. (“Jane”) was not competent to refuse psychotropic medication.
Judicial bias claim forfeited due to lack of postdisposition motion
State v. Benjamin J. Klapps, 2021 WI App 5; case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court granted the state’s petition to revoke Klapps’s conditional release under § 971.17(3)(e), citing in particular the report of a prior examiner who didn’t testify at the revocation hearing and whose report wasn’t entered into evidence. (¶¶2-13). Klapps argued the trial judge had prejudged his case based on the previously filed report,
Defense win! COA schools State in math and 4th Amendment
State v. Frederick Jennings, 2019AP1539-CR, 12/22/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Three officers noticed Jennings either in or near the passenger side of a Toyota having dark tinted windows. They detained him, found marijuana and contraband in the car, arrested him, and found heroin in his pocket. Jennings moved to suppress arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the detention. Two officers testified at the suppression hearing. They contradicted each other and the body cam video, none of which supplied reasonable suspicion for the stop. While the circuit court denied suppression, the court of appeals reversed.
Jury instruction on voluntary intoxication wasn’t erroneous
State v. Chidiebele Praises Ozodi, 2019AP886-CR, District 2, 12/16/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The legislature amended § 939.42 in 2013 Wis. Act 307 to eliminate the defense of voluntary intoxication when the intoxication negated the existence of a requisite mental state, like intent or knowledge. But because the state has the burden of proving every element of an offense, including the mental state, there’s a due process argument that evidence of intoxication that might negate that element is relevant and admissible, despite the absence of a statutory defense of voluntary intoxication. (¶27 & n.4). If that’s so, then what, if anything, should the court tell the jury about how to use that evidence?