On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Andrew W. Bunn, 2019AP2127-CR, 9/9/20, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

One evening, an unknown woman approached a cop car in a church parking lot near a playground and said that two adults were having oral sex in a pickup truck on the other side of a fence. The cops saw the truck but no activity inside. They didn’t ask for the woman’s name, but they did go investigate.

State v. Victoria L. Conley, 2019AP902, 9/10/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Conley pleaded to one count of disorderly conduct related to a couple of altercations occurring over a few minutes in Madison. After sentencing she moved to withdraw her plea alleging that the court failed to apprise her of the nature of the charge, and that she did not otherwise understand. The court of appeals holds that, assuming the colloquy was deficient, the record shows she understood the charges.

On August 31, 2020, the court of appeals ordered publication of the following criminal law related cases:

State v. Nathaniel R. Lecker, 2020 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)

The application of a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law. This is an incontrovertible maxim of appellate review. “Question of law” sounds so august and erudite and specialized, doesn’t it? A question of law is a question into which an astute lawyer–or judge–would have special insight; he or she could be trusted to come to the right–or at least a particularly sound–answer to such a question. But sometimes statutes are written in very ordinary terms with no particular resonance, and no special definition, in the legal world. And sometimes these ordinary terms are also rather elastic–or relative. In those instances, can the answer to a “question of law” be something other than a standardless, “know it when I see it” exercise of arbitrary will?

State v. D.S., 2019AP2230 through 2019AP2233, District 1, 8/25/30 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.S. challenges the orders terminating her parental rights to her children on the ground, first because her lawyer was unable to appear and represent her at a pretrial hearing because his law license was temporarily suspended, second because trial counsel didn’t obtain 400 pages of discovery until the day before the  dispositional hearing. Her challenges are rejected.

State v. Morgan E. Geyser, 2020 WI App 58; case activity (including briefs)

Morgan Geyser, one of the two 12 year old defendants in the Slenderman case, was charged in adult court with attempted 1st degree intentional homicide. At her preliminary hearing, the court found probable cause that she committed a crime for which it had exclusive jurisdiction. On appeal, Geyser argued that the adult court had found the facts necessary to mitigate attempted 1st degree homicide to attempted 2nd degree homicide and thus it lost jurisdiction. She also argued that her custodial statements to police should have been suppressed because her Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The court of appeals rejected both arguments.

State v. Jordan Alexander Lickes, 2020 WI App 59; case activity (including briefs); review granted 11/18/2020, affirmed, 2021 WI 60

This is not much of a surprise after State v. Ozuna, but the court of appeals here reverses a grant of expunction, holding in a to-be-published decision that any noncompliance with conditions of probation–even those that are not ordered by the court, but are imposed by DOC rule–makes expunction unavailable.

State v. Heather Jan VanBeek, 2019AP447, 8/12/20, District 2; certification granted 9/16/2020; case activity (including briefs)

VanBeek was sitting with a companion in her parked truck when an officer approached. There’d been a tip that people were sitting in the truck for an hour and that someone had come to the truck with a backpack, then departed. The officer asked a few questions, got satisfactory answers, and then asked for ID, purportedly for his report of the contact. The truck’s occupants were reluctant to hand over their licenses, but the officer insisted, and they did. He held onto them for more than five minutes and summoned a drug dog, who eventually alerted. At some point in this time frame, reasonable suspicion developed, but it wasn’t present when the officer took the IDs. So, was the encounter, at that point, “consensual” (as the state argues) or were the truck’s occupants seized–which, without reasonable suspicion, would be unconstitutional?

State  v. Catherine Cuskey Large, 2019AP1966-CR, 8/13/20, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication; case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals correctly affirmed the circuit court’s decision to suppress OWI evidence in this case, where an officer admitted that the New Glarus Police Department’s “protocol” was to administer PBTs on motorists whether they had probable cause for OWI or not. But court of appeals did so by taking a heavy-handed approach to waiver, a rule of administration that appellate courts have the discretion to apply or not.

Rock County v. R.J., 2020AP93, 8/13/20, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Thank heavens this opinion is not published. R.J’s initial commitment expired before he filed his notice of appeal. According to the court of appeals, R.J. should have sua sponte addressed mootness in his initial brief–before the County ever argued the point. Because R.J. waited to see whether the County would even raise mootness and then addressed the matter in his reply, the court of appeals dismissed his appeal. The court of appeals also made an error of law regarding the “contemporaneous objection” requirement.  Hopefully, R.J. will move for reconsideration or petition for review.