On Point blog, page 102 of 214
Conflict of Interest – Representation of Defendant by Prosecutor in Prior Case – Generally
State v. Christopher M. Medina, 2006 WI App 76
For Medina: Daniel P. Ryan
Issue/Holding: A claim that the prosecutor represented the defendant in a prior case may be raised in a pretrial motion to disqualify the prosecutor, which requires a showing that “the subject matter of the two representations are ‘substantially related,’” ¶15, quoting State v. Tkacz, 2002 WI App 281,
Counsel – Conflict of Interest – Representation of Defendant by Prosecutor in Prior Case – Pretrial Motion to Disqualify, Timeliness
State v. Christopher M. Medina, 2006 WI App 76
For Medina: Daniel P. Ryan
Issue: Whether a motion to disqualify a prosecutor because of representation of defendant in a prior case, brought immediately before jury selection, may be deemed waived on timeliness grounds.
Holding:
¶24 We conclude the circuit court may, in the proper exercise of its discretion, deny a motion to disqualify a prosecutor under the substantial relationship standard if the motion is untimely.
Counsel – Conflict of Interest – Representation of Defendant by Prosecutor in Prior Case – Postconviction Motion to Disqualify – Actual Conflict Required
State v. Christopher M. Medina, 2006 WI App 76
For Medina: Daniel P. Ryan
Issue/Holding:
¶33 The circuit court here accepted the district attorney’s testimony that he did not remember any conversation with Medina during the prior representation. It also found that the district attorney did not refer to any information at sentencing from the prior representation that was not a matter of public record.
Review – Factors – Gallion – Generally
State v. Chad W. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49, PFR filed 3/13/06
For Ziegler: Kenneth P. Casey, UW Law School
Issue/Holding:
¶32 We conclude that the trial court’s sentencing remarks satisfy Hall as to the reasons for the consecutive sentences and Gallion as to the reasons for the length of the sentence. As noted, the trial court engaged in a thorough and exhaustive examination of the relevant sentencing objectives and factors.
Sentencing – Applicability of TIS to Crime not Completed until Advent of TIS II
State v. Ronnie L. Thums, 2006 WI App 173
For Thums: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether an offense which was partially committed during the TIS-I regime but not completed until advent of TIS-II comes under the former or latter sentencing regime.
Holding:
¶11 Thums had not committed the crime of stalking with a dangerous weapon during TIS-I. He therefore did not become subject to the TIS-I penalties during TIS-I.
Review – Exercise of Discretion – Generally
State v. Jack W. Klubertanz, 2006 WI App 71, PFR filed 4/14/06
For Klubertanz: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶21 We conclude that the circuit court here properly exercised its sentencing discretion under the standards set forth in Gallion. The court identified the objectives it sought to achieve with the sentence it imposed: punishing Klubertanz, protecting the public,
Sentencing – Review – Factors – Gallion – Generally
State v. Chad W. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49, PFR filed 3/13/06
For Ziegler: Kenneth P. Casey, UW Law School
Issue/Holding:
¶23 The principal objectives of a sentence include, but are not limited to, the protection of the community, the punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of the defendant, and deterrence to others. Id., ¶40. A sentencing court should indicate the general objectives of greatest importance and explain how,
Sentencing Review – Factors – TIS – Probation as 1st Alternative
State v. Steven A. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26
For Harvey: Christopher William Rose
Issue/Holding:
¶47 Harvey correctly states Gallion’s teaching that probation should be considered as the first sentencing alternative. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶25. Here, the trial court expressly addressed probation. … In sum, the court concluded that probation would unduly depreciate the offense. …
¶48 Probation should be the disposition unless confinement is necessary to protect the public,
Sentencing Review – Articulation of Factors – Defendant’s Character
State v. Donald Odom, 2006 WI App 145
For Odom: Eileen Miller Carter; J.C. Moore, SPD, Milwaukee Trial
Issue/Holding: Trial court’s discussion of the three primary sentencing factors was adequate, though the court did not explicitly identify those factors, ¶25.
Sentencing Review – Articulation of Factors by Trial Court
State v. Jeremy D. Russ, 2006 WI App 9
For Russ: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶14 This court observes a strong policy of deferring to the sentencing discretion of a trial court, presuming the sentence to be reasonable unless the defendant can demonstrate from the record that the court acted unreasonably. State v. Mosley, 201 Wis. 2d 36,