On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Mahlik D. Ellington, 2005 WI App 243
For Ellington: Andrea Taylor Cornwall

Issue/Holding1: The confrontation clause doesn’t prohibit a witness from reading to the jury admissible medical records:

¶13      First, as we have seen, the certified medical records were received by the trial court without objection. Certainly, the jurors could have read the pertinent excerpts, and, also, the prosecutor or defense counsel could have read to the jury excerpts from those records.

State v. Boon Savanh, 2005 WI App 245
For Savanh: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding1: Statement of coconspirator during drug transaction, conveyed to jury via police informant buying drugs as part of controlled buy, not “testimonial”:

¶25      We do not think an objective witness would reasonably believe that Vongrasamy would have thought his informal telephone conversation with his roommate would be available for use at a later trial.

State v. Donavin Hemphill, 2005 WI App 248
N.B. The holding quoted below was overruled, in State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶24n. 8. In other words, “a spontaneous statement to a police officer” is not, as a matter of law, non-testimonial.
For Hemphill: Jeffrey Jensen

Issue/Holding: An out-of-court statement by a witness to police (responding to a report of “trouble” involving a “subject with a gun”) which pointed out the defendant (“Those are the ones.

State v. Kevin D. James, 2005 WI App 188
For James: Terry W. Rose

Issue/Holding: The mere fact that § 908.08 imposes a mandatory protocol (videotape admitted into evidence first; child called to testify afterward) violates neither confrontation, ¶¶10-14, nor separation-of-powers, ¶¶15-25, doctrines.This statutory procedure allows the State to introduce a child’s videotaped statement, with the child available for questioning at the defendant’s request.

State v. Lionel N. Anderson, 2005 WI App 238
For Anderson: Harry R. Hertel; Steven H. Gibbs

Issue/Holding: Issue/Holding: Pretrial videotaped statement, § 908.08(5), doesn’t violate confrontation when the person actually testifies, ¶24.

State v. David J. Roberson, 2005 WI App 195, affirmed on other grounds, 2006 WI 80
For Roberson: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: ¶15 n. 3:

Recently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court construed article I, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution as providing greater protection against self-incrimination than the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, State v.

State v. Barbara E. Harp, 2005 WI App 250
For Harp: Aaron N. Halstead, Kathleen Meter Lounsbury, Danielle L. Carne

Issue/Holding: ¶13 n. 4:

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall … be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ….” Article I, section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that “no person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment ….” Two recent decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court have concluded that certain provisions of the state constitution provide greater protections than analogous provisions of the federal constitution.

State of Wisconsin ex rel. Mateo D.O. v. Circuit Court, 2005 WI App 85
For Mateo D.O.: Colleen Bradley, SPD, Oshkosh Trial

Issue/Holding:

¶15. A petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition is an appropriate remedy to redress the denial of judicial substitution. See State ex rel. James L.J. v. Circuit Court for Walworth County, 200 Wis. 2d 496,

State v. Edward W. Fisher, 2005 WI App 175
For Fisher: Eileen Miller Carter

Issue/Holding: 

¶16            Fisher’s contentions grossly misrepresent the record. Assuming the court’s oral ruling contained some ambiguity, the written judgment of conviction and the conditions of extended supervision are crystal clear with respect to what conduct the conditions cover. See Jackson v. Gray, 212 Wis. 2d 436,

State v. Lonnie C. Davis, 2005 WI App 98
For Davis: Pamela Moorshead

Issue/Holding:

¶24 Davis next contends that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences without an adequate explanation of why that was the minimum amount of time necessary.  We reject this claim.¶25      The trial court explained why the maximum term was required in this case.

…

¶26      … The court must provide an explanation for the general range of the sentence imposed,