On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Guy W. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25
For Colstad: T. Christopher Kelly

Issue/Holding: Although some United States Supreme Court cases seemingly assume that probable cause is required to support a stop for civil infractions, state precedent allows such a stop on reasonable suspicion, ¶12. The stop in this case is upheld:

¶14 The undisputed testimony demonstrates that the collision occurred on a straight road with “absolutely clear”

State v. James F. Brienzo, 2003 WI App 203, PFR filed 10/10/03
For Brienzo: Jerome F. Buting

Issue: Whether attempted sexual assault of a child (by intercourse), § 948.02(2), is a crime known to law, in that the offense lacks an intent element and any crime of intent, § 939.32, requires specific intent for the completed act.

Holding: Sexual contact explicitly requires “intentional touching,” and therefore supports a charge of attempted assault by contact, 

State v. Evan Zimmerman, 2003 WI App 196, (AG) PFR filed 9/10/03
For Zimmerman: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding: Although “most of the persuasive evidence against” Zimmerman was his own statements and alibi; and although a conviction may not be based solely on a negative inference drawn from the defendant’s own version, other evidence sufficiently supported the conviction, including: “evidence of his obsessive behavior,

State v. Theodore J. Krawczyk, 2003 WI App 6, PFR filed 1/21/03
For Krawczyk: John T. Wasielewski

Issue/Holding:

¶25. Krawczyk next argues that he was incorrectly charged as “a party to the crime” of felony murder and that this error also rendered his plea to that offense unknowing. We agree with Krawczyk that the State did not need to include the party-to-a-crime allegation in the felony murder charge.

State v. Anthony M. Cotton, 2003 WI App 154
For Cotton: Timothy T. Kay

Issue/Holding:

¶19. Following the preliminary hearing and bindover, the State filed an information containing new charges pertaining to Cotton’s encounter with Paikowski-one count of battery or threat of battery to Paikowski and a further similar count regarding Paikowski’s family pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.201(2)(a) and (b). These charges require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant caused or threatened to cause bodily harm to the victim or victim’s family,

State v. Timothy T. Clark, 2003 WI App 121
For Clark: Rodney Cubbie

Issue/Holding: Police tow of an automobile for “safekeeping,” even though “none of the typical public safety concerns illustrated by Opperman are at issue,” but rather on the ground that the vehicle was unlocked and therefore potentially at risk of theft, was unreasonable because effective alternatives to police seizure were available:

¶21.

State v. Scott Michael Harwood, 2003 WI App 215
For Harwood: Pat J. Schott, Margaret G. Zickuhr

Issue: Whether warrantless entry was supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances, as required by State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶17, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621, based upon a tenant’s reporting a break-in at another apartment within the complex.

Holding1 (probable cause):

¶15.

Meriter Hospital v. Dane County, 2003 WI App 248, affirmed, 2004 WI 145

Issue: Whether issuance of an “apprehension request” for alleged parole violation, following dismissal of pending charges upon jail inmate’s transfer to a hospital for treatment, leaves the person in “custody.”

Holding:

… We recently decided that a person did not have criminal status while hospitalized once a trial court stays confinement.

State v. Rick L. Edwards, 2003 WI App 221, PFR filed 10/24/03
For Edwards: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: A probationer whose order of jail confinement has been stayed during a period of hospitalization is not in custody for § 946.42 purposes and therefore may not be charged with escape for leaving the hospital and failing to return to jail. ¶21, and distinguishing,

State v. Michael J. Forster, 2003 WI App 29, PFR filed 1/31/03
For Forster: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether designation of “breast,” in § 939.22(19), applies to males as well females, so that touching of a male breast may constitute sexual assault.

Holding: The statute plainly applies to the “intimate parts,” including “chest,” “of a human being,” and therefore applies to both genders.