On Point blog, page 15 of 214
Mandatory minimum for OWI trumps SAP early release requirement
State v. Jack B. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81; case activity (including briefs)
If an inmate serving the initial confinement (IC) portion of a bifurcated sentence completes the Substance Abuse Program (SAP), § 302.05(3)(c)2. mandates that the sentencing court “shall” modify the inmate’s sentence by converting the remaining period of IC to extended supervision (ES) so that the inmate is released from confinement to ES. The court of appeals holds this mandate doesn’t apply to an inmate who is serving a mandatory minimum term of IC for an OWI offense if the inmate hasn’t yet served the mandatory minimum term.
“Marsy’s Law” gives a crime victim standing to get involved in Shiffra-Green litigation
State & T.A.J. v. Alan S. Johnson, 2020 WI App 73, petition to review granted, 2/26/21; case activity (including briefs)
This is the first of what will likely be a series of appellate court decisions that re-make criminal litigation in light of “Marsy’s Law,” the recently-passed crime victims’ rights amendment to Article I, § 9m, of the Wisconsin constitution.
October 2020 publication list
On October 29, 2020, the court of appeals ordered the publication of the following criminal law related opinions:
Defense win: Voluntary statement obtained in violation of Miranda can’t be used in state’s case-in-chief. Period.
State v. Manuel Garcia, 2020 WI App 71, petition to review granted, 1/20/21, affirmed by an evenly divided court, 2021 WI 76; case activity (including briefs)
Even if a court suppresses a defendant’s voluntary statement because it was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the state may use the statement to impeach the defendant if he or she elects to testify. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). The issue in this case is whether this “impeachment exception” allows the state to use the defendant’s statement to “rehabilitate” one of its witnesses. The court of appeals holds it does not: the state may use an illegally obtained statement only to impeach the defendant’s testimony.
September 2020 publication list
On September 30, 2020, the court of appeals ordered publication of the following criminal law related decisions:
Error in the “Informing the Accused” form doesn’t help drivers accused of OWI
State v. Scott W. Heimbruch, 2020 WI App 68; case activity (including briefs)
When an officer arrests a driver either for OWI or for causing death or great bodily harm without suspicion of OWI and requests a chemical test, he must read the driver the legislatively prescribed “Informing the Accused” form. See §343.305(3) and (4). The form describes the potential penalties the driver faces for refusing the chemical test. In 2017, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared that the form’s information for drivers accused of causing death or great bodily harm without suspicion OWI was inaccurate. See State v. Blackman, 2017 WI 77, ¶¶5, 38, 377 Wis. 2d 339, 898 N.W.2d 774. Unfortunately, the legislature has never bothered to change the form.
COA upholds severe restrictions on internet use during supervised release
State v. Peter J. King, 2020 WI App 66; case activity (including briefs)
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S Ct. 1730 (2017) struck down a law making it a felony for a registered sex offender to use any social networking site that permits minors to become members or to create personal web page. The statute was so broad that it violated the 1st Amendment. See our post here. In this case, the court of appeals holds that Packingham’s reasoning does not apply to court-ordered conditions of extended supervision that sharply restrict a defendant’s access to the internet.
August 2020 publication list
On August 31, 2020, the court of appeals ordered publication of the following criminal law related cases:
COA holds overdose aider immunity didn’t apply the day after 911 call
State v. Nathaniel R. Lecker, 2020 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)
The application of a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law. This is an incontrovertible maxim of appellate review. “Question of law” sounds so august and erudite and specialized, doesn’t it? A question of law is a question into which an astute lawyer–or judge–would have special insight; he or she could be trusted to come to the right–or at least a particularly sound–answer to such a question. But sometimes statutes are written in very ordinary terms with no particular resonance, and no special definition, in the legal world. And sometimes these ordinary terms are also rather elastic–or relative. In those instances, can the answer to a “question of law” be something other than a standardless, “know it when I see it” exercise of arbitrary will?
What do Stalin, Wisconsin, and the Slenderman case have in common?
State v. Morgan E. Geyser, 2020 WI App 58; case activity (including briefs)
Morgan Geyser, one of the two 12 year old defendants in the Slenderman case, was charged in adult court with attempted 1st degree intentional homicide. At her preliminary hearing, the court found probable cause that she committed a crime for which it had exclusive jurisdiction. On appeal, Geyser argued that the adult court had found the facts necessary to mitigate attempted 1st degree homicide to attempted 2nd degree homicide and thus it lost jurisdiction. She also argued that her custodial statements to police should have been suppressed because her Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The court of appeals rejected both arguments.