On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Russell L. Dibble, 2002 WI App 219, PFR filed 8/14/02
For Dibble: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: First-degree recklessly endangering safety, § 941.30(1), is not a lesser included offense of aggravated battery, § 940.19(5), under the “elements-only” test. Aggravated battery requires intent (to cause great bodily harm); endangering safety requires recklessness (while showing utter disregard for human life). It is this last —

State v. Alan C. Campbell, 2002 WI App 20, PFR filed 1/16/02
For Campbell: Alexander D. Cossi

Issue: Whether Campbell’s conviction for forgery in another state is regarded as a felony for purposes of felon in possession, § 941.29.

Holding:

¶6. We agree with Campbell that the Ohio forgery statute is broader than Wisconsin’s, and that looking solely at the language of the Ohio statute would be insufficient to prove that Campbell was guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon.

State v. Russell L. Dibble, 2002 WI App 219, PFR filed 8/14/02
For Dibble: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: First-degree recklessly endangering safety, § 941.30(1), is not a lesser included offense of aggravated battery, § 940.19(5), under the “elements-only” test. Aggravated battery requires intent (to cause great bodily harm); endangering safety requires recklessness (while showing utter disregard for human life). It is this last —

State v. Dale H. Chu, 2002 WI App, PFR filed 4/23/02
For Chu: Andrew Shaw

Issue/Holding: Evidence held sufficient, despite disagreement of experts on how fire was started; the jury was required to determine whether defendant intentionally started the fire, not specifically how it was set.

¶44      Chu may instead be arguing that the verdicts should be overturned because the State’s experts could not agree on the precise method of starting the fire,

State v. Mark S. Mielke, 2002 WI App 251, PFR filed 10/3/02
For Mielke: David J. Van Lieshout

Issue/Holding: Warrantless entry of a residence by the police, to investigate a domestic violence report concededly providing probable cause, was supported by exigent circumstances where the police could reasonably conclude that the safety of the reported victim was being compromised.

This terse little opinion (4+ pp) bids to do for DV cases what California v.

State v. Dennis Lee Londo , State v. Richard John Vernon, 2002 WI App 89, PFR filed 4/2/02
For Londo: Michael B. Plaisted
For Vernon: Dennis P. Coffey, Seth P. Hartigan

Issue: Whether the police were justified in warrantless entry and search of a residence, during which they seized contraband, in order to investigate a reported burglary.

Holding: The police had probable cause,

State v. Todd W. Timblin, 2002 WI App 304
For Timblin: Alex Flynn

Issue: Whether agency necessarily becomes an element of theft by fraud, § 943.20(1)(d), when the defendant obtains the property through an intermediary.

Holding: The intermediary must actually be an agent before an agency relationship is necessary to state’s proof. Where, as here, the intermediary acted as a mere “conduit” for delivering money between defrauded victims and defendant —

State v. Kelley L. Hauk, 2002 WI App 226
For Hauk: David D. Cook

Issue/Holding: State need not charge defendant with both bail jumping and underlying crime in order to obtain conviction for bail jumping (i.e., violating bond by committing crime). ¶¶14-18.

¶19 We therefore conclude that as long as there is evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant intentionally violated his or her bond by committing a crime,

State v. Joseph M. Espinoza, 2002 WI App 51, subsequently overruled by State v. Brent R. Reed, 2005 WI 53
For Espinoza: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether a suspect’s mere denial of guilt of the crime under investigation may in and of itself establish probable cause for the separate crime of obstructing, § 946.41(1).

Holding:

¶20.

State v. Paul Venema, 2002 WI App 202
For Venema: Randall R. Garczynski

Issue/Holding:

¶20 We reject Venema’s argument that a contract has to be in existence in order for a violation to occur under Wis. Stat. § 946.13(1)(a). Such an interpretation is undermined by the plain meaning of the statutory language. The common meaning of “negotiate” is to “communicate with another party for the purpose of reaching an understanding[.]”