On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Tyrone Price, 231 Wis.2d 229, 604 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Price: James L. Fullin, Jr., SPD, Madison Appellate.

Issue: Whether confinement time spent on parole holds qualifies as “actual confinement serving a criminal sentence” thereby extending the five-year period for a prior, qualifying sentence-enhancement conviction under § 939.62(2).

Holding: Time spent under parole hold qualifies as time spent under a criminal sentence within the meaning of the repeater act:

¶13 Since the expansion of the five-year period is at issue in this case,

State v. Lisa A. Carter, 229 Wis. 2d 200, 598 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Carter: Paul G. LaZotte

Holding: Hit-and-run, § 346.67, applies to “premises held out to the public for use of their motor vehicles.” The event occurred at a closed gas station; the court holds the element satisfied: ” … The premises is bordered by two city streets and abuts an alley in the rear.

State v. Jack E. Thurk, 224 Wis.2d 662, 592 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Thurk: Christopher A. Mutschler

Holding: Following a vehicular homicide the culpable driver voluntarily accompanied an officer to the station and submitted to a chemical blood test. He seeks suppression, on the ground that he was denied a request for a breathalyzer as an alternate test. The COA rejects the argument, holding that he had no right to the alternate test because he wasn’t under arrest.

State v. Jamerrel Everett, 231 Wis.2d 616, 605 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Everett: Timothy T. Kay; Michael Patrick Cotter

Issue: Whether the prosecution constituted double jeopardy because the defendant had been disciplined for the same conduct by the juvenile institution.

Holding: Although prison discipline may carry punitive aspects, its principal purposes are institutional order and rehabilitation, State v. Fonder, 162 Wis.

State v. Roger L. Warren, 229 Wis. 2d 172, 599 N.W.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Warren: Daniel F. Snyder

Holding: Warren’s perjured testimony at a single hearing dealing with a single general subject supports multiple perjury counts, because each charge dealt with different perjured details and is therefore “different in fact” if not law. In other words, “different evidence is required to establish that Warren responded falsely to the questions upon which”

State v. John J. Thoms, 228 Wis. 2d 868, 599 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Thoms: Steven L. Miller

Issue/Holding: The court reverses a persistent repeater sentence, § 939.62(2m). Thoms was originally charged in the complaint with the standard 10-year sentence enhancement, § 939.62(1)(c)&(2), based on a prior felony theft conviction. However, the information changed the enhancement allegation to persistent offender, § 939.62(2m) – life without parole.

State v. Andres DelReal, 225 Wis.2d 565, 593 N.W.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1999)
For DelReal: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Holding: The defense was denied exculpatory evidence when a detective testified that the defendant had not been swabbed for gunshot residue when in fact he had, with negative results.

State v. Dawn C. Moline, 229 Wis. 2d 38, 598 N.W.2d 929 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Moline: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate.

Issue/Holding:

By this decision, we hold that a prior conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia pursuant to § 961.573, STATS., qualifies as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender statute, § 961.48(3), STATS. … The statute is meant to include all prior convictions,

State v. Lisa A. Carter, 229 Wis. 2d 200, 598 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Carter: Paul G. LaZotte.

Issue/Holding: The jail assessment in §§ 302.46(1) & 814.60(2)(ag) is contingent on imposition of a fine or forfeiture.

Section 814.60(2)(ag), STATS., provides that “[i]n addition to any fine imposed, a defendant shall be required to pay any … [j]ail assessment imposed by s. 302.46(1).”  Section 302.46(1), 

State v. Daniel E. Rohe, 230 Wis.2d 294, 602 N.W.2d 125 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Rohe: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate.

Issue: Whether costs for a sexual assault examination were properly taxable, where the examination neither produced any results nor was used at trial.

Holding: Because the examination was part of the state’s investigation and prosecution; and because the examiners were on the state’s witness list,