On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Michael Wilson, 229 Wis.2d 256, 600 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Wilson: Martha A. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate.

Issue/Holding:

Ison lacked probable cause to arrest Wilson when he refused to allow Wilson to use the bathroom because at that time, Ison could not identify Wilson as the source of the marijuana odor emanating from the basement. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently held that “the odor of a controlled substance provides probable cause to arrest when the odor is unmistakable and may be linked to a specific person or persons because of the circumstances in which the odor is discovered or because other evidence links the odor to the person or persons.”State v.

State v. Mata, 230 Wis.2d 567, 602 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Mata: Daniel P. Murray.

Issue: Whether the police had probable cause to search the passenger of a stopped car, based on the odor of “raw” marijuana.

Holding: The odor of marijuana was sufficiently linked to the passenger to justify the search.

The police stopped a car because it didn’t have a front plate.

State v. Michael Wilson, 229 Wis.2d 256, 600 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Wilson: Martha A. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate.

Holding: After unlawfully intruding on a home’s curtilage and smelling marijuana burning inside the home, an officer approached Wilson and wouldn’t let him go to the bathroom without first patting him down. This, the court says, amounted to an arrest under State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437,

State v. Michael Wilson, 229 Wis.2d 256, 600 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Wilson: Martha A. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate.

Holding: Consent to search was mere acquiescence and therefore involuntary. (“Depriving a defendant of necessities is an indicia that consent is involuntary.”)

State v. Ronald L. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542, 602 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Monarch: Craig S. Lambert

Issue: Whether a charge of § 948.22(2) nonsupport based on arrearages accrued more than six years prior to the charge is barred by the statute of limitations

Holding:: The crime of nonsupport is complete after each 120-day period of intentional failure to pay, including arrearages as well as current obligations,

State v. Crystal Harrell a/k/a Parker, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996)

Issue/Holding:

Although Parker encourages us to provide an objective standard of review for the initial subjective decision by a judge not to disqualify himself or herself, we decline to do so. Wisconsin Statute § 757.19(2)(g) is clearly drafted so as to place the determination of partiality solely upon the judge.

State v. Mark Inglin, 224 Wis.2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Inglin: Stephen M. Glynn & Robert R. Henak

Holding: Inglin argues denial of right to offer an affirmative defense to § 948.31(1)(b), namely that his actions were necessary to prevent mental harm to the child. Although his argument “present[s] an intriguing due process theory based on the interplay of § 948.04(2), Stats., and 948.31(4)(a), Stats.

State v. Mark Inglin, 224 Wis.2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Inglin: Stephen M. Glynn & Robert R. Henak

Holding: § 948.31(1)(b) penalizes several different actus reus alternatives, including taking a child away, or withholding a child more than 12 hours beyond court approval. Inglin had his ex-wife’s consent to take their child on a camping trip to Colorado. He deceived her, though, and fled with the child to Canada.

State v. Dawn C. Moline, 229 Wis. 2d 38, 598 N.W.2d 929 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Moline: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether prior conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia, § 961.573, qualifies the offender as a repeat drug offender,  § 961.48(3).

Holding:

By this decision, we hold that a prior conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia pursuant to § 961.573, STATS., qualifies as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender statute,

State v. Jonathan V. Manke, 230 Wis.2d 421, 602 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Manke: Waring R. Fincke

Issue/Holding: After a plea-based sentence has been vacated, and re-sentencing ordered, the “fair and just reason” standard applies to a motion to withdraw the plea:

Before considering if Manke met his burden of proof, our initial determination must be which is the correct standard to apply when evaluating his plea withdrawal motion.