On Point blog, page 35 of 214
Mandatory DNA surcharge for certain misdemeanors violates ex post facto prohibition
State v. Garett T. Elward, 2015 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)
Defendants who committed a misdemeanor offense before April 1, 2015 January 1, 2014, cannot be made to pay the mandatory $200 DNA surcharge that is supposed to be imposed for each misdemeanor conviction beginning January 1, 2014, because imposition of the surcharge on that class of defendants violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. [See UPDATE below regarding the date change.]
Statute authorizing hearsay at prelims doesn’t violate ex post facto prohibition
State v. David E. Hull, 2015 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)
The recently enacted statute allowing the admission of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it affects only the evidence that may be admitted at the preliminary hearing and does not alter the quantum or nature of evidence necessary to convict the defendant. In addition, the court commissioner properly refused to allow Hull to call the alleged victim to testify at the preliminary hearing because the anticipated testimony was not relevant to the probable cause inquiry.
Court of appeals reverses suppression order; misapplies “inevitable discovery” doctrine
State v. Mastella L. Jackson, 2015 WI App 49, petition for review granted, 10/8/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 56; click here for briefs
This decision is SCOW bait. Police in Outagamie County engaged in what the court of appeals called “reprehensible” actions while interrogating the defendant. “Outraged” the circuit court suppressed the defendant’s statements to police and the physical evidence obtained during the search of her home. The court of appeals reversed the suppression of physical evidence on the theory that the untainted evidence described in the officers’ search warrant established probable cause and that the physical evidence was admissible via the inevitable discovery doctrine.
Wisconsin’s standards for determining competency for self-representation are constitutional
State v. Andrew L. Jackson, 2015 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)
The standard established under State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), for determining a defendant’s competency to represent himself does not violate Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), the court of appeals holds. The court also affirms the circuit court’s conclusions that Jackson didn’t validly waive his right to counsel and wasn’t competent to represent himself.
Trial counsel found ineffective; promised defendant would testify, told jury about defendant’s sordid past, failed to elicit impeachment evidence
State v. James Richard Coleman, 2015 WI App 38; case activity (including briefs)
Coleman’s trial lawyer was ineffective for telling the jury Coleman would testify when Coleman had never said he intended to testify; for telling the jury that Coleman had a prior criminal conviction; and for failing to impeach the victim’s allegations by eliciting inconsistent statements she made to other witnesses.
Third trial not a charm
State v. Tyron James Powell, 2014AP1053-CR, District 1, 3/24/15 (not recommended for publication); click here for docket and briefs
After obtaining two mistrials, Powell probably thought he’d get lucky the third time around. Instead, he got a conviction followed by a court of appeals decision that rejected his arguments on impeachment evidence, on the admission of his prior convictions and on his trial lawyer’s ineffectiveness for failing to file a suppression motion.
Misleading jury instruction regarding “computerized communication system” under § 948.075 requires new trial
State v. Rory A. McKellips, 2015 WI App 31, petition for review granted 11/16/15, reversed, 2016 WI 51; case activity (including briefs)
McKellips is entitled to a new trial on charges he used a computer to facilitate a child sex crime because the jury was erroneously instructed to decide whether McKellips’s cell phone constituted a “computerized communication system,” when it should have been instructed to decide whether McKellips’s uses of the phone constituted communication via a “computerized communication system.”
Prostitute has “reasonable expectation of privacy” too
State v. Charles W. Adams, 2015 WI App 34; click here for docket and briefs.
§ 942.09(2)(am)1 prohibits recording someone in the nude, without the person’s consent, in circumstances where the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and where the recorder had reason to know that the nude person did not consent to the recording. This case holds that the statute protects a prostitute who is videotaped nude during commercial sexual activity.
Medical examiner’s reliance on toxicology report of out-of-state lab violated defendant’s right to confrontation
State v. Jason S. VanDyke, 2015 WI App 30; case activity (including briefs)
In this prosecution for reckless homicide by delivery of heroin, VanDyke’s right to confrontation was violated where the medical examiner relied on the toxicology report of an out-of-state drug testing lab to conclude the victim had died of a heroin overdose, the toxicology report was admitted into evidence as part of the autopsy report, but no witness from the lab was called to testify about the toxicology testing.
Leaving messages with foster parents does not qualify as “communicating with a child” under TPR statute
Dane County DHS v. Hershula B., 2014AP2076, 2/26/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket
Hershula appealed an order terminating her parental rights. She argued that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the abandonment issue because she presented evidence that she had communicated indirectly with her child. The court of appeals held that the phrase “communicate with the child” requires that the child share in the action of communicating with the parent. Slip op. ¶22. Indirect communications don’t count.