On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Nelson Luis Fortes, 2015 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)

A “misunderstanding” about what sentence the state could recommend under the plea agreement did not entitle Fortes to plea withdrawal or resentencing because after the misunderstanding became evident at the sentencing hearing, Fortes elected to proceed rather than seek an adjournment with a possible eye toward plea withdrawal.

State v. Miranda K. Hinderman, 2014AP1787-CR, 2/12/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); click here for briefs

Just because police had grounds to arrest Hinderman for OWI didn’t mean that they also had reason to believe that evidence relating to the OWI might be found in a 3″x3″ pouch inside her purse, inside her car, where they happened to find marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

State v. Michael W. Crute, 2015 WI App 15; case activity

An administrative rule (§ Adm 2.14(2)(vm)(intro.) and 5.) requires a permit for any rally, meeting, or similar event held in a state building, and persons participating in an unpermitted event can be ticketed for “unlawful assembly.” But the rule did not contain a minimum group size, so it covered unpermitted events undertaken by as few as one person. The court of appeals holds the rule is not a valid time, place, and manner regulation under the First Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. It also rejects the state’s attempt to save the rule by construing it to apply only to groups over 20 persons.

State v. Bobbie Tanta Bowen, 2015 WI App 12; case activity

Bowen was found guilty of bail jumping for violating the provision of his bail that he have no contact with F.B., the victim of an earlier battery charge, or F.B.’s residence. The court of appeals holds that the trial evidence—which showed Bowen went into F.B.’s residence but had no direct contact with F.B. while he was inside—was sufficient to support the verdict because the bond condition “that [Bowen] not have contact with F.B.” did not require proof that Bowen directly communicated with F.B.

State v. Brett W. Dumstrey, 2015 WI App 5, petition for review granted 3/16/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 3; case activity

The court of appeals holds that the warrantless, nonconsensual entry by police into Dumstrey’s apartment complex parking garage was not unreasonable because the area was not part of the curtilage of Dumstrey’s home. The court also holds that any trespass by the police didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment because the garage wasn’t a constitutionally protected area. But a dissenting judge concludes prior Wisconsin case law establishes the garage was part of the curtilage and that the police conduct was unreasonable.

State v. Tahj E. Kitt, 2015 WI App 9; case activity

“When a convicted offender has put sentence credit at issue, the court—not the clerk—must make and explain the decision on how much sentence credit is to be awarded.” (¶2).

State v. Jordan John Samsa, 2015 WI App 6; case activity

The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in using the criminogenic needs section of the COMPAS assessment report, which identifies areas in which the offender needs correctional or community intervention, as an indicator of Samsa’s danger to the community.

State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2015 WI App 4; case activity

A person committed as a sexually violent person under ch. 980 does not have a due process right to have the state prove at a discharge hearing that he is still a sexually violent person, so the clear and convincing evidence standard under § 980.09(3) is not facially unconstitutional.

Kenosha County v. Blaire A. Frett, 2014 WI App 127; case activity

State v. Melody P.M., 2009 AP2991 (WI App June 10, 2009), a 1-judge opinion, held that Wis. Stat. § 973.015 permits circuit courts to expunge civil forfeiture violations. Here, the court of appeals explicitly overrules  Melody P.M. and holds that civil forfeiture violations may not be expunged.

State v. Fernando Moreno-Acosta, 2014 WI App 122; case activity

While § 943.201(2) requires the state to prove the defendant used personal identifying information belonging to an actual person, it need not prove that the defendant knew the information belonged to another “real, actual person.”