On Point blog, page 36 of 215
Medical examiner’s reliance on toxicology report of out-of-state lab violated defendant’s right to confrontation
State v. Jason S. VanDyke, 2015 WI App 30; case activity (including briefs)
In this prosecution for reckless homicide by delivery of heroin, VanDyke’s right to confrontation was violated where the medical examiner relied on the toxicology report of an out-of-state drug testing lab to conclude the victim had died of a heroin overdose, the toxicology report was admitted into evidence as part of the autopsy report, but no witness from the lab was called to testify about the toxicology testing.
Leaving messages with foster parents does not qualify as “communicating with a child” under TPR statute
Dane County DHS v. Hershula B., 2014AP2076, 2/26/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket
Hershula appealed an order terminating her parental rights. She argued that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the abandonment issue because she presented evidence that she had communicated indirectly with her child. The court of appeals held that the phrase “communicate with the child” requires that the child share in the action of communicating with the parent. Slip op. ¶22. Indirect communications don’t count.
Proceeding to sentencing despite misunderstanding about plea agreement defeats claims for plea withdrawal, resentencing
State v. Nelson Luis Fortes, 2015 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)
A “misunderstanding” about what sentence the state could recommend under the plea agreement did not entitle Fortes to plea withdrawal or resentencing because after the misunderstanding became evident at the sentencing hearing, Fortes elected to proceed rather than seek an adjournment with a possible eye toward plea withdrawal.
Court of appeals affirms suppression; sees one-shot-sized container exception to Gant
State v. Miranda K. Hinderman, 2014AP1787-CR, 2/12/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); click here for briefs
Just because police had grounds to arrest Hinderman for OWI didn’t mean that they also had reason to believe that evidence relating to the OWI might be found in a 3″x3″ pouch inside her purse, inside her car, where they happened to find marijuana and drug paraphernalia.
Administrative rule requiring permits for events in state buildings regardless of group size violates First Amendment
State v. Michael W. Crute, 2015 WI App 15; case activity
An administrative rule (§ Adm 2.14(2)(vm)(intro.) and 5.) requires a permit for any rally, meeting, or similar event held in a state building, and persons participating in an unpermitted event can be ticketed for “unlawful assembly.” But the rule did not contain a minimum group size, so it covered unpermitted events undertaken by as few as one person. The court of appeals holds the rule is not a valid time, place, and manner regulation under the First Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. It also rejects the state’s attempt to save the rule by construing it to apply only to groups over 20 persons.
Violation of no-contact bail condition didn’t require proof defendant directly communicated with subject of no-contact order
State v. Bobbie Tanta Bowen, 2015 WI App 12; case activity
Bowen was found guilty of bail jumping for violating the provision of his bail that he have no contact with F.B., the victim of an earlier battery charge, or F.B.’s residence. The court of appeals holds that the trial evidence—which showed Bowen went into F.B.’s residence but had no direct contact with F.B. while he was inside—was sufficient to support the verdict because the bond condition “that [Bowen] not have contact with F.B.” did not require proof that Bowen directly communicated with F.B.
Unauthorized entry to apartment building’s secure parking garage didn’t violate Fourth Amendment
State v. Brett W. Dumstrey, 2015 WI App 5, petition for review granted 3/16/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 3; case activity
The court of appeals holds that the warrantless, nonconsensual entry by police into Dumstrey’s apartment complex parking garage was not unreasonable because the area was not part of the curtilage of Dumstrey’s home. The court also holds that any trespass by the police didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment because the garage wasn’t a constitutionally protected area. But a dissenting judge concludes prior Wisconsin case law establishes the garage was part of the curtilage and that the police conduct was unreasonable.
Judge—not clerk—makes sentence credit determination
State v. Tahj E. Kitt, 2015 WI App 9; case activity
“When a convicted offender has put sentence credit at issue, the court—not the clerk—must make and explain the decision on how much sentence credit is to be awarded.” (¶2).
Sentencing court didn’t err in its interpretation or application of COMPAS report
State v. Jordan John Samsa, 2015 WI App 6; case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in using the criminogenic needs section of the COMPAS assessment report, which identifies areas in which the offender needs correctional or community intervention, as an indicator of Samsa’s danger to the community.
Lower burden of proof at ch. 980 discharge trial doesn’t violate due process
State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2015 WI App 4; case activity
A person committed as a sexually violent person under ch. 980 does not have a due process right to have the state prove at a discharge hearing that he is still a sexually violent person, so the clear and convincing evidence standard under § 980.09(3) is not facially unconstitutional.