On Point blog, page 38 of 214
Court lost competency to issue harassment injunction
Tiffany Hill v. D.C., 2014 WI App 99; case activity
Because the plain language of § 813.125(3)(c) allows only one extension of a temporary restraining order, the circuit court lost competency to proceed when it extended the TRO twice.
Extended statute of limitation for theft runs from actual discovery, not from when theft should have been discovered
State v. Kim B. Simmelink, 2014 WI App 102; case activity
The court of appeals holds that § 939.74(2)(b)’s extended statute of limitation for certain theft charges runs from actual discovery of the theft, and not from when the theft should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
A “motor bicycle” is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of § 346.63(1)
State v. Thomas W. Koeppen, 2014 WI App 94; case activity
A “motor bicycle” is a bicycle with a motor added, and can be either pedaled or self-propelled using the motor, § 340.01(30). Whether a person can be charged under the OWI/PAC statute based on his operation of a motor bicycle depends on whether a motor bicycle is a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). The court of appeals concludes that a plain-language reading of the relevant statutes shows a motor bicycle is a motor vehicle, “at least when the motor bicycle being operated is self-propelled, rather than pedaled.” (¶1).
Retrograde extrapolation of blood alcohol concentration survives Daubert challenge
State v. Todd J. Giese, 2014 WI App 92; case activity
Expert testimony regarding retrograde extrapolation of Giese’s blood alcohol concentration is admissible under new version of § 907.02(1) despite the fact some experts doubt its reliability because it was the product of reliable principles and methods and based upon sufficient facts and data.
Minor may consent to recording of conversation under § 968.31’s one-party consent rule
State v. Price G. Turner, III, 2014 WI App 93; case activity
A minor does not as a matter of law lack the capacity to consent to police interception of the minor’s conversations with another person and therefore vicarious consent by a parent is not required.
Ch. 980 petition is timely as long as it’s filed before the person’s release or discharge from sentence
State v. Hershel R. Stanley, 2014 WI App 89; case activity
Even if DOC was required to release Stanley from prison on his presumptive mandatory release date instead of holding him to his maximum discharge date, the ch. 980 petition filed against him before his discharge date was timely because § 980.02(1m) permits filing a ch. 980 petition before a person is released or discharged from his sentence.
Rule prohibiting collateral attacks on prior judicial orders applies to administrative orders
State v. Vernon D. Hershberger, 2014 WI App 86; case activity
As a general rule, a person may not collaterally attack a prior judicial order or judgment in a proceeding brought to enforce that order or judgment, e.g., State v. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, ¶¶51-55, 294 Wis. 2d 100, 718 N.W.2d 649. The court of appeals holds this rule also applies to proceedings brought to enforce an administrative order.
Failure to preserve evidence rule from Youngblood applies even though defendant wasn’t notified of right to test evidence before it was destoyed
State v. Jessica M. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42; case activity
Saying it is bound by the rule from Youngblood v. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the court of appeals holds that the state’s destruction of a blood sample before the defendant was notified of her option to test the sample did not violate her due process rights because she has not shown the sample was “apparently exculpatory.” A vigorous dissent says the majority reads Youngblood too broadly, and concludes that because the evidence was inculpatory and necessary to the prosecution, destroying the evidence violated Weissinger’s due process rights even if the state didn’t act in bad faith.
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to comment on defendant’s silence or for telling jury defendant would testify
State v. Russell S. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80; case activity
In the first Wisconsin case to address how Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), affects the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence, the court of appeals reads Salinas to apply to a narrow factual scenario not present in this case. The court goes on to assume that trial counsel should have objected to testimony about Krancki’s silence, but finds his failure to object wasn’t prejudicial. The court also concludes trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for saying in his opening statement that Krancki would testify or for failing to exclude references to the .02 blood alcohol limit.
Lack of scienter requirement in statute prohibiting driving with a detectable amount of a controlled substance doesn’t violate due process
State v. Michael R. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42 (posts here and here); case activity
Section 346.63(1)(am), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, does not violate due process by failing to require proof that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance. In addition, Luedtke’s due process rights were not violated when the state crime lab destroyed his blood sample before he could have it independently tested.