On Point blog, page 39 of 214
Exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into apartment; officer’s earlier steps past the threshold “irrelevant”
State v. Cordarol M. Kirby, 2014 WI App 74; case activity
The court of appeals holds that “while exigent circumstances may justify entry, the fact that entry has already been made does not necessarily invalidate reliance on the exigent circumstances doctrine.” (¶22). Thus, because in this case there were exigent circumstances justifying police entry into an apartment to locate a backpack the police believed contained firearms, it “does not matter” that an officer had earlier stepped over the threshold of the apartment door to converse with people inside.
Implied consent law covering drivers not arrested for OWI is constitutional; defendant’s consent to blood draw was voluntary
State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity
The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.
Federal racketeering conviction counts as prior drug offense under § 961.41(3g)(c)
State v. Rogelio Guarnero, 2014 WI App 56, petition for review granted 11/14/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 72; case activity: 2013AP1753-CR; 2013AP1754-CR
Guarnero’s conviction for violating the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act was a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances,” and therefore qualified as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c), because the predicate acts of racketeering involved, among other things, controlled substance offenses.
State’s complaint need not precisely allege date of child sexual assault offenses
State v. Brian Kempainen, 2014 WI App 53, petition for review granted 9/18/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 32; case activity
In this case, the circuit court dismissed 2 counts of sexual assault of a child against Kempainen because the charges failed to provide sufficient notice of when the assaults occurred thus violating due process. The court of appeals, clarifying the test in State v. R.A.R. and State v. Fawcett, reversed and held that the date of the crimes need not be precisely alleged.
Good-faith exception to exclusionary rule means evidence from unlawful use of GPS device can be admitted
State v. Scott E. Oberst, 2014 WI App 58; case activity
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained during a period when binding Wisconsin appellate precedent permitted the warrantless installation of a global positioning system (GPS) device. Thus, even though the installation of the GPS device on the defendant’s vehicle was unconstitutional under United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), exclusion of the evidence obtained from the device is an inappropriate remedy.
Circuit court can’t order condition of supervision that restricts operating privileges in excess of the period set under § 343.30
State v. Jack E. Hoppe, 2014 WI App 51; case activity
A sentencing court may not prohibit a defendant convicted of OWI from driving a motor vehicle as a condition of extended supervision when the length of extended supervision exceeds the maximum period for revoking operating privileges set by § 343.30.
Circuit court properly denied plea withdrawal after it found witness recantations to be incredible and uncorroborated
State v. John Francis Ferguson, 2014 WI App 48; case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Ferguson’s plea withdrawal motion, which was based on recantations by two witnesses who had previously said Ferguson fatally shot a man. The circuit judge applied the proper standard under State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997), when it found the recantations were incredible as a matter of law and uncorroborated by other newly-discovered evidence, and its findings are not clearly erroneous.
Correct information about sentence credit constitutes a “new factor”
State v. Dennis R. Armstrong, 2014 WI App 59; case activity
The fact that Armstrong was entitled to eight months rather than approximately two years of sentence credit is a “new factor” because the information was unknowingly overlooked at sentencing and the amount of sentence credit was highly relevant to the circuit court’s imposition of the sentence:
¶13 At the sentencing hearing,
Court of Appeals clarifies prejudice standard for plea withdrawal motions under Padilla v. Kentucky
State v. Ivan Mendez, 2014 WI App 57; case activity
When Mendez pleaded guilty to maintaining a drug trafficking place his attorney failed to inform him that a conviction for charge would subject him to automatic deportation from the United States with no applicable exception and no possibility of discretionary waiver. Padilla v. Kentucky,
Statutory summary suspension from Illinois counts as prior conviction under § 343.307(1)
State v. Akil C. Jackson, 2014 WI App 50; case activity
Under State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213, Jackson’s statutory summary suspension in Illinois resulting from an OWI and PAC citation counts as a prior conviction under § 343.307(1) even though the citation was eventually dismissed.
Carter considered whether a prior suspension of operating privileges under the Illinois “zero tolerance” law should be counted as a prior conviction under § 343.307.