On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Jonathan A. Herr, 2013 WI App 37; case activity

In a case arising from a high-speed chase and subsequent arrest for OWI, the court holds that the use of unreasonable force to arrest the defendant does not require the suppression of evidence that was not a product of, or causally related to, the alleged unreasonable force.

Police saw Herr driving erratically and attempted to stop him.

State v. Edward C. Lefler, 2013 WI App 22; case activity

Probable cause found to search trunk of vehicle for evidence of burglary-related crimes, after an indisputably lawful stop for drunk driving:

¶11      …  “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”  United States v.

Racine County v. Latanya D.K., 2013 WI App 28; case activity

TPR – Waiver of jury trial need not be part of admission colloquy

¶2        Latanya’s major arguments raise an important question:  Must the court engage in a personal colloquy with a parent regarding his or her waiver of the right to a jury trial before accepting the parent’s admission that grounds for termination of parental rights exist?

Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, petition for review granted 6/12/13, sub. nom. Appling v. Walker; case activity

Wisconsin’s domestic partnership law upheld against challenge it violates 2006 “marriage amendment” to the state constitution (art. XIII, § 13), declaring that the only marriage recognized in Wisconsin is one “between one man and one woman” and prohibiting same-sex couples entering into a “legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage.”

¶2        In 2009,

State v. Melvin Pugh, 2013 WI App 12; case activity

Two officers on patrol saw Pugh near two cars parked next to a vacant, boarded-up building posted with a “no parking” sign. This caused the officers to question Pugh—legitimately—about his possible illegal parking, but during that questioning the police also started asking about a nearby drug house and ended up physically seizing Pugh by grabbing his wrists when he slowly backed away.

State v. Mark A. Sanders, 2013 WI App 4; case activity

Search incident to arrest — area within arrestee’s “immediate control”

Search of bed in room from which defendant emerged just before being arrested upheld under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which permits an arresting officer to search the person arrested and the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control” in order to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime and protect officers’ safety.

State v. Shawn David Schulpius, 2012 WI App 134; court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); case activity

SVP Discharge Hearing – Showing Required, § 980.09(2) 

Before granting discharge hearing on a ch. 980 petition, the circuit court must satisfy itself that the petition answers two concerns: First, under § 980.09(1) “paper-review” determination, the petition alleges sufficient facts to show that the petitioner no longer satisfies commitment criteria.

State v. Tony J. Lalicata, 2012 WI App 138 (recommended for publication); case activity

Probation is not an available disposition under § 948.02(1)(b) (child sexual assault). By mandating that “the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence” with a confinement portion of at least 25 years for that offense, § 939.616 forecloses the possibility of probation:

¶14      …  We conclude instead that § 939.616(1r) unambiguously prohibits probation,

State v. Calvin L. Brown, 2012 WI 139 (recommended for publication); case activity

A guilty plea colloquy need not include an explanation of ptac liability when the defendant directly committed the crime:

¶13      …  Although the trial court did not explain that, by directly committing the La Quinta robbery, Brown was “concerned” in its commission as defined by the party to a crime statute,

State v. Joshua A. Prescott, 2012 WI App 136; case activity

Felon-in-possession, § 941.29, was properly joined for trial with reckless injury by use of dangerous weapon:

¶17      Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the charges were properly joined. The felon in possession and reckless injury charges were “based on the same act or transaction.” See Wis.