On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Brandon M. Melton, 2012 WI App 95, WSC review granted 11/14/12(recommended for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; case activity

Under “unique facts,” the circuit court possessed inherent authority to order destruction of a PSI: the PSI contained uncharged offenses irrelevant to sentencing whose inclusion was improper under DOC rules; and, though sealed, it coexisted with a second PSI in the court file:

¶22      The circuit court did not articulate any public policy reasons for rejecting Melton’s request to destroy the entire PSI report,

State v. Richard Lavon Deadwiller, 2012 WI App 89, supreme court review granted 1/14/13; affirmed, 2013 WI 75; case activity

A report from an “outside” lab (Orchid Cellmark) relied on by a State Crime Lab technician for “investigative” purposes in developing a DNA match between defendant and assailant wasn’t “testimonial,” therefore didn’t violate confrontation:

¶1        Richard Deadwiller appeals the judgments entered on jury verdicts convicting him of two counts of second-degree sexual assault with the use of force.  

David R. Turnpaugh v. State of Wisconsin Claims Board, 2012 WI App 72; case activity

Turnpaugh, whose conviction for soliciting was overturned when the court of appeals concluded that it was unsupported by any evidence, State v. Turnpaugh, 2007 WI App 222, 305 Wis. 2d 722, 741 N.W.2d 488, petitioned for compensation on the basis of innocence, § 775.05. The Claims Board denied the petition on two grounds: he had failed to prove his innocence;

State v. Willie H. Jackson, 2012 WI App 76 (recommended for publication); case activity

§ 973.048(1m) (2003-04) authorizes the sentencing court to require sex offender registration under § 301.45 for conviction of enumerated crimes, “if the court determines that the underlying conduct was sexually motivated as defined in s. 980.01(5)” and public protection would be advanced thereby. (“Sexually motivated,” as might be imagined, means that “sexual arousal or gratification”

State v. Nathan J. Meinhardt, 2012 WI App 82 (recommended for publication); case activity

Amendments to § 973.015(1)(a) (2009-10), which expanded the offender’s age-ceiling and the eligible pool of offenses, doesn’t apply retroactively.

¶3        The determinative issue in this case is whether the circuit court has the authority to apply the amended version of Wis. Stat.§ 973.015(1)(a) retroactively to Meinhardt’s case.  The question of whether a statute can be applied retroactively is a question of law which this court reviews de novo.  

State v. Michael D. Carroll, 2012 WI App 83 (recommended for publication); case activity

Repeal of ability to earn “positive adjustment time” wasn’t highly relevant to Carroll’s sentence, therefore didn’t constitute a new factor that could support sentence modification.

¶9        Because 2011 Wis. Act 38 did not become effective until more than a year after Carroll’s sentencing hearing, it is obvious that the sentencing judge could not have known about the repeal at the time of sentencing.  

State v. Jerred Renard Washington / Jerred Renard Washington v. State, 2012 WI App 74 (recommended for publication); case activity (974.06); case activity (writ)

Habeas (Knight Petition) – Laches 

Following his plea-based conviction in 1997, Washington’s retained counsel filed a postconviction 809.30 motion in 1998. Counsel did not file a notice of appeal, however, after the motion was denied. Then, in 2009,

State v. Joel Joseph Lobermeier, 2012 WI App 77 (recommended for publication); for Lobermeier: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Appellate Procedure – Waiver – Jury Instructions 

Failure to object to a jury instruction amounts to a failure to preserve for review an asserted objection, which must therefore be reviewed in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nonetheless, failure to object to a “material variance”

State v. Wayne P. Harris, 2012 wI App 79(recommended for publication); for Harris:  Attorney Gary Grass; case activity

We know that “[a] defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information.”  See State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1  But what happens when the sentencing court relies upon a DOC-prepared revocation summary that is “technically true but misleading” or that is “written in a way that that invite[s] the court to draw negative inferences”? 

State v. Laurence W. Tucker, 2012 WI App 67 (recommended for publication); for Tucker: Robert T. Ruth; case activity

Tucker pleaded guilty pursuant to plea bargain, which terms included continuation of his release on bond and compliance with same. After Tucker failed to appear at sentencing, necessitating his arrest on a bench warrant and issuance of a new charge of bail jumping, the State informed counsel it was no longer bound by the agreement,