On Point blog, page 58 of 216
Statute of Limitations: Attempted first-Degree Intentional Homicide
State v. Rodney A. Larson, 2011 WI App 106 (recommended for publication); for Larson: Chris Gramstrup; case activity
Prosecution for attempt rather than completed crime, §939.32, comes within the general limitation period in § 939.74(1). Therefore, although prosecution for homicide may be commenced at any time, § 939.74(2)(a), Larson’s prosecution for attempted first-degree intentional homicide had to be commenced within 6 years, and must be dismissed as untimely.
Parole: Mootness Doctrine, rel. to Deferment – Review of Deferment, Risk-Determination
Harlan Richards v. Graham, 2011 WI App 100(recommended for publication); for Richards: Kendall W. Harrison, Jennifer L. Gregor; case activity
Mootness Doctrine
Challenge to Parole Commission decision to increase deferment period from 10 to 12 months, and to Program Review Committee decision to increase security status, not rendered moot by subsequent parole and program hearings.
¶11 An issue is moot when a party seeks a determination that will have no practical effect on an existing legal controversy.
Search & Seizure: Consent to Search: Co-Occupant – Warrantless Entry: Probable Cause & Exigent Circumstances
State v. Deundra R. Lathan, 2011 WI App 104 (recommended for publication); for Lathan: George S. Tauscheck; case activity
Consent to Search, Co-Occupant
Consent to search premises given by one occupant overrides refusal to consent by co-occupant when neither is the subject of the search or ensuing arrest (resolving question expressly held open by Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 n.
Sex Offender Registration: Out-of-State Convictions – “Misdemeanor Treatment,” § 301.45(6)(a)2
State v. Yancy D. Freland, 2011 WI App 80 (recommended for publication); for Freland: Michael D. Zell; case activity
Conviction for an out-of-state sex offense comparable to a misdemeanor in Wisconsin will be treated as a misdemeanor for sex offender registration purposes, § 301.45(6).
¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1d)(am)1. specifically defines has been “[f]ound to have committed a sex offense by another jurisdiction” to include a person who has been convicted “for a violation of a law of another state that is comparable to a sex offense.”[7] Taken as a whole,
Statutes: Retroactive Application
Rock Tenn Company v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, 2011 WI App 93 (recommended for publication); case activity
A worker’s compensation provision authorizing payment “for any future treatment” enacted after a work-related injury was incurred is remedial in nature and therefore can “be retroactively applied to award prospective treatment expenses.”
¶13 We reject Rock Tenn’s argument and conclude that LIRC reasonably held that Wis.
Reasonable Suspicion, Terry Stop: High-Crime Area, Ski Mask, et al.; Appellate Procedure: State’s Waiver of Argument
State v. Deshon C. Matthews, 2011 WI App 92 (recommended for publication); for Matthews: Paul G. Bonneson; case activity
Terry Stop – Reasonable Suspicion
Reasonable suspicion supported stop of Matthews, when police on patrol saw him wearing a ski mask and hoodie late at night in a high-crime area near a woman who was walking away form him and who appeared to be frightened.
OWI Repeater: Proof, Prior “Conviction”; Appellate Procedure: Potential Sanction for Frivolous Argument
State v. Marilee Devries, 2011 WI App 78 (recommended for publication); for Devries: Matthew S. Pinix; case activity
OWI – Repeater – Proof, Prior “Conviction”
Certified copies of proceedings in foreign jurisdictions established adequate proof of prior OWI “connvictions,” § 343.307(1)(d).
¶9 When Wisconsin’s driving laws provide for the enhancement of penalties for a current offense based on prior offenses, the State must present “‘competent proof’” of those earlier offenses.
Escape, § 946.42(3): Proof – Elements
State v. Isaac Hughes, Sr., 2011 WI App 87 (recommended for publication); for Hughes: Benbow P. Cheesman, Jr.; case activity
Conviction for escape, § 946.42(3), may be sustained even if the jury never actually saw the judgment of conviction that landed the defendant in custody.
¶12 We agree with the trial court that, when considered in light of all the other evidence adduced at trial,
Restitution: Damages from Marijuana Grow Operation
State v. Michael S. Hoseman, 2011 WI App 88 (recommended for publication); for Hoseman: Timothy M. Johnson; case activity
Hoseman is liable in restitution for damages to a rented house caused by his marijuana manufacturing operation. Restitution requires that there be a “direct victim” of the crime and a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the claimed damages, ¶16. Both requirements are satisfied.
Direct victim:
¶23 The cases Hoseman relies upon are inapposite under the facts of this case;
Appellate Standard of Review: Video Recording
State v. Jeffrey D. Walli, 2011 WI App 86 (recommended for publication); for Walli: Chad A. Lanning; case activity
Trial court factual findings made from a combination of live testimony and video evidence are reviewed deferentially, under the “clearly erroneous” standard of review; the court rejects de novo review of the video recording. Here, it is a police squad video of a traffic stop, with the officer testifying (and the trial court finding) that Walli in fact crossed the center line,