On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Terion Lamar Robinson, 2009 WI App 97
For Robinson: Beth A. Eisendrath

Issue/Holding: Given the trial court finding that Robinson either lived or stayed at the apartment, the police were authorized to enter to effectuate his arrest under auspices of an arrest warrant:

¶16      In Blanco, the police, who had an arrest warrant for Blanco, entered an apartment where they believed Blanco was staying. 

State v. Jeremy D. Schladweiler, 2009 WI App 177
Pro se

Issue/Holding:

¶9        Commonly referred to as “boot camp,” the CIP is governed by Wis. Stat. § 302.045, which provides that “the [DOC] shall provide a challenge incarceration program for inmates selected to participate” after meeting the eligibility requirements for the program. Sec. 302.045(1). …

¶10      Once the trial court has made an eligibility determination,

State v. Michael A. Sveum, 2009 WI App 81, affirmed on other grounds, 2010 WI 92
For Sveum: Robert J. Kaiser, Jr.

Issue/Holding: A search warrant for seizure of the sorts of items Sveum used or kept in connection with a 1996 stalking conviction established probable cause he was keeping such items in 2003:

¶35      The warrant affidavit stated that the affiant was a detective with twenty-two years of experience who had specialized training in stalking crimes. 

State v. Michael A. Sveum, 2009 WI App 81, affirmed on other grounds, 2010 WI 92
For Sveum: Robert J. Kaiser, Jr.

Issue/Holding: 

¶40      Sveum’s particularity argument is that the many items authorized for seizure were so “non-specific” that the warrant was an invalid general warrant. Police were authorized to seize phone bills, journals, calendars, logs, computers and devices related to computers,

State v. Michael A. Sveum, 2009 WI App 81, affirmed on other grounds, 2010 WI 92
For Sveum: Robert J. Kaiser, Jr.

Issue/Holding: The Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law excludes from coverage “(a)ny communication from a tracking device,” § 968.27(4)(d); a GPS device is such a “tracking device” and, therefore excluded from WESCL coverage.

State v. John David Ohlinger, 2009 WI App 44, PFR filed 4/1/09
For Ohlinger: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶8        The one-party consent exception reads as follows:

(2) It is not unlawful …:….

(b) For a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where the person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception.

State v. John David Ohlinger, 2009 WI App 44, PFR filed 4/1/09
For Ohlinger: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether, for purposes of authorizing one-party consent under WESCL, “a person acting under color of law” may be a law enforcement officer.

Holding:

¶2        [H]e contends that Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2)(b), commonly referred to as the one-party consent exception,

State v. Garrett L. Huff, 2009 WI App 92, PFR filed 6/3/09
For Huff: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue/Holding: Impossibility of fulfilling goal of conspiracy (here: election bribery, where other “conspirators” were undercover officers ineligible to vote) doesn’t preclude conviction, given Wisconsin’s recognition of “unilateral” conspiracies, State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998):

¶11   … Thus,

State v. Dwan J. Earl, 2009 WI App 99
For Earl: Mark D. Richards, Christy Marie Hall

Issue/Holding: Earl did not satisfy the “initial minimal burden of establishing some reasonable expectation of privacy” in a package addressed to a fictitious recipient at a vacant residence; moreover, when Earl picked up the package from the driver he gave his own name and thus “disassociated” himself from the addressee.

State v. Dwan J. Earl, 2009 WI App 99
For Earl: Mark D. Richards, Christy Marie Hall

Issue/Holding:

¶9        Sealed packages sent through the mail are entitled to full protection under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). In order to challenge a warrantless search or seizure, one must show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the thing or place searched or seized.