On Point blog, page 69 of 214
Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law, §§ 968.31(2)(b)-(c) – One-Party Consent Exception – Law Enforcement Officer as Consenting Party
State v. John David Ohlinger, 2009 WI App 44, PFR filed 4/1/09
For Ohlinger: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether, for purposes of authorizing one-party consent under WESCL, “a person acting under color of law” may be a law enforcement officer.
Holding:
¶2 [H]e contends that Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2)(b), commonly referred to as the one-party consent exception,
Conspiracy, § 939.31 – Impossibility of Fulfilling Objective
State v. Garrett L. Huff, 2009 WI App 92, PFR filed 6/3/09
For Huff: Jeffrey W. Jensen
Issue/Holding: Impossibility of fulfilling goal of conspiracy (here: election bribery, where other “conspirators” were undercover officers ineligible to vote) doesn’t preclude conviction, given Wisconsin’s recognition of “unilateral” conspiracies, State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998):
¶11 … Thus,
Expectation of Privacy – Mail – Fictitous Addressee
State v. Dwan J. Earl, 2009 WI App 99
For Earl: Mark D. Richards, Christy Marie Hall
Issue/Holding: Earl did not satisfy the “initial minimal burden of establishing some reasonable expectation of privacy” in a package addressed to a fictitious recipient at a vacant residence; moreover, when Earl picked up the package from the driver he gave his own name and thus “disassociated” himself from the addressee.
Expectation of Privacy – Mail, Generally
State v. Dwan J. Earl, 2009 WI App 99
For Earl: Mark D. Richards, Christy Marie Hall
Issue/Holding:
¶9 Sealed packages sent through the mail are entitled to full protection under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). In order to challenge a warrantless search or seizure, one must show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the thing or place searched or seized.
Reasonable Suspicion – Basis – Traffic Stops – Administrative Code Equipment Violation (Excessive Tint) – Stop Effectuated by Local Police
State v. Dennis E. Bailey, 2009 WI App 140
For Bailey: Jeffrey W. Jensen
Issue/Holding1: The police have authority to stop a vehicle for an equipment violation of an administrative code provision incorporated under local ordinance:
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 349.02(2)(a) and (b) expressly allow a police officer to stop a vehicle for violation of a statute or ordinance enacted under this chapter.
Frisk of Automobile – Furtive Movement
State v. Dennis E. Bailey, 2009 WI App 140
For Bailey: Jeffrey W. Jensen
Issue/Holding: Court upholds frisk of vehicle, following stop for minor equipment violation (excessive window tint) in high crime area, where driver made furtive gesture (kicking motions under front seat) and officer testified that he saw a bag, which he thought contained a gun, protruding from under seat, ¶¶24-50. State v. Gary A.
Frisk of Automobile – Driver Wearing Empty Gun Holster
State v. Paul Anthony Butler, 2009 WI App 52, PFR filed 4/20/09
For Butler: Trisha R. Stewart Martin
Issue/Holding: “Frisk” of car supported by concern driver had gun, in that he was wearing an empty gun holster, ¶16.
Kidnapping, § 940.31(1)(b) – Elements – “Hold to Service Against Will”
State v. Jeremy Denton, 2009 WI App 78 / State v. Aubrey W. Dahl, 2009 WI App 78
For Denton: Paul G. Bonneson
For Dahl: Patrick M. Donnelly
Issue/Holding: Though merely incidental to robbery, kidnapping charge is supported on theory that ordering the victim to relinquish property holds that person to service against his or her will:
¶26 … The defendants contend that,
§ 940.19(5), Aggravated Battery – Intent Element not Refuted, Lesser Included Option of 2nd-Degree Reckless Injury not Supported on Facts
State v. James D. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, PFR filed 8/3/09
Pro se
Issue/Holding:
¶52 We conclude as a matter of law that shooting a person in the thigh at a range of sixteen feet with a shotgun is practically certain to cause at least a protracted loss or impairment of the function of the person’s leg, and is therefore injury constituting “great bodily harm” within the meaning of the statutes.
Battery to Peace Officer, § 940.20(2) – Elements: Officer Need Not Act “Lawfully”
State v. Dione Wendell Haywood, 2009 WI App 178
For Haywood: Robert E. Haney
Issue/Holding: In a battery-to-officer prosecution, it is no defense that the officer refused to leave the premises when the resident withdrew consent to enter, because acting “lawfully” is not an element:
¶11 The flaw in Haywood’s contention, however, is that a law-enforcement officer need not be acting “lawfully” for what he or she does to be done in the officer’s “official capacity.” Rather,