On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Ray Shawn Cherry, 2008 WI App 80
For Cherry: John T. Wasielewski

Issue/Holding:

¶5        The statutes governing this issue are clear. If a trial court sentences a defendant to a felony involving a sex crime contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225, 948.02(1) or (2) 948.025, or 948.085, the trial court must order the defendant to pay the $250 surcharge for the DNA sample.

State v. Ray Shawn Cherry, 2008 WI App 80
For Cherry: John T. Wasielewski

Issue: Whether the sentencing court properly exercised discretion in imposing a DNA surcharge, where it misconstrued such action as mandatory rather than permissive and ignored the defendant’s prior such assessment.

Holding:

¶9        We hold that in assessing whether to impose the DNA surcharge, the trial court should consider any and all factors pertinent to the case before it,

State v. Tamara C. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, PFR filed 5/7/08
For Limon: Wm. Tyroler, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Lisa A. Packard, Law Student

Issue/Holding:

¶34      Here, the officers were outnumbered and without backup when, following an anonymous tip that drug dealing and drug loitering activities were taking place on the porch of a residence in a high-crime area, they approached Limon and two men.

State v. Aaron E. Applewhite, 2008 WI App 138, PFR filed 9/19/08
For Applewhite: Pamela Moorshead

Issue/Holding:

¶12      The next question before us is whether Bastil’s discovery of contraband in Applewhite’s pockets is supported by the “plain touch” doctrine. When the pat-down itself is based on reasonable suspicion, the “plain feel” or “plain touch” exception to the warrant requirement may apply, and “when an officer touches or feels an object during a pat[-]down which his or her training and experience lead the officer to believe may be contraband,

State v. Tamara C. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, PFR filed 5/7/08
For Limon: Wm. Tyroler, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Lisa A. Packard, Law Student

Issue/Holding:

¶36      In her final argument, Limon argues that when the officer opened her purse, the search exceeded the scope of a valid weapons frisk under Terry. Although Terry provides only for an officer “to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing … in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him,” id.

State v. Michael Anthony King, 2008 WI App 129
For King: Mark S. Rosen

Issue/Holding: Although an “anticipatory” search warrant may be issued to seize property in transit, a warrant may not condition its execution on verification of an address, ¶¶16-24

State v. Juan A. Casarez, 2008 WI App 166
For Casarez: Adam C. Essling

Issue/Holding:

¶12      Although Casarez concedes the affidavit establishes probable cause that he committed a crime, he asserts that it contains no evidence to establish that a crime was committed at his home, that the gun was ever observed at his home, or that he was ever seen with the gun at his home.

State v. Adrian J. Jackson, 2008 WI App 109
For Jackson: Craig S. Powell; Brian Kinstler

Issue: Whether a warrant established probable cause to search either the entirety of a multi-unit residential building.

Holding:

¶19      The magistrate was told only that the informant saw Jackson with two guns “at the residence of 4124 N. 21st Street” and that a booking record shows Jackson used that address eight months earlier.[9] Nothing in the Affidavit states that Jackson had been observed using both of the two-story duplex units,

State v. Michael Anthony King, 2008 WI App 129
For King: Mark S. Rosen

Issue/Holding: A search warrant that conditions its execution on verification of the target’s address violates the 4th amendment’s particularity requirement:

¶25      … The Fourth Amendment clearly sets forth the particularity requirement that must be satisfied prior to issuance of a warrant. … The particularity requirement is necessary “to direct the officer to the exact place to be searched and to guard against abuses that prevailed under the old writs of assistance which left the place to be searched to the discretion of the searching officer.” Rainey v.

State v. Adrian J. Jackson, 2008 WI App 109
For Jackson: Craig S. Powell; Brian Kinstler

Issue/Holding: A warrant describing the building to be searched only as “a two-story duplex residence” did not satisfy the particularity requirement:

¶9    If the location to be searched is not described with sufficient particularity to inform officers which unit in a multi-unit building they are to search, the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment has not been satisfied.