On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31

For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger

Issue/Holding: Jury instructions on the elements of duty and intent under § 946.12(3) created mandatory conclusive presumptions:

¶10      Schultz contends that the following sentences in the jury instruction given by the trial court operated as mandatory conclusive presumptions on the issues of intent and duty: “The use of a state resource to promote a candidate in a political campaign or to raise money for a candidate provides to that candidate a dishonest advantage” (establishing the intent element);

State v. Antonio M. Hall, 2007 WI App 168

For Hall: Michael D. Kaiser

Issue/Holding:

¶17   From our examination of these statutory provisions, we find no ambiguity in the relevant language and conclude that the provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(3g), 973.01(3m) and 302.113(9)(am) express a clear intent to restrict the sentencing discretion of the reconfinement court at a reconfinement hearing;

Dane co. DHS v. Dyanne M., 2007 WI App 129, District 4 court of appeals, 3/29/07 (published)

Issue/Holding:

¶19 Dyanne acknowledges that the CHIPS order makes reference to “warnings” and contains the statutory language defining the possible grounds for termination. She also does not dispute that the order contains the conditions that were necessary for Artavia’s return. Dyanne’s argument is limited to an assertion that the order fails to sufficiently connect the warning language to the statutory language.

Dane Co. DHS v. Dyanne M., 2007 WI App 129, District 4, 3/29/07 (published)

Competency of TPR Court – Statutory Time Limits, Generally

Issue/Holding:1: Generally, compliance with a statutory TPR time limit is mandatory, such that non-compliance results in lost circuit court competency absent an applicable exception, ¶5, citing Dane Co. DHS v. Susan P.S., 2006 WI App 100, ¶63.

Issue/Holding:2: The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of lost judicial competency for lapse of a time limit without obtaining a proper extension under § 48.315,

Waukesha Co. DHHS v. Teodoro E., 2008 WI App 16, District 2 (published)

Issue/Holding: The trial court properly exercised discretion in terminating rights:

¶25 Teodoro finally argues that at the dispositional stage, the trial court erroneously determined that termination of his parental rights would be in the best interests of the children. This determination is committed to the circuit court’s discretion, and will not be overturned unless that discretion is erroneously exercised.

Waukesha Co. DHHS v. Teodoro E., 2008 WI App 16, District 2 (published)

Issue/Holding: Conditions imposed for non-termination of a deported parent’s children weren’t impossible, notwithstanding parent’s inability to return to country:

¶23 But as the circuit court noted, “Mexico is not prison” and Teodoro remained free to work on and meet many of the conditions of return. As an example, the first condition,

State v. Jeffrey L. Torkelson, 2007 WI App 272, PFR filed 11/30/07
For Torkelson: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: Custody, for purposes of Miranda, requires that the suspect’s freedom be restricted to a degree associated with formal arrest, and is as gauged by a multi-factor test articulated in State v. Zan Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, ¶¶13-14. None of those factors are present in this instance,

State v. Heather A. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242, PFR filed 11/29/07
For Markwardt: Richard Hahn

Issue/Holding:

¶35   The circuit court relied on statements Markwardt made one hour and eleven minutes into the interview for its ruling that she had properly asserted her right to remain silent. Her exact words were: “Then put me in jail. Just get me out of here.

State v. Heather A. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242, PFR filed 11/29/07
For Markwardt: Richard Hahn

Issue/Holding: Markwardt’s in-custody statement was voluntary: any stress she was under was “unrelated to police conduct” (¶37); she didn’t unequivocally assert her rights (¶40); that the interrogator “was at times confrontational and raised his voice is not improper police procedure and does not, by itself, establish police coercion” (¶42,

State v. Philip R. Bons, 2007 WI App 124, PFR filed 4/24/07
Issue/Holding:

¶23      Applying the plain language of the rule, Gorokhovsky’s certification of compliance is false. His appendix contains only a copy of the judgment of conviction, the notice of motion and motion to suppress, and the notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief. How these documents in any way inform this court about the trial court’s determinations “essential to an understanding of the issues raised,” we do not know.