On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Donald W. Thexton, 2007 WI App 11, PFR filed 1/02/07
For Thexton: Kirk B. Obear

Issue/Holding: Thexton wasn’t entitled to Miranda warnings “at the time the PSI was being prepared”:

¶8        Thexton also claims that Streekstra violated his Fifth Amendment rights when he interviewed him during the investigation.  Thexton claims that Streekstra used the prior PSI as a basis for questioning him,

State v. Donald W. Thexton, 2007 WI App 11, PFR filed 1/02/07
For Thexton: Kirk B. Obear

Issue/Holding: The agent’s use of a prior PSI during the interview of defendant for the current case did not trigger any additional right to counsel:

¶10      Thexton further argues that his right to counsel was violated because he was unable to consult with his attorney regarding the use of the prior PSI during the interview.

State v. Owen Budd, 2007 WI App 245
For Budd: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Evidence that SVP respondent would be under DOC supervision if not committed under ch. 980 properly excluded as irrelevant, ¶¶8-14 (“the fact of supervision is irrelevant to whether Budd is a sexually violent person under § 980.01(7),” ¶14).The court in essence follows its statement in State v. Charles W.

State v. Owen Budd, 2007 WI App 245
For Budd: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence as to the “screening process” for referring SVP cases, which had the effect of informing the jury that fewer than 5% of eligible sex offenders are selected for commitment proceedings.

Holding:

¶16   We need not conclude, as Budd urges,

State v. Barry L. Smalley, 2007 WI App 219, PFR filed 10/19/07
For Smalley: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: “(T)he phrase ‘more likely than not’ in the statute means what it says: that an event is more likely to occur than not to occur; that is, has a greater than 50% chance of happening. Thus, in order to find Smalley a sexually violent person,

State v. Barry L. Smalley, 2007 WI App 219, PFR filed 10/19/07
For Smalley: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶18      Smalley notes that the actuarial instruments fail to take an individual’s mental disorder into account, and that they therefore predict dangerousness in general, rather than dangerousness due to mental disorder. He argues that because a jury in a Wis. Stat. ch.

State v. Steven C. Feldmann, 2007 WI App 35, PFR filed 3/23/07
For Feldmann: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The ch. 980 omission of required proof of a recent overt act of sexual violence does not violate equal protection, as compared with the ch. 51 mental health commitment requirement of proof of a recent overt act demonstrating dangerousness.

The supreme court refused to impose such requirement under ch.

State v. Lorenzo Wood, 2007 WI App 190, PFR filed 8/16/07
For Wood: Michael D. Kaiser

Issue/Holding:

¶6 “When a resentencing is required for any reason, the initial sentence is a nullity; it ceases to exist.” Carter, 208 Wis. 2d at 154. In resentencing “the court imposes a new sentence after the initial sentence has been held invalid.” Id. at 147.

State v. Lorenzo Wood, 2007 WI App 190, PFR filed 8/16/07
For Wood: Michael D. Kaiser

Issue/Holding:

¶7 Counsel for Wood points out that published opinions have been somewhat imprecise in distinguishing between the requirements for, and effect of, sentence modification as opposed to resentencing. We acknowledge that language has, on occasion, been imprecise. …

…

¶9 Similarly, in State v.

State v. Lorenzo Wood, 2007 WI App 190, PFR filed 8/16/07
For Wood: Michael D. Kaiser

Issue/Holding: The governor’s 1994 letter exhorting bureaucratic opposition to (pre-TIS) parole for certain crimes was not a new factor, even though the sentencing court expressly took into consideration DOC data purporting to show the likely chance of parole:

¶11 We held in Delaney that the Thompson 1994 letter was not a “new factor” in part because: (1) there was no showing that the 1994 letter had any impact on Delaney’s discretionary parole eligibility;