On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Jeffrey Lorenzo Searcy, 2006 WI App 8
For Searcy: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding: Failure to raise a Crawford objection didn’t amount to waiver: “However, Searcy could not have raised at trial a Confrontation Clause claim based on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), because his December 2002 trial preceded the March 2004 Crawford decision by well over a year.

 State v. Juan F. Milanes, 2006 WI App 259, PFR filed 12/7/06
For Milanes: Joan M. Boyd

Issue/Holding:

¶13      A valid guilty or no contest plea waives all nonjurisdictional defenses to a conviction, including constitutional violations. See State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d 119, 122-23, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983). One exception to this rule is the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

State v. Earl W. Haase, 2006 WI App 86, (State’s) PFR filed 5/17/06
For Haase: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether restitution may be ordered for damage caused to a squad car destroyed by fire during pursuit of the defendant.

Holding:  A governmental “agency must be a direct victim of the criminal conduct to be reimbursed for a loss,

Olson v. Darlington Mutual Ins., 2006 WI App 204

Issue/Holding:

¶4        … The required elements of judicial estoppel are:

            First, the later position must be clearly inconsistent with the earlier position; second, the facts at issue should be the same in both cases; and finally, the party to be estopped must have convinced the first court to adopt its position—a litigant is not forever bound to a losing argument.

State v. Justin D. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, PFR filed 7/14/06
For Gudgeon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where the appellate court is positioned equally to review the matter, whether labeled one of fact or of law, no deference need be given the trial court:

¶19      … (T)his court is in just as good a position as the circuit court to answer that question.

Herr v. Bradley D. DeBraska, 2006 WI App 29

Issue/Holding1: Where the defendant and victim had fully settled a civil claim for defendant’s liability arising out of the crime, but the defendant’s wages were subsequently garnished by the State to satisfy the restitution order in the criminal case, the trial court properly exercised discretion to reopen the civil judgment, to determine whether the civil judgment should be offset against the restitution order,

State v. Kevin Brown, 2006 WI App 41
For Brown: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶10      We first examine the trial court’s reliance on the earlier order and its determination that it was “the law of the case.” Citing Univest Corp. v. General Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 38, 435 N.W.2d 234 (1989), Brown argues:

The law of the case doctrine is inapplicable.

State v. Quentrell E. Williams, 2006 WI App 212
For Williams: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: ¶23, n.5:

 Williams also contends that the evidence was relevant to whether he intentionally caused harm to A.B.A. because intentional child abuse is a specific intent crime. However, Williams was acquitted of intentionally causing harm to a child. Thus, he cannot show that he was prejudiced in his defense as to intentionally causing harm to a child by his attorney’s failure to introduce that evidence.

State v. Randy Mcgowan, 2006 WI App 80
For Mcgowan: Dianne M. Erickson

Issue/Holding: Wrongful admission of misconduct evidence was reversible error:

¶37      Based on our review, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of Janis’s testimony did not contribute to the verdict. The State’s case was based entirely on various recollections about events that occurred years earlier. [3] The defense disputed many of those recollections and noted the lack of physical evidence of any sort corroborating physical abuse by a large man of a small child.

State v. Anthony D., 2006 WI App 218
For Anthony D.: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate

Dicta: ¶7 n. 2:

We note that the language of the juvenile restitution statute differs from that of the criminal restitution statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.20. The criminal statute does not require the court to make a finding that the defendant can pay the restitution amount,