On Point: Published 2004

State v. John F. Powers, 2004 WI App 156
For Powers: Marcus J. Berghahn; John D. Hyland

Issue/Holding: An employee of the Tomah VA Medical Center is not an employee of an in-patient treatment facility within the meaning of §§ 940.225(2)(g), 940.295(2)(b), (c), (h), (k), and 50.135(1), because the Center is not licensed or approved by DHFS, ¶11, and the pending charge under that section must therefore be dismissed,

State v. Walter Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127
For Leutenegger: Bill Ginsberg

Issue/Holding: ¶21 n. 5:

The State does not challenge the circuit court’s holding that the garage was part of the curtilage of Leutenegger’s house and subject to the warrant requirement. This implicit concession appears appropriate in this case. Published decisions on this topic consistently hold that an attached garage is part of the curtilage. 

State v. Louis D. Thomas, 2004 WI App 115, PFR filed 6/17/04
For Thomas: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding: Wis. Const. art. I, § 25 (“right to keep and bear arms”) did not effectively repeal § 941.29 (felon in possession). ¶¶7-12.

Issue/Holding: § 941.29 is neither vague, ¶¶14-18, nor overbroad, ¶¶19-23.

Issue/Holding: § 941.29 doesn’t violate equal protection, ¶¶24-29. (Comparative classes: felons / misdemeanants;

State v. Charles Chvala, 2004 WI App 53, affirmed, 2005 WI 30
For Chvala: James A. Olson, et. al,  Lawton & Cates

Holdings:

• Section 946.12(3), which proscribes exercising a discretionary power inconsistent with the duties of the defendant’s office (in this instance, a state legislator) is not vague. Though those “duties” aren’t identified in any specific statute,

State v. John S. Provo, 2004 WI App 97, PFR filed 5/7/04
For Provo: William H. Gergen

Issue/Holding: “… We hold that § 948.07 requires only that the defendant cause the child to go into any vehicle, building, room, or secluded place with the intent to engage in illicit conduct, but not that the child necessarily be first separated from ‘the public,’” ¶1. That is,

State v. Walter Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127
For Leutenegger: Bill Ginsberg

Issue/Holding:

¶12. A warrantless home entry is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶28. The government bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless entry into a home occurred pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See State v.

State v. Jack P. Lindgren, 2004 WI App 159, PFR filed 8/20/04
For Lindgren: Stephen M. Compton

Issue: Whether the evidence was sufficient, on the element of possession, to sustain conviction for possessing child pornography, where the defense expert “testified that no evidence of any child pornography had been saved on Lindgren’s computer,” ¶23.

Holding:

¶25. Lindgren’s challenge to the concept of possession in the context of computer material has been recently,

State v. Robert A. Ragsdale, 2004 WI App 178, PFR filed 8/5/04For Ragsdale: Timothy T. Kay

Issue/Holding:

¶14. Moreover, the questioning of the boy here presents a situation analogous to the safety exceptions set forth in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654-60 (1984), and its progeny. Quarles set forth a public safety exception to the requirement for Mirandawarnings.

State v. Christopher M. Repenshek, 2004 WI App 229, PFR filed 12/17/04
For Repenshek: Stephen E. Mays

Issue/Holding: The test for probable cause is purely objective, so that the arresting officer’s intent to arrest for a crime that is in fact non-existent is irrelevant. Because in Repenshek’s instance probable cause to arrest indisputably existed, his arrest was not illegal even though the officer thought he was arresting Repenshek for a crime that,

State v. Ibrahim Begicevic, 2004 WI App 57
For Begicevic: Donna J. Kuchler

Issue/Holding:

¶9. When Kennedy initially made contact with Begicevic, he appeared confused on how to get to Milwaukee. She immediately noticed a strong odor of intoxicants and that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. … Because Kennedy was giving Begicevic the benefit of the doubt, she had him perform a fourth field sobriety test,