On Point blog, page 1 of 11
Assertion of Right to Counsel – Not Offense-Specific
State v. Willie B. Cole, 2008 WI App 178
For Cole: Scott A. Szabrowicz
Issue/Holding:
¶25 … If a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he or she is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself or herself reinitiates conversation. …
¶26 The Fifth Amendment/ Miranda right to counsel during custodial interrogations is not offense specific.
Audiovisual Recording, § 908.08(1) – Transcription by Court Reporter Required
State v. Pablo Ruiz-Velez, 2008 WI App 169
For Ruiz-Velez: Melnda A. Swartz, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue: Whether audiovisual recordings of statements made by alleged victims and admitted into evidence under § 908.08(1) must be transcribed by the official court reporter.
Holding:
¶4 Wisconsin Stat. Rule 885.42(4) provides: “At trial, videotape depositions and other testimony presented by videotape shall be reported.” As we have seen,
“Meaningful participation” in TPR by webcam
Waukesha Co. DHHS v. Teodoro E., 2008 WI App 16, District 2 (published)
Issue/Holding: A deported father’s participation in the TPR proceeding by a webcam system was “meaningful,” given that he could see and hear witnesses, be seen by the court, and communicate privately with counsel and with aid of an interpreter, ¶¶10-19.
State v. Lavelle W., 2005 WI App 266 (telephone hookup not functional equivalent of personal presence,
TPR – Withdrawal of Element (Parental Unfitness) from Jury Consideration Amounted to Denial of Jury Trial
Manitowoc County HSD v. Allen J., 2008 WI App 137
Issue/Holding:
¶1 Allen J. appeals from orders terminating his parental rights to his children, Brandon [1] and Stephanie J. He argues that he was deprived of his right to a jury trial because the court, rather than the jury, answered one of the verdict questions on an element of parental unfitness. Allen’s counsel had stipulated that the element was satisfied,
TPR – No Contest Plea, Withdrawal of – Prima Facie Showing re: Grounds and Potential Disposition
Oneida Co. DSS v. Therese S., 2008 WI App 159
Grounds
Issue/Holding: Informing the parent of potential “dispositions in a general sense” is not enough to satisfy § 48.422(7)(a):
¶16 Thus, at the very least, a court must inform the parent that at the second step of the process, the court will hear evidence related to the disposition and then will either terminate the parent’s rights or dismiss the petition if the evidence does not warrant termination.
Prior Assertion of Right to Counsel
State v. Willie B. Cole, 2008 WI App 178
For Cole: Scott A. Szabrowicz
Issue/Holding: “Under the above case law, it is clear that, if Cole did invoke his Fifth Amendment/Miranda right to counsel when he was arrested on the battery charge, then the statement he gave Officer Riley while still in custody is inadmissible even if Cole’s waiver of Miranda rights in that interview was otherwise valid,”
Suppression Hearing Procedure – Burden of Proof Re: Prior Assertion of Right to Counsel as Invalidating Subsequent Waiver
State v. Willie B. Cole, 2008 WI App 178
For Cole: Scott A. Szabrowicz
Issue/Holding:
¶38 The parties have not provided, and we have not discovered, any case that addresses the burden of proof in a factual context similar to this—where the defendant asserts he previously invoked his right to counsel as a basis for invalidating a later waiver. [9] However, we are persuaded that placing the burden on the State to show a prior waiver of this right,
Suppression Hearing Procedure – Burden of Proof, Generally
State v. Willie B. Cole, 2008 WI App 178
For Cole: Scott A. Szabrowicz
Issue/Holding: The State bears the burden of proof, by preponderance of evidence, of a valid waiver of Miranda rights, ¶27.
¶35 As we have stated above, it is the State’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant validly waived his Miranda rights and that the statement was voluntary.
Involuntary Statement – Derivative Evidence – Admissibility of Subsequent Statement
State v. Charles W. Mark, 2008 WI App 44; on appeal following remand in State v. Mark, 2006 WI 78, 292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90
For Mark: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding1:
¶20 When an individual has given an involuntary statement, a subsequent statement is also considered involuntary unless it can be “separated from the circumstances surrounding” the earlier statement by a “break in the stream of events,” between the first statement to the second,
Involuntary Statement (Due to Immunity Grant) – Derivative Evidence: Experts’ Opinions
State v. Charles W. Mark, 2008 WI App 44; on appeal following remand in State v. Mark, 2006 WI 78, 292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90
For Mark: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding1:
¶28 In Kastigar, the … Court stated that, once a defendant demonstrates that he or she has testified under a grant of immunity for matters related to the prosecution,