On Point: Published 2011

State v. Brian K. Avery, 2011 WI App 148 (recommended for publication), supreme court review granted, 2/23/12; for Avery: Keith A. Findley; case activity; prior 974.06 appeal: 2008AP500-CR; direct appeal: 1997AP317

Newly Discovered Evidence – New Forensic  Method – Photogrammetric Analysis 

Expert photogrammetric opinion, derived from video enhancement technology (“VISAR”) not commercially available until after Avery’s trial,

J. K. v. Mark Peters, 2011 WI App 149 (recommended for publication); case activity

Appellate Procedure – “Waiver,” Distinguished from “Forfeiture” 

¶1 n. 1:

In using the term “waiver,” we are aware of the recently decided case of State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, where our supreme court clarified the distinction between the terms “forfeiture” and “waiver.”  See id.

State v. James T. Kettner, 2011 WI App 142 (recommended for publication); for Kettner: Andrew R. Hinkel, Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Hearing-Impaired Juror – Inability to Hear Certain Testimony 

A juror’s inability to hear most of alleged victim S.K.’s answers in a videotaped interview didn’t violate Kettner’s rights to impartial jury or due process, given that S.K. also testified in person consistent with her videotaped answers. 

State v. Courtney C. Beamon, 2011 WI App 131 (recommended for publication); for Beamon: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; petition for review granted, 4/25/12

Fleeing, § 346.04(3) – Elements 

¶4        ….  In State v. Sterzinger, 2002 WI App 171, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 925, 649 N.W.2d 677, this court separated the language of § 346.04(3) into segments:  (1) No operator of a vehicle,

State v. Devon L. Bean, 2011 WI App 129 (recommended for publication); for Bean: Scott D. Obernberger; case activity

Sew-up Confession 

The fourth interrogation of Bean within a 60-hour period following his arrest did not, under the particular facts, amount to an impermissible “sew-up” confession.

General principles. The question, in brief, is whether the time between arrest and formal charge was “inordinate.”

State v. Steven A. Avery, 2011 WI App 124 (recommended for publication); for Avery: Martha K. Askins, Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Search Warrant – Execution – Reasonableness 

Warrant-based search of Avery’s property was a reasonable continuation of the original search 3 days earlier.

General statement:

¶18      Generally, searches are subject to the “one warrant, one search” rule.  

State v. Paschall Lee Sanders, 2011 WI App 125 (recommended for publication); for Sanders: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

The definitions of “mental disorder” in since-amended pattern instruction Wis JI—Criminal 2502 (2009), though concededly contradictory, didn’t prevent from being tried the issue of whether Sanders qualified for commitment as a sexually violent person:

¶14      As we have seen, two sentences in what the circuit court told the jury are contradictory:

(1)   “Mental disorder means a condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence and causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”  (Emphasis added.)

(2)   “Not all persons with a mental disorder are predisposed to commit sexually violent offenses or have serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”

As noted earlier,

State v. Orbin B. Harris, 2011 WI App 130 (recommended for publication); for Harris: Matthew S. Pinix; case activity

Good-time credit may not be earned on a  jail sentence for a violent offense being served in prison:

¶1       Orbin B. Harris appeals the judgment convicting him of battery and intimidation and the order denying his postconviction motion.  Harris, who was sentenced to ten months in the house of correction for the battery and to seven years in state prison for the intimidation,

DOC v. Warren Lilly, Jr., 2011 WI App 123 (recommended for publication); case activity

¶2        The primary issues we address on this appeal and their resolution are as follows:

I.                   In light of Saenz, what is the correct legal standard for the showing DOC must make to obtain a court order continuing to authorize the forced feeding of an inmate?[1]

We conclude that in this situation DOC must show that: (1) if forced feeding is withdrawn,

State v. James G. Brereton, 2011 WI App 127 (recommended for publication); for Brereton: Matthew S. Pinix; case activity

After lawfully stopping Brereton, the police removed him from his car, towed it to a lot and then, after obtaining a warrant, attached a GPS tracking device. Ensuing monitoring led to information connecting Brereton to a crime. The court holds as follows:

• Fourth amendment concerns are implicated because the tracking device was placed inside the hood while the vehicle was in police possession and out of public view,¶8,