On Point: Published 2011

State v. Herbert O. Richard, 2011 WI App 66 (recommended for publication); for Richard: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Changes in the scoring of the actuarial test which was used to support Richard’s commitment at his original trial, cannot support his discharge petition even though his new score would reduce his predicted likelihood of reoffending.

¶13      Richard argues that the circuit court improperly dismissed his petition for discharge and that he is entitled to a discharge hearing. 

Village of Menomonee Falls v. Jason R. Ferguson, 2011 WI App 73 (recommended for publication); for Ferguson: Daniel P. Fay; case activity

Ferguson’s guilt for violating local sex offender residence-restriction ordinance upheld, as against argument that he fell within grandfather clause exception. The ordinance bars registered sex offenders from living within 1500 feet of any facility for children, but excepts an offender who had established and reported a residence prior to the ordinance’s effective date.

Fond du Lac County v. Helen E. F., 2011 WI App 72(recommended for publication), affirmed 2012 WI 50; for Helen E.F.: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Alzheimer’s disease is not a qualifying mental condition for purposes of ch. 51 commitment, therefore Helen E.F. is not a proper subject for treatment as a matter of law. The disease is a degenerative brain disorder,

State v. Ralph H. Davis, 2011 WI App 74 (recommended for publication); for Davis: Chandra N. Harvey, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Warrantless Entry – Curtilage – Implied Invitation Doctrine

¶9      The protections of the Fourth Amendment extend beyond the walls of the home to the “curtilage.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). “[C]urtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a [person]’s home and the privacies of life,

Adam Martine v. Quentin J. Williams, 2011 WI App 68 (recommended for publication); case activity

¶13      Prior to last year, this court applied a general rule regarding court of appeals’ cases reversed by the supreme court that “holdings not specifically reversed on appeal retain precedential value.”  Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶44, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78 (citation omitted).  

State v. Carl Cornelius Gilbert, Jr. / State v. Price T. Hunt, 2011 WI App 61, affirmed 2012 WI 72 (recommended for publication); for Gilbert: William J. Tyroler, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; for Hunt:  Eric James Van Schyndle, Leah Stoecker, Allison E. Cimpl-Wiemer; case activity (Gilbert), case activity (Hunt); affirmed, 2012 WI 72

SVP – Pre-Commitment Return to DOC Custody

¶1        … 

State v. Robby D. Kuenzi, 2011 WI App 30; for Rory Kuenzi: Thomas W. Johnson; for Robby Kuenzi: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Animal Cruelty, § 951.02

Cruel mistreatment of non-captive wild animals – in this case, deer intentionally rammed by snowmobiles, concededly cruel acts – may be prosecuted under § 951.02, whether or not the acts are specifically regulated by chapter 29 hunting restrictions. 

State v. James M. Drown, 2011 WI App 53; for Drown: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

As a matter of law, equitable estoppel doesn’t bar prosecution of a crime. After pleading guilty to Shawano County charges related to an abduction and assault, Drown was charged in Oconto based on the same incident. The trial court granted a defense motion to dismiss on the ground of equitable estoppel,

State v. Winston B. Eison, 2011 WI App 52; for Eison: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Preservation of Issue – Motion in Limine

Eison objected to introduction of evidence of his arrest on an unrelated offense via motion in limine, which the trial court granted. At trial, however, the court allowed the State to introduce this evidence. Eison didn’t need to lodge additional objection to preserve the issue for review.

State v. Derek J. Copeland, 2011 WI App 28; for Copeland: David Leeper; case activity

Trial court has discretion under § 906.15(3) to order an attorney not to discuss with a sequestered witness who hasn’t yet testified the testimony of other witnesses; this authority extends to barring counsel from providing the sequestered witness with a transcript of prior-witness testimony. The trial court in this instance misperceived a lack of such authority,