On Point: Published 2012

State v. Shawn David Schulpius, 2012 WI App 134; court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); case activity

SVP Discharge Hearing – Showing Required, § 980.09(2) 

Before granting discharge hearing on a ch. 980 petition, the circuit court must satisfy itself that the petition answers two concerns: First, under § 980.09(1) “paper-review” determination, the petition alleges sufficient facts to show that the petitioner no longer satisfies commitment criteria.

State v. Tony J. Lalicata, 2012 WI App 138 (recommended for publication); case activity

Probation is not an available disposition under § 948.02(1)(b) (child sexual assault). By mandating that “the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence” with a confinement portion of at least 25 years for that offense, § 939.616 forecloses the possibility of probation:

¶14      …  We conclude instead that § 939.616(1r) unambiguously prohibits probation,

State v. Calvin L. Brown, 2012 WI 139 (recommended for publication); case activity

A guilty plea colloquy need not include an explanation of ptac liability when the defendant directly committed the crime:

¶13      …  Although the trial court did not explain that, by directly committing the La Quinta robbery, Brown was “concerned” in its commission as defined by the party to a crime statute,

State v. Joshua A. Prescott, 2012 WI App 136; case activity

Felon-in-possession, § 941.29, was properly joined for trial with reckless injury by use of dangerous weapon:

¶17      Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the charges were properly joined. The felon in possession and reckless injury charges were “based on the same act or transaction.” See Wis.

State v. Thomas E. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 137 (recommended for publication); case activity

After performing an HGN test, which exhibited 6 out of 6 indicia of impairment, Schmidt was arrested for OWI. At the ensuing trial, he asserted diabetes as a possible cause for the HGN result. The trial court ordered, as a condition of his testifying to this effect, that he submit to an HGN test outside the presence of the jury.

State v. Gary M. Hemmingway, 2012 WI App 133; case activity

Stalking,  § 940.32(2m)(a), which previously survived overbreadth and vagueness challenges based on rights to travel and equal protection, State v. Ruesch, 214 Wis. 2d 548, 571 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1997), now withstands a free-speech challenge: The statute isn’t a facially overbroad regulation of protected speech, in that the first amendment doesn’t immunize intentional conduct aimed at causing serious distress or fear of bodily harm.

State v. Allen Dell Vaughn, 2012 WI App 129 (recommended for publication); case activity

Waiver / Forfeiture of Right, Generally 

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege; forfeiture is:  (1) the failure to object to something without intending to relinquish that which an objection might have preserved and (2) doing something incompatible with the assertion of a right, ¶21, citing State v.

State v. Marilee F. Devries, 2012 WI App 119 (recommended for publication); case activity

Devries’ probation agent, after detecting alcohol on her breath during a visit at the probation office, had a law enforcement officer administer a preliminary breath test. One thing led to another and she was convicted of OWI. She challenges the PBT as a police, rather than probation, search because the probation officer wasn’t involved in the test,

State v. Ronald W. Lichty, 2012 WI App 129(recommended for publication); case activity

Lichty pleaded no contest pursuant to plea bargain which allowed, due to a good-faith mistake, the State to recommend a period of extended supervision that exceeded the permissible maximum by one year. The error was discerned prior to sentencing, where the State reduced its extended supervision recommendation by one year. (His plea was to two counts of the same offense,

Godfrey & Kahn, S.C. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2012 WI App 120(recommended for publication); case activity

A court doesn’t possess inherent authority to impose on counsel a sanction (here, monetary) for pre-litigation advice, that is, conduct occurring before the court’s jurisdiction was invoked:

¶3        We conclude that the record, particularly the trial court’s own words in its ruling, clearly shows that the trial court imposed the sanction for pre-litigation legal advice that the trial court believed Godfrey &