On Point blog, page 2 of 6
Warrant invalidated because primary basis consisted of information the police garthered by trespassing
State v. Jeremiah R. Popp & Christopher A. Thomas, 2014 WI App 100; case activity: Popp; Thomas
The search warrant for the home shared by Popp and Thomas was invalid because the primary basis for the warrant was derived from observations made by police when they trespassed on the defendants’ property and peered into their windows.
Prison visitor subjected to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda, but physical evidence not suppressed
State v. Marie A. Ezell, 2014 WI App 101; case actvity
Prison guards overheard Ezell tell her incarcerated boyfriend that she would smuggle in drugs for him on her next visit. When she tried to follow through, the guards detained her in a conference room, questioned her, and obtained damning evidence. Due to the lack of Miranda warnings, this custodial interrogation violated the 5th Amendment, but the court nevertheless declined to suppress the physical evidence derived from the Miranda violations.
Court scolds State for shoddy advocacy, holds alleged “stop” was actually an arrest without probable cause
State v. Thomas J. Anker, 2014 WI App 107; case activity
If a conservation warden shouted “you’re under arrest,” ordered you to stop walking, forcibly handcuffed you, and restrained you in his car until he could turn you over to investigating authorities, would you think you were under arrest or simply “temporarily detained”? The State, with a straight face, claimed these facts showed a Terry stop. The court of appeals, with a stern tone, rebuked the State and sharply criticized its brief.
Defendant allowed dual credit for presentence custody served for a burglary and an unrelated civil commitment
State v. Joseph T. Trepanier, 2014 WI App 105; case activity
This case presents an issue of first impression: Whether a defendant is entitled to sentence credit for time spent in presentence custody for a burglary when he was also in custody pursuant to an unrelated civil commitment for contempt of court. The State, naturally, opposed dual sentence credit. But the winner is . . . the defendant!
Postconviction counsel may raise defendant’s competence to stand trial though trial court and trial counsel had no such concerns
State v. Jimmie Lee Smith, 2014 WI App 98, petition for review granted 6/12/15; case activity
If you’re working on a competency issue, read this decision. Neither the trial court nor defense counsel raised the subject of Smith’s competency at the time of trial. And Smith had not received a pre-trial competency exam. That’s why the postconviction court rejected Smith’s claim that he was incompetent at the time of trial. There was no contemporaneous evidence to support it. The court of appeals reversed, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial.
Court lost competency to issue harassment injunction
Tiffany Hill v. D.C., 2014 WI App 99; case activity
Because the plain language of § 813.125(3)(c) allows only one extension of a temporary restraining order, the circuit court lost competency to proceed when it extended the TRO twice.
Extended statute of limitation for theft runs from actual discovery, not from when theft should have been discovered
State v. Kim B. Simmelink, 2014 WI App 102; case activity
The court of appeals holds that § 939.74(2)(b)’s extended statute of limitation for certain theft charges runs from actual discovery of the theft, and not from when the theft should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
A “motor bicycle” is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of § 346.63(1)
State v. Thomas W. Koeppen, 2014 WI App 94; case activity
A “motor bicycle” is a bicycle with a motor added, and can be either pedaled or self-propelled using the motor, § 340.01(30). Whether a person can be charged under the OWI/PAC statute based on his operation of a motor bicycle depends on whether a motor bicycle is a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). The court of appeals concludes that a plain-language reading of the relevant statutes shows a motor bicycle is a motor vehicle, “at least when the motor bicycle being operated is self-propelled, rather than pedaled.” (¶1).
Retrograde extrapolation of blood alcohol concentration survives Daubert challenge
State v. Todd J. Giese, 2014 WI App 92; case activity
Expert testimony regarding retrograde extrapolation of Giese’s blood alcohol concentration is admissible under new version of § 907.02(1) despite the fact some experts doubt its reliability because it was the product of reliable principles and methods and based upon sufficient facts and data.
Minor may consent to recording of conversation under § 968.31’s one-party consent rule
State v. Price G. Turner, III, 2014 WI App 93; case activity
A minor does not as a matter of law lack the capacity to consent to police interception of the minor’s conversations with another person and therefore vicarious consent by a parent is not required.