On Point: 11. Defense Wins

State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2017AP1518-Cr, District 4, 6/14/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), review granted 10/9/18, reversed, 2019 WI 80; case activity (including briefs)

Here’s a rare sighting! One district of the court of appeals has declared that it is not bound by a decision addressing the same set of facts issued by another district. This is what you call SCOW bait (sorry to say, given that this is a defense win). Randall was arrested for OWI, an officer read the “Informing the Accused” card, and she agreed to a blood test. A few days later, her lawyer sent the lab a letter withdrawing her consent. The court of appeals held that Randall had a right to withdraw her consent up to the time when blood was actually tested. But just 6 months ago, the court of appeals reached the opposite result in State v. Sumnicht. 

State v. John Patrick Wright, 2017AP2006-CR, 6/12/18, District 1;(1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 10/9/18, reversed 2019 WI 45, ; case activity (including briefs)

Police stopped Wright’s car because a headlight was out, but they asked him whether he had a concealed carry permit and weapons in the car. He admitted he had a firearm and explained that he had recently completed the CCW course. Too bad. He was arrested and charged with 1 count of carrying a concealed weapon. He moved to suppress on the grounds that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to question him about a CCW permit and weapons.

Scott Schmidt v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1727, 5/29/18, reversing Schmidt v. Pollard, No. 13-CV-1150 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2017); reversed en banc 12/20/18

A criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at all “critical stages” of the case. You probably think that a hearing, before a murder trial, that determines whether the accused will get to present his only defense counts as such a “critical stage.” The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, however, “easily reject[ed]” that notion in this (published) case. The Seventh Circuit now disagrees, saying the Wisconsin decision “unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent and, frankly, ignored reality.”

Waukesha County v. M.J.S., 2017AP1843, 5/30/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

Section 51.61(1)(g)4 and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607 establish that a person subject to a possible involuntary medication order is entitled to receive a reasonable explanation of the proposed medication, why it is being prescribed, its advantages and disadvantages (include side effects), and alternatives to it. If the person is incapable of expressing an understanding of these matters or incapable of applying the information to his situation in order to make an informed decision, then he is incompetent to refuse them. In this case, M.J.S. failed to show for the examination where a doctor would have attempted the statutorily-required explanation. The circuit court ordered involuntary meds; the court of appeals reversed.

Fond du Lac County v. Isaac Anthony Dahlke, 2017AP1417, District 2, 5/9/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The stop of Dahlke’s car was unlawful because the officer didn’t have an objectively reasonable belief that Dahlke entered a wayside in violation of an ordinance prescribing hours when the wayside is closed.

McCoy v. Louisiana, USSC No. 16 – 8255, 2018 WL 218-617, 5/14/18, reversing and remanding State v. McCoy, 2018 So.3d 535 (La. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary).

In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, SCOTUS holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that his lawyer refrain from admitting that he is guilty of a charged crime when he objects to that admission. It further holds that if a lawyer concedes guilt in this situation, Strickland and the harmless error rule do not apply. The defendant automatically gets a new trial.

Adams County HHS Dep’t v. M.J.A., 2018AP249, District 4, 4/26/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment and terminated M.J.A.’s parental rights on continuing CHIPS grounds. The court should not have done that, because the parties’ summary judgment submissions show there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

Chippewa County v. M.M., 2017AP1325, 5/1/18, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

You don’t see this very often. A jury found M.M. mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous under §51.20(1)(a)2.c based on testimony by not 1, not 2, but 3 doctors–all of whom said that M.M.’s paranoia and conduct would cause others to feel fearful and threatened and possibly assault him in an effort to protect themselves. This idea that M.M. was “indirectly” dangerous to himself did not wash with the court of appeals. It reversed and also rejected the County’s claim that M.M.’s appeal from this 6-month commitment was moot.

State v. William H. Craig, 2017AP651-CR, 4/17/18, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Criminal defendants have a broad right to pretrial discovery under §971.23(1), but that right is tempered by  §971.23(6), which authorizes the circuit court to enter protective orders for good cause. The court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before granting a motion for protective order. But if it denies a hearing, it must explain its rationale. The circuit court did not do that here, so the court of appeals reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings.

State v. Cheneye Leshia Edwards, 2017AP633-CR, 4/17/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity (including briefs).

Edwards entered a plea to disorderly conduct and asked the sentencing court to order expungement in the event he successfully completed probation.  The court denied the request without explaining why. So Edwards filed a postconviction motion arguing that (1) the sentencing court erroneously exercised its discretion, and (2) the postconviction court had the inherent authority to grant expunction.  The court of appeals reversed on (1) and declined to address (2).