On Point: 12. Statute of limitations

State v. Bradley A. Faber, 2010AP2325-CR , District 2, 3/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Faber: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

¶1        The State of Wisconsin appeals from an order of the circuit court dismissing the criminal charges against Bradley A. Faber.  Faber was issued a pair of citations for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) (First offense) by the City of Delavan in November 2005 and February 2006. 

Donald J. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, affirming unpublished decision; for McGuire: Robert R. Henak; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Statute of Limitations – § 939.74(3) – Constitutionality

Under § 939.74(3), the statute of limitations is tolled during “the time during which the actor was not publicly a resident within this state.” McGuire wasn’t a Wisconsin resident, but allegedly committed criminal acts in Wisconsin approximately 36 years before charges were issued.

State v. Bruce Duncan MacArthur, 2008 WI 72, on Certification
For MacArthur: Alex Flynn
Amicus: Robert R. Henak

Issue/Holding:

¶50      Our approach to tolling is guided by United States v. Florez, a Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion that articulated the requisite burden of proof and standard of review for the federal tolling provision. Florez,

State v. Bruce Duncan MacArthur, 2008 WI 72, on Certification
For MacArthur: Alex Flynn
Amicus: Robert R. Henak

Issue/Holding: Alleged violations, between 1965 and 1972, of since-repealed ch. 944 sexual assault statutes come within the statute of limitations provision extant during that time frame.

There is, of course, a whole lot more to it than that, at least in terms of getting to that point,

State v. Robert C. Deilke, 2004 WI 104, reversing 2003 WI App 151, 266 Wis. 2d 274, 667 N.W.2d 867
For Deilke: Kelly J. McKnight

Issue/Holding:

¶28 The primary purpose of the statute of limitations is to protect the accused from criminal consequences for remote past actions. State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10, ¶15, 259 Wis.

State v. Walter Junior Benjamin, 2003 WI 50, affirming 2002 WI App 89
For Hamilton: Robert A. Ramsdell

Issue/Holding:

¶3. Walter’s case raises questions about the application of statutes of limitations to child support collection actions. The issue presented is whether the State, as an assignee of Walter’s deceased former wife, filed a timely action to collect child support arrearages in 2000.

State v. Kevin D. Jennings, 2003 WI 10, reversing 2002 WI App 16, 250 Wis. 2d 138, 640 N.W.2d 165
For Jennings: Steven M. Compton

Issue/Holding:

¶1 … At issue is whether a criminal complaint that is filed against a defendant, who is already incarcerated, is sufficient to commence a prosecution. Based on the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) (1999-2000) and related criminal statutes that deal with the commencement of criminal prosecutions and warrantless arrests,

State v. Bobby R. Dabney, 2003 WI App 108, PFR filed 5/23/03
For Dabney: Lynn E. Hackbarth

Issue/Holding:

¶21. Here, it is undisputed that the DNA profile complaint and warrant were issued three days before the statute of limitations expired. We have already concluded that the complaint and warrant in this case were sufficient to commence the prosecution. Thus, the case was timely filed.

State v. James D. Miller, 2002 WI App 197, PFR filed 8/2/02
For Miller: Matthew H. Huppertz, Craig Kuhary, Daniel P. Fay

Issue/Holding: A verdict form requiring the jury to find that the offense occurred between March 1, 1989, and November 28, 1992, adequately established a time period for the offense. And, by finding that the victim was unable to complain due to the effects of the sexual contact or efforts by the defendant,

State v. David J. Lenz, 230 Wis.2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Lenz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether a charge of § 948.22(2) nonsupport based on arrearages accrued more than six years prior to the charge is barred by the statute of limitations.

Holding: The crime of nonsupport is complete after each 120-day period of intentional failure to pay, including arrearages as well as current obligations,