On Point blog, page 16 of 22
§ 943.34, Receiving Stolen Property: Venue
State v. Kenneth W. Lippold, 2008 WI App 130, PFR filed 8/18/08
For Lippold: Thomas J. Nitschke
Issue/Holding: On a charge of receiving stolen property, venue may rest in the county where the underlying theft occurred (and, provable by circumstantial rather than direct evidence):
¶16 Extrapolating from the holding in Swinson, we conclude that because the crime of receiving stolen property requires more than two acts,
Defenses – Statute of Limitations, § 939.74 – Version Applicable to Since-Repealed, Ch. 944 Offense
State v. Bruce Duncan MacArthur, 2008 WI 72, on Certification
For MacArthur: Alex Flynn
Amicus: Robert R. Henak
Issue/Holding: Alleged violations, between 1965 and 1972, of since-repealed ch. 944 sexual assault statutes come within the statute of limitations provision extant during that time frame.
There is, of course, a whole lot more to it than that, at least in terms of getting to that point,
Defenses – § 940.09(2), Homicide by Intoxicated Use: Death Would Have Occurred Anyway – Admissibility of Evidence of Deceased’s Prior Conduct as Relevant to Intervening Cause
State v. Steven P. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, affirming unpublished opinion
For Muckerheide: Mark S. Rosen
Issue/Holding: On a trial of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, § 940.09(1)(b), where the defense was that the death would have occurred anyway because the deceased grabbed the wheel just prior to the accident, evidence that the deceased “had, on prior occasions, gestured as if to grab the steering wheel of his father’s vehicle and,
§ 939.48(2), Defense of Self – Provocation: Initial Aggressor & Right to Assert Privilege
Root v. Saul, 2006 WI App 106
For Root: Thomas E. Hayes
Issue/Holding: Either slapping or punching someone in the face “is certainly conduct that can provoke others to attack”; and, because Saul indisputably slapped or punched Root in the face the jury could have found Saul the initial aggressor, the jury should have been instructed in accordance with Wis JI—Criminal 815 (embodying § 939.48(2), initial aggressor may not assert self-defense privilege except under enumerated circumstances),
Common Law Defenses – Collateral Attack on Order as Element of Pending Offense, Generally
State v. John W. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, on certification
For Campbell: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶42 Where a valid order or judgment is a necessary condition for one of the elements of a crime, a collateral attack upon the order or judgment can negate an element of the crime if the order or judgment is void. See State v.
Defenses – Mistake, § 939.43(1) – Relation to Reckless Conduct
State v. Quentrell E. Williams, 2006 WI App 212
For Williams: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Because “recklessly” causing harm to a child, § 948.03(b), is determined solely from an objective point of view, evidence related to whether the actor “subjectively thought his [disciplinary action] was reasonable parental discipline” is irrelevant, including evidence of how the actor was him or herself disciplined as a child,
Defenses – Imperfect Self-Defense, Generally
State v. Thomas G. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, PFR filed 7/10
For Kramer: Timothy A. Provis
Issue/Holding:
¶23 At trial, Kramer asserted he acted in self-defense, and the jury was instructed on imperfect self-defense. A successful defense based on imperfect self-defense reduces first-degree intentional homicide to second-degree intentional homicide. [12] The test is subjective; a defendant must present “evidence of actual beliefs that [he] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force [he] used was necessary to defend [himself].”State v.
Common Law Defenses – Laches Bar
State ex rel Marvin Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, reversing and remandingsummary order of court of appeals
For Coleman: Brian Kinstler
Issue/Holding:
¶28 Prihoda, Sawyer, Lohr and Schafer all employ a three-element test where the first element is unreasonable delay in bringing the claim and the other two elements apply to the party asserting laches: lack of knowledge (that the claim would be brought) and effect (prejudice).
Defenses – Issue Preclusion — “Actually Litigated” Requirement: OWI – Prior Judicial Overturn of Administrative Suspension, Not Necessarily Preclusive as to Subsequent Prosecution for Drunk Driving
City of Sheboygan v. Steven Nytsch, 2006 WI App 191, PFR filed 9/11/06
For Nytsch: Chad A. Lanning
Issue: Whether a prior judicial review of a driver’s license suspension, overturning the administrative suspension, had a preclusive effect on the issue of probable cause to arrest for drunk driving in the subsequent prosecution for that offense.
Holding:
¶11 Thus, a threshold prerequisite for application of the doctrine is that,
Common Law Defenses – Collateral Attack on Custody Order, § 948.31
State v. John W. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, on certification
For Campbell: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: To attack a custody order as void, in defense against interference with child custody, § 948.31, “the family court would have had to lack subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, or Campbell would have had to receive inadequate notice of the divorce proceedings,” ¶46.
Campbell argued that the custody order was procured by fraud,