On Point: 1. Generally

State v. Marshun Dante Jackson, 2019AP2091, 2/17/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Jackson pleaded to being part of a conspiracy to commit fraud (passing bad checks) against a bank in Dunn County. Then he was charged in St. Croix county with committing fraud against a bank there (initially this was also charged as a conspiracy, but ultimately he pleaded to the fraud itself as party to the crime). Both offenses occurred on the same date, and Jackson claims that the dual prosecutions violated both his constitutional right against double jeopardy and a statutory provision forbidding conviction of both conspiracy to commit a crime and the underlying crime itself. The court of appeals rejects both claims, holding that the conspiracy covered by the Dunn County charge didn’t encompass the acts in St. Croix County.

If you’re waiting for a decision on whether solicitation of 1st degree reckless injury is a crime in Wisconsin and on whether solicitation of 1st degree recklessly endangering safety is a lesser included offense of 1st degree reckless injury, STOP! SCOW just dismissed the case raising these issues–State v. Kelly James Kloss–as improvidently granted. SCOW’s really DIGing it this term. This is the second time in less than a month that it has issued a Dismissed as Improvidently Granted order.

State v. Kody K. Johnson, 2019AP1058-CR, District 4, 1/9/19, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Johnson accepted a negotiated disposition of 3 contempt charges stemming from his interference with child custody. He then moved to withdraw his plea arguing that the charges had no factual basis and were multiplicitous.

State v. Kelly James Kloss, 2018AP651-CR, petition and cross petition for review of a published court of appeals decision, both granted 6/11/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

Is solicitation of first degree reckless injury a crime under Wisconsin law?

Is solicitation of first degree recklessly endangering safety a lesser included offense of first degree reckless injury, making conviction for both offenses multiplicitous in this case?

State v. George W. Mallum, III, 2016AP765-CR, District 1, 12/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mallum was convicted of two counts of disorderly conduct arising out of a single incident, but because the charges were not identical in fact the convictions are not multiplicitous.

Review of a court of appeals summary disposition; case activity (including briefs); petition for review

Issues (composed by On Point)

(1)  Could the defendant be convicted of two counts of hit and run with death resulting for a single act of leaving the scene of an accident that caused two deaths?

(2) Is the defendant’s sentence unduly harsh?

State v. Joshua Java Berry, 2016 WI App 40; case activity (including briefs)

Berry was found guilty at a bench trial of being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 941.29(2)(a) (2013-14). Before sentencing, Berry’s lawyer figured out that Berry’s prior conviction was for a misdemeanor, not a felony. The court vacated the felon-in-possession conviction and dismissed the charge with prejudice, and the state immediately recharged him under § 941.29(2)(b) (2013-14) because Berry had a prior delinquency adjudication. (¶¶2-6). Recharging him doesn’t violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

State v. Trista J. Ziehr, 2015AP994-CR, 1/13/16, District 2 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity, including briefs

There isn’t much case law on Wisconsin’s “mandatory reporter” requirement, and this opinion makes no attempt to fill the gaps. Ziehr ran a daycare center and thus had a mandatory duty to report child abuse to the proper authorities whenever she had reasonable cause to suspect that such abuse had occurred. Wis. Stat. §48.981(2) & (6). A jury convicted her of failing to report abuse by her son. On appeal she argued primarily that: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury; (2) the State’s complaint was duplicitous, and (3) the trial court erroneously admitted “other acts” evidence. She lost on all issues.

Demetrius M. Boyd v. Gary A. Boughton, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2809, 8/14/15

Boyd challenged his convictions in state court for both bail jumping and the substantive offense on which the bail jumping charges were premised, arguing that convictions for both crimes violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. That challenge having failed, he sought federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit holds that, in the absence of clearly established federal law holding that the substantive offense is a lesser-included offense of the bail jumping and that Boyd could not therefore be convicted of both offenses, the state courts reasonably concluded that Boyd’s convictions for both offenses doesn’t violate double jeopardy.

State v. Ronnie L. Thums, 2012AP929-CR, District 4, 7/25/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Sufficiency of evidence of conspiracy

Thums was charged with offering money to Trepanier, a fellow prison inmate, to kill Thums’s ex-wife and others associated with her. (¶2). In response to Trepanier’s questions about how he’d be paid, Thums told Trepanier to burglarize his ex-wife’s mother’s home and then drew a map depicting the location of that home and his ex-wife’s home.