On Point: 12. Double Jeopardy, 5th Am.

State v. Thomas A. Nommensen, 2007 WI App 224
For Nommensen: Anthony L. O’Malley

Issue/Holding: Although charges of repeated sexual assault, § 948.025(1) were the same in law, they were different in fact because they :

¶8        Charged offenses are not multiplicitous if the facts are either separate in time or of a significantly different nature. Id. at 749. “The appropriate question is whether these acts allegedly committed … are so significantly different in fact that they may properly be denominated separate crimes although each would furnish a factual underpinning or a substitute legal element for the violation of the same statute.” Id.

State v. Alvin M. Moore, 2006 WI App 61, PFR filed 3/21/06
For Moore: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶15      Charges are multiplicitous if they charge a single criminal offense in more than one count. State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 159, 493 N.W.2d 23 (1992). Claims of multiplicity are analyzed using a two-prong test that requires examination of: (1) “whether the charged offenses are identical in law and fact;” and (2) if they are not,

State v. Jose M. Jaimes, 2006 WI App 93, PFR filed 5/11/06
For Jaimes: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding: Retrial is ordinarily not barred when the defendant successfully requests mistrial, except where prosecutorial overreaching, comprised of the following elements, has been shown: the prosecutor’s has “ a culpable state of mind in the nature of an awareness that his activity would be prejudicial to the defendant”;

State v. Jose M. Jaimes, 2006 WI App 93, PFR filed 5/11/06
For Jaimes: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding:

¶11      Next, Jaimes argues that the prosecutor’s responsibility to avoid provoking a mistrial must extend to the law enforcement officers who testify at trial …. In effect, Jaimes argues that the officer’s testimony must be imputed to the prosecutor, and when an officer testifies about explicitly excluded evidence,

State v. Otis G. Mattox, 2006 WI App 110
For Mattox: Scott D. Obernberger

Issue: Whether grant of mistrial over objection, after defense counsel was held in contempt for supposedly violating a court order with respect to questioning a witness, was manifestly necessary so as to permit retrial.

Holding:

¶19      As noted, the chief concerns of the trial court in continuing the trial were the problems occasioned by Schnake being found in contempt,

State v. Rachel W. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, reversing unpublished decision
For Kelty: Michael J. Fairchild

Issue/Holding: The defendant’s striking the victim “twice with two separate objects, each time committing herself to strike the baby, each blow separate, distinct, not identical in fact,” supports two separate charges of first-degree reckless injury, § 940.23(1)(a), ¶¶49-50.

State v. Richard A. Moeck, 2005 WI 57, affirming 2004 WI App 47
For Moeck: David D. Cook

Issue/Holding1:

¶37 A mistrial is warranted if the mistrial is “manifestly necessary.” The State bears the burden to demonstrate that a “‘manifest necessity’ [exists] for any mistrial ordered over the objection of the defendant.” A “manifest necessity” warranting a mistrial is a high degree of necessity.

State v. Barbara E. Harp, 2005 WI App 250
For Harp: Aaron N. Halstead, Kathleen Meter Lounsbury, Danielle L. Carne

Issue/Holding:

¶13      The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution prevent the state from trying a defendant multiple times for the same offense. [4] “[G]iven the importance of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy,

State v. Bart C. Gruetzmacher, 2004 WI 55, on certification
For Gruetzamacher: Jennelle London Joset

Issue/Holding:

¶14. We now decide whether circuit courts should be allowed to correct obvious errors in sentencing where it is clear that a good faith mistake was made in an initial sentencing pronouncement, where the court promptly recognizes the error, and where the court, by reducing an erroneous original sentence on one count and increasing the original sentence on another,

State v. Shawn A. Beasley, 2004 WI App 42, PFR filed 3/26/04
For Beasley: Robert Ruth

Issue: Whether charges and convictions for burglary while armed (§ 943.10(2)(a)) and burglary while committing battery (§ 943.10(2)(d)) are multiplicitous.

Holding:

¶5. We reject Beasley’s challenge for two reasons. First, the subsections of Wis. Stat. § 943.10(2) do not define penalty enhancers, they define distinct crimes.