On Point blog, page 9 of 14
Illegal Plea Bargains – “Reopen and Amend”
State v. James Stoner, III, 2009AP2963, District 2, 9/22/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Stoner: Joshua Davis Uller; BiC; Resp.; Reply
“Reopen-and-amend” plea bargains, “referring to those plea bargains where the State and defendant agree that a judgment of conviction, once announced, will be amended by the State upon the happening of some future event.
Plea-Withdrawal – Double Jeopardy
State v. Charles D. Brown, No. 2009AP2093-CR, District I, 6/23/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Brown: Martin J. Pruhs; BiC; Resp.
Under State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992), a court may not sua sponte order withdrawal of a guilty plea, absent fraud or intentional withholding of material information.
Double Jeopardy: Habeas Review of “Manifest Necessity for Mistrial”
Renico v. Lett, USSC No. 09-338, 5/3/10
The state court’s conclusion of manifest necessity for mistrial where the foreperson reported inability to reach unanimity wasn’t unreasonable, hence grant of habeas relief is vacated:
… (T)rial judges may declare a mistrial “whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity” for doing so. Id., at 580. The decision to declare a mistrial is left to the “sound discretion” of the judge,
State v. Earnest Jean Jackson, 2009AP1449-CR, District I, 4/27/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); for Jackson: Mark S. Rosen; BiC: Resp.; Reply
Double Jeopardy – Retrial Following Mistrial
Mistrial on defendant’s motion, occasioned by prosecutorial failure to disclose that witness was cooperating with police in separate investigation of Jackson, didn’t bar retrial: there was no showing that the prosecutor was aware of the undisclosed information, or that failure to disclose was intended to provoke mistrial,
State v. Patrick R. Patterson, 2008AP1968-CR, Wis SCt review granted 3/16/10
decision below: 2009 WI App 161; for Patterson: David R. Karpe
Issues:
Is contributing to the delinquency of a child resulting in death a lesser-included offense of first-degree reckless homicide under Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2)?
Can one contribute to the delinquency of a 17-year-old individual when such individuals are no longer subject to juvenile delinquency petitions?
Was a reckless homicide jury instruction defective because it gave as an element to be proved that the deceased used and died from a substance “alleged to have been delivered by the defendant?”
Was there prosecutorial misconduct in refreshing the recollection of witnesses with the testimony and statements of other witnesses?
State v. Patrick R. Patterson, 2009 WI App 61, PFR 10/30/09
court of appeals decision, for Patterson: David R. Karpe
Multiplicity – First-Degree Reckless Homicide by Delivery of Controlled Substance, § 940.02(2)(a) and Contributing to Delinquency Resulting in Death of Child, § 948.40(4)(a): Not Multiplicitous
Based largely on State v. Jimmie Davison, 2003 WI 89 (multiple convictions for battery permissible so long as multiple batteries have been charged), the court holds that § 939.66(2) permits conviction for both §§ 940.02(2)(a) and 948.04(4)(a),
State v. Charles Lamar, 2009 WI App 133, review granted
Consecutive sentences following partial plea withdrawal and reconviction
Click here for court of appeals decision, petition for review granted 10/27/10
Defense counsel: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: After sentencing on 3 separate counts, the trial court granted Lamar’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to 2 of the counts. He continued to serve the sentence on the unchallenged count. Upon subsequent reconviction on the 2 counts,
Double Jeopardy – Multiplicity – § 940.02(2)(a) and § 948.40(4)(a): Not Multiplicitous
State v. Patrick R. Patterson, 2009 WI App 161
For Patterson: David R. Karpe
Issue/Holding: Based largely on State v. Jimmie Davison, 2003 WI 89 (multiple convictions for battery permissible so long as multiple batteries have been charged), the court holds that § 939.66(2) permits conviction for both §§ 940.02(2)(a) and 948.04(4)(a), ¶¶1-21. The offenses are not the same “in law”—each containing at least one element not in the other—and therefore Patterson bears the burden of overcoming a presumption in favor of cumulative punishment.
Double Jeopardy – Resentencing – No Presumption of Vindictiveness
State v. Charles Lamar, 2009 WI App 133, PFR filed 9/10/09
For Lamar: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: No presumption of vindictiveness applied to resentencing by a different judge upon guilty pleas re-entered after the original trial court granted Lamar’s postconviction motion to withdraw the initial guilty pleas.
¶17 In Naydihor, our supreme court found that the Pearce presumption did not apply.
Double Jeopardy – Multiplicity: Bail Jumping – Single Bond, Same Condition but Different Cases
State v. Dana Eaglefeathers, 2009 WI App 2, PFR filed 1/9/09
For Eaglefeathers: Patricia A. Fitzgerald
Issue/Holding: Violation of the same condition in a single bond applicable to two different cases (failure to appear at both preliminary hearings scheduled for the same time and court) supports multiple bail jumping charges:
¶8 The parties do not dispute that the offenses charged against Eaglefeathers are identical in law;