On Point blog, page 1 of 1
Defense win: State failed to meet burden at Kastigar hearing
State v. Karl L. Quigley, 2016 WI App 53; case activity (including briefs)
Karl Quigley confessed to sex offenses during an interrogation by a police detective, and later confessed to additional offenses while being questioned by his probation officer. The court of appeals rejects his Miranda challenge to his initial confession, but agrees that the state failed to show that evidence obtained after the statement to the P.O. was “derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of” that statement, as required by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Because Quigley’s plea bargain incorporated charges from both sets of offenses, the court remands for plea withdrawal.
State v. Gregory M. Sahs, 2009AP2916-CR, WSC review granted 11/14/12
on review of unpublished decision; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
Whether Sahs’ statements to his probation agent, along with evidence derived from those statements, were suppressible under the “Evans-Thompson” rule, which holds that a probationer’s statements which are compelled by the terms of probation – provide information to an agent when requested or face revocation – are covered by use- and derivative-immunity.
Sahs,
“Evans-Thompson” Immunity – Derivative Use
State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, on certification; case activity
Probationer’s statement, compelled by rules of his supervision, is covered by derivative as well as use immunity in a criminal prosecution.
¶3 We hold that the statement that Spaeth made to Oshkosh police was derived from the compelled, incriminating, testimonial statement that he made to his probation agent. Thus,
State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2009AP2907-CR, review granted 2/8/11
on certification; for Spaeth: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
Issue (formulated by On Point):
Whether a statement made to law enforcement following a probationer’s honest accounting to his probation agent may derive from a “legitimate source wholly independent of compelled testimony” and therefore admissible in a criminal case, notwithstanding the promise of immunity for such statements when made to probation agents.
See prior post for further discussion.
State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2009AP2907-CR, District 2, 12/29/10
certification; for Spaeth: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; Spaeth BiC; State Resp.; Reply
ISSUE
In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 460 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that the government may compel incriminating testimony so long as it comes with a grant of use and derivative use immunity—that is to say,