On Point: M. Scienter

Micah D. Stern v. Michael Meisner, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2558, 2/9/16

Stern’s conviction for using a computer to facilitate a sex crime against a child under § 948.075 is constitutional because the Wisconsin appellate court’s conclusion that the statute allows conviction based on the defendant’s “reason to believe” the victim is a minor was neither unreasonable nor unforeseeable.

State v. Lavarren D. Etienne, 2014AP2881-CR, 6/18/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This appeal concerned the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict that Etienne intentionally violated a bond which prohibited him from having contact with “P.J.”  Etienne said the contact was accidental. Due to the deference given to jury findings,  Etienne’s argument failed.  So did his claimed due process violation.

Elonis v. United States, USSC No. 13-983, 2015 WL 2464051 (June 1, 2015), reversing United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved a prosecution of Elonis for threats he made in postings on his Facebook page, and it was being widely watched for the First Amendment question it raised. But the Court sidestepped the constitutional question, and holds instead that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the federal statute he was prosecuted under, requires the government to prove some sort of mental state regarding the threatening nature of the communication.

State v. Michael R. Luedtke/State v. Jessica Weissinger, 2015 WI 42, 4/24/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that § 346.63(1)(am), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, is a strict liability crime and does not violate due process by failing to require proof that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance.

Consolidated review of two published court of appeals decisions: State v. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73 (case activity); and State v. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79 (case activity)

Issues (composed by On Point)

In light of State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, does the Wisconsin Constitution provide greater due process protection than the federal constitution, such that defendants charged with operating with a detectable amount of a controlled substance in their blood are denied due process under the Wisconsin Constitution when their blood samples are destroyed before the defendants had notice of the charges or test results and thus had no chance to get the blood independently tested?

Does the offense of operating with a detectable amount of controlled substances in the blood violate due process by failing to require the state to prove that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance?

State v. Michael R. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42 (posts here and here); case activity

Section 346.63(1)(am), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, does not violate due process by failing to require proof that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance. In addition, Luedtke’s due process rights were not violated when the state crime lab destroyed his blood sample before he could have it independently tested.

State v. John Lee Schaefer, 2003 WI App 164, PFR filed 8/21/03
For Schaefer: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶32. Schaefer claims that by allowing conviction for possession of child pornography when a defendant “reasonably should know” that the child depicted is under eighteen years of age, Wis. Stat. § 948.12 omits a scienter requirement for the offense. He contends that in expressing the intent element regarding the minority of the depicted child in the pornographic materials as “knows or reasonably should know,”