On Point: O. Substantive due process

State v. Allan Nathan Carroll, Jr. A/K/A/ U’si Ch-ab, 2023AP870, 3/20/24, District 2 (one-judge appeal; ineligible for publication); case activity

Carroll, Jr., a.k.a. Ch-ab, pro se, appeals a jury verdict convicting him of resisting or obstructing an officer. Ch-ab raises two claims on appeal: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated during a traffic stop that led to his arrest and conviction and (2) that his “status as an ‘Indigenous Aborigine American’ relieved him of the obligation to comply with Wisconsin law requiring that motor vehicles operating on Wisconsin roads be registered and display license plates.” The court rejects his arguments on appeal and affirms.

State v. Dallas R. Christel, 2020AP1127-1128-Cr, 12/8/21, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Christel argued that §940.235, which criminalizes strangulation and suffocation, (1) violates substantive due process on its face and as applied to him, (2) is overbroad, and (3) is void for vagueness. He also argued for a new-factor-based sentence modification on his bail-jumping convictions. The court of appeals torpedoed every claim.

Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2018AP1887, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 7/24/20; case activity

Issues presented:

1. Did the circuit court lose competency to conduct a recommitment hearing because the County did not file the evaluation of K.E.K. at least 21 days before the expiration of her commitment, as required by § 51.20(13)(g)2r.?
2. Is the recommitment standard in § 51.20(1)(am) facially unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment  because it violates the guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection of the law or abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens?
3. Is the recommitment standard in § 51.20(1)(am) unconstitutional as applied to K.E.K.?

Kahler v. Kansas, USSC No. 18-6135, 2020 WL 1325817, 3/23/20, affirming State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105 (Kan. 2018); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Kansas amended its insanity defense to limit to defendants whose mental illness prevents them from forming the required intent to commit a crime. A majority of the Supreme Court holds that does not violate due process.

State v. Stephan I. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, 12/3/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2017AP1894, case activity (including briefs)

The result here is simple, and expected, given the current makeup of the court: a five-two majority to overturn State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582. Dubose held that “show up” identifications–those where the police present a witness with only one suspect–were inherently suggestive, and identifications so obtained would be inadmissible unless circumstances rendered the procedure “necessary.” So, now, Wisconsin courts will review claims that a show-up identification should be excluded under the test of State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 264, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995): a defendant must carry the initial burden to show the procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and if he or she does, the state must then prove that the identification is nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances.

State v. Fitzgerald, 2018AP1296-CR, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19; case activity

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) held that a mentally ill  defendant has a constitutional right to avoid unwanted antipsychotic medication. The State can force it on him to restore his competency for trial only by proving the 4 “Sell factors.” Fitzgerald holds that §971.14 does not conform to Sell. Going forward, the State cannot obtain involuntary med orders based solely on §971.14 because it is constitutionally infirm.  The State must satisfy Sell factors. The cases where this is possible may be “rare.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  Involuntary medication to restore competency to proceed should be the exception, not the rule.

State v. Michael A. Keister, 2019 WI 26, 3/19/19, reversing a court of appeals order dismissing the appeal and vacating a circuit court order; case activity (including briefs)

The statute providing for grants to set up treatment courts, § 165.95, does not create a fundamental liberty interest for defendants to participate in treatment court and does not itself need to define the procedures for expulsion from treatment court.

State v. Blake Lee Harrison, 2017AP1811, District 3, 2/26/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Harrison’s due process and void-for-vagueness challenges to § 346.63(1)(am) (prohibiting driving with a detectable amount of restricted controlled substance) go up in smoke.

State v. Michael A. Keister, 2017AP1618-CR, state’s petition for review granted 9/4/2018; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (based on the state’s petition for review )

1. Does a person have a fundamental liberty interest in participation in a treatment court funded by the state and county when he or she is charged with an offense involving violent conduct as defined in § 165.95(1)(a) (2015-16)?
2. Does § 165.95 (2015-16), the statute creating DOJ’s grant funding for treatment courts, violate procedural due process because it does not procedures for treatment courts to follow in expelling a participant?

State v. Robert Mario Wheeler, 2016AP55-CR, 2/21/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Robert Wheeler was tried for reckless injury and being a felon in possession of a gun arising out of a single shooting incident. To keep the jury from hearing about his status as a felon, the parties stipulated that he was and agreed that the gun possession charge would be decided by the court. Wheeler’s counsel specifically noted the possibility that the two counts could be decided differently, given the different factfinders. (¶5).