On Point: 13. Due Process

State v. Andre M. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, 6/12/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals; opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that when the parties in an OWI prosecution are disputing the number of prior offenses, the circuit court can require the dispute to be resolved before it accepts the defendant’s plea; it doesn’t have to wait till sentencing to determine the number of prior offenses. And even if the court errs in denying the state the chance to prove an additional prior OWI conviction at sentencing, it violates due process to allow the circuit court to resentence the defendant on the basis of the additional conviction if the additional conviction would increase the penalty that could be imposed.

Elonis v. United States, USSC No. 13-983, 2015 WL 2464051 (June 1, 2015), reversing United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved a prosecution of Elonis for threats he made in postings on his Facebook page, and it was being widely watched for the First Amendment question it raised. But the Court sidestepped the constitutional question, and holds instead that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the federal statute he was prosecuted under, requires the government to prove some sort of mental state regarding the threatening nature of the communication.

State v. General Grant Wilson, 2015 WI 48, reversing an unpublished court of appeals summary disposition; opinion by Prosser; concurrence by Ziegler; dissent by Abrahamson; case activity (including briefs)

If this portly opinion had been placed on 40-page reducing plan, it would have gained clarity and exposed its inner motive: ensuring that a 22-year old conviction sticks. In Wisconsin, even when the case against a defendant is overwhelming, he still has the right to present evidence that a 3rd party committed the crime of which he is accused per State v. Denny. To do so, he must show that the 3rd party had a motive and an opportunity to commit, and a direct connection to, the crime charged. SCOW here reaffirms Denny but “engineers” a more stringent “opportunity” test for certain cases.

Click here for certification order; circuit court order affirmed, 2016 WI 1; click here for case activity

Issue (composed by the court of appeals):

This appeal raises an important issue of first impression regarding the constitutionality of a mental health treatment statute related to inmates within the Wisconsin state prison system.  The question presented is whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) (2013-14) is facially unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds because it does not require that a court find an inmate dangerous prior to ordering the inmate civilly committed for treatment and authorizing the involuntary medication of the inmate.  A definitive answer to this question from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, along with a clear statement as to the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny to apply in such a case, would be of great value to the bench, the bar, the legislature, and the citizenry.  Thus, we certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.61.

State v. Michael R. Luedtke/State v. Jessica M. Weissinger, 2015 WI 42, 4/24/15, affirming two published decisions of the court of appeals: Luedtke; Weissinger; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs): Luedtke; Weissinger

Brushing aside the argument that the Wisconsin Constitution’s due process clause provides greater protection to its citizens than the federal constituiton, the supreme court affirms the existing Wisconsin rule governing claims that the destruction of evidence by the state violates a defendant’s right to due process.

State v. Michael R. Luedtke/State v. Jessica Weissinger, 2015 WI 42, 4/24/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that § 346.63(1)(am), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, is a strict liability crime and does not violate due process by failing to require proof that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance.

State v. Joel M. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, 3/31/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs)

This lengthy decision addresses three discrete issues: Whether Hurley was given sufficient notice of the child sexual assault charges he had to defend against; whether other acts evidence was properly admitted; and whether the prosecutor’s closing argument justified a new trial in the interest of justice.

This post covers the court’s conclusion that under its just-revised “totality of the circumstances” test for deciding whether charges of child sexual assault give a defendant adequate notice of the charges, Hurley was given sufficient notice by a criminal complaint charging him with repeated acts of sexual assault of M.C.N., his stepdaughter, on three or more occasions “on and between” 2000 and 2005. Our post on the other-acts issue is here, and our post on the prosecutor’s closing argument is here.

Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2014AP1048, 4/1/15, District 2, click here for certification; certification granted 5/12/15, circuit court orders affirmed, 2016 WI 1

Issue

This appeal raises an important issue of first impression regarding the constitutionality of a mental health treatment statute related to inmates within the Wisconsin state prison system. The question presented is whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) (2013-14) is facially unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds because it does not require that a court find an inmate dangerous prior to ordering the inmate civilly committed for treatment and authorizing the involuntary medication of the inmate. A definitive answer to this question from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, along with a clear statement as to the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny to apply in such a case, would be of great value to the bench, the bar, the legislature, and the citizenry. Thus, we certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.61.

State v. Brian S. Kempainen, 2015 WI 32, 3/19/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that when determining whether the accusations in a criminal complaint are specific enough to give a defendant fair notice of the charges and an opportunity to defend against them, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, and not just the specific set or subset of factors listed in State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1981).

State v. Eddie Lee Anthony, 2015 WI 20, affirming unpublished COA decision; click here for docket and briefs

Resolving an issue of first impression, SCOW has decided that a defendant may forfeit his constitutional right to testify by stating an intent to bring up irrelevant matters or by engaging in conduct incompatible with the assertion of that right. Also, the erroneous denial of the right to testify is subject to a harmless error analysis–even where the record shows the defendant would testify to both relevant and irrelevant matters.