On Point: 13. Due Process

State v. Angelica Nelson, 2014 WI 70, 7/16/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority decision by Justice Roggensack; case activity

Nelson wanted to testify at her trial on child sexual assault charges, but after a colloquy with her about waiving her right to remain silent the trial judge wouldn’t let her because he concluded she was testifying against counsel’s advice and her testimony was “completely irrelevant” to the elements the State had to prove. (¶¶14-16). The supreme court assumes without deciding that the trial judge erred, but it follows the majority of jurisdictions in holding that erroneous denial of a defendant’s right to testify is subject to harmless error analysis because its effect on the outcome of the trial is capable of assessment.

State v. Jessica M. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42; case activity

Saying it is bound by the rule from Youngblood v. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the court of appeals holds that the state’s destruction of a blood sample before the defendant was notified of her option to test the sample did not violate her due process rights because she has not shown the sample was “apparently exculpatory.” A vigorous dissent says the majority reads Youngblood too broadly, and concludes that because the evidence was inculpatory and necessary to the prosecution, destroying the evidence violated Weissinger’s due process rights even if the state didn’t act in bad faith.

State v. Russell S. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80; case activity

In the first Wisconsin case to address how Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), affects the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence, the court of appeals reads Salinas to apply to a narrow factual scenario not present in this case. The court goes on to assume that trial counsel should have objected to testimony about Krancki’s silence, but finds his failure to object wasn’t prejudicial. The court also concludes trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for saying in his opening statement that Krancki would testify or for failing to exclude references to the .02 blood alcohol limit.

State v. Michael R. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42 (posts here and here); case activity

Section 346.63(1)(am), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, does not violate due process by failing to require proof that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance. In addition, Luedtke’s due process rights were not violated when the state crime lab destroyed his blood sample before he could have it independently tested.

State v. Antonio D. Williams, 2013AP814; 6/3/14; District 1; (not recommended for publication); case activity

This appeal raises a host of issues but the most interesting concern the trial court’s decisions to: (1) prohibit defense counsel from cross-examining the State’s cooperating witnesses, all of whom were testifying in the hopes of receiving reduced sentences for themselves, about the maximum penalties they faced; and (2) allow the State to use a letter police found in an envelope marked “for my lawyer” to impeach Williams’s alibi witness.

State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity

The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.

State v. Brian Kempainen, 2014 WI App 53, petition for review granted 9/18/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 32; case activity

In this case, the circuit court dismissed 2 counts of sexual assault of a child against Kempainen because the charges failed to provide sufficient notice of when the assaults occurred thus violating due process.  The court of appeals, clarifying the test in State v. R.A.R. and State v. Fawcett, reversed and held that the date of the crimes need not be precisely alleged.

Review of a summary disposition, case activity

Issues (lifted from the State’s PFR here)

Did Wilson satisfy the opportunity requirement for presenting third-party-perpetrator evidence under State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1984) with respect to Willie Friend?

If the answer to the first question is “yes,” was the error in excluding the Denny evidence harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.?

State v. Raynard Rashawn Jackson, 2012AP1854, 2012AP1861, and 2012AP1862, District 1, 10/15/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity: 2012AP1854; 2012AP1861; 2012AP1862

Jackson was alleged to have been involved in a shooting, and as part of their investigation the police constructed a photo array to show to three eyewitnesses, all of whom identified Jackson. (¶¶2, 10-11). The array consisted of photos of Jackson and five other persons.

State v. Michael E. Mauermann, 2012AP2568-CR, District 4, 7/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Iowa County Ordinance § 600.08 provides that “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle so as to make any loud, disturbing or unnecessary noise in or about any public street, alley, park or private residence which may tend to annoy or disturb another by causing the tires of said vehicle to squeal,