On Point blog, page 2 of 5
Defense win in SCOTUS casts doubt on SCOW decision permitting counsel to concede client’s guilt
McCoy v. Louisiana, USSC No. 16 – 8255, 2018 WL 218-617, 5/14/18, reversing and remanding State v. McCoy, 2018 So.3d 535 (La. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary).
In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, SCOTUS holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that his lawyer refrain from admitting that he is guilty of a charged crime when he objects to that admission. It further holds that if a lawyer concedes guilt in this situation, Strickland and the harmless error rule do not apply. The defendant automatically gets a new trial.
Court of Appeals rejects challenges to child sexual assault convictions
State v. Timothy P. Gregory, 2016AP1265-CR, District 2, 3/14/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In this lengthy decision, the court of appeals rejects multiple challenges Gregory makes to his convictions for child sexual assault that occurred in 1997.
SCOTUS will review concessions of guilt by trial counsel
McCoy v. Louisiana, USSC No. 16-8255, cert granted 9/28/17
Is it unconstitutional for defense counsel to concede an accused’s guilt over the accused’s express objection?
Defense win on newly-discovered Denny evidence affirmed on appeal
State v. Daniel G. Scheidell, 2015AP1598-CR, 3/29/17, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Congrats to the Remington Center for a winning a new trial in the interests of justice based on newly-discovered, 3rd-party perpetrator evidence 19 years after Scheidell was convicted of 1st degree sexual assault and armed robbery. Even better, their win was affirmed on appeal!
James E. McWilliams v. Jefferson S. Dunn, USSC No. 16-5294, cert. granted 1/13/2017
Question presented:
Whether, when this court held in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), that an indigent defendant is entitled to meaningful expert assistance for the “evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense,” it clearly established that the expert should be independent of the prosecution.
State v. Stietz, 2014AP2701-CR, petition for review granted, 10/11/16
Review of a per curiam opinion; case activity (including briefs); petition for review
Issues (from Stietz’s petition):
1. On the facts of this case, did the court of appeals deny Stietz’s federal and state constitutional rights to present a complete defense of self-defense, and contradict controlling precedent of this Court in State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977), by weighing Stietz’s credibility and requiring more than “some evidence,” even if inconsistent, to support a self-defense instruction?
2. On the facts of this case, did the court of appeals deny Stietz’s federal and state constitutional rights to present a defense by forbidding argument that Stietz was defending himself against two men he reasonably believed were armed trespassers?
3. On the facts of this case the court of appeals contradict this Court’s controlling decision in State v. Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 577 N.W.2d 825 (1998), by foreclosing self-defense against wardens who: (a) the accused did not know were law enforcement officers, on evidence the jury was entitled to credit; (b) were not even claiming to make an arrest, but only were trying to disarm a man without apparent right; and (c) were not acting peaceably in any event, but rather were trying violently to disarm a lawfully armed man?
Defense experts’ testimony about possible blood test errors too speculative to be admitted
State v. Ali Garba, 2015AP1243-CR, District 2, 10/5/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Garba wanted to present testimony from two expert witnesses about possible reliability problems with the gas chromatography tests of his blood, but the circuit court wouldn’t let him. The court of appeals holds the circuit court properly exercised its discretion and rejects Garba’s claim the ruling violated his right to present a defense.
Privilege re: desire to shoot victim waived by statement of desire to shoot self
State v. Daniel L. Schmidt, 2016 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals rejects three challenges to Schmidt’s jury-trial conviction of two homicides.
State court’s exclusion, on hearsay grounds, of exculpatory evidence didn’t violate right to present defense
Wayne Kubsch v. Ron Neal, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1898, 8/12/15
After being convicted of murdering his wife, her son, and her ex-husband, Kubsch was sentenced to death. He challenged his conviction and sentence in a federal habeas proceeding on three grounds: (1) the Indiana trial court excluded evidence of a witness’s exculpatory hearsay statement to police; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective in seeking admission of the witness’s hearsay statement; and (3) his waiver of counsel and choice to represent himself at the sentencing phase of his trial were not knowing and voluntary. The court, over a dissent by one judge as to the first and second claims, rejects Kubsch’s arguments.
SCOTUS: State court misapplied Atkins standard for determining intellectual disability
Brumfield v. Cane, USSC No. 13-1433, (June 18, 2015), reversing Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918 (5th Cir. 2014); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary); Majority opinion by Sotomayor; dissenting opinion by Thomas (joined in part by Roberts, Scalia and Alito)
Brumfield was convicted of murder and sentenced to death before Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) prohibited the execution of the intellectually disabled. Afterwards, Brumfield, who has an IQ of 75, sought to prove is intellectual disability in state court, but was denied the time and funding to get an expert as well as an evidentiary hearing. In a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS found this an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented under 28 USC §2254(d)(2) and allowed Brumfield to have his Atkins claim considered on the merits in federal court.