On Point: N. Statutory challenge

State v. Keith Kenyon, 2022AP2228-CR, 9/16/25, District I (recommended for publication); case activity

Although COA is surprisingly candid in acknowledging some of the injustices present in this appeal, the Court ultimately concludes that Kenyon’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by existing precedent.

State v. Walter L. Johnson, 2024AP79-CR, 2/13/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity

In a case resolving a hot issue for OWI litigators, COA rejects challenges to an RCS prosecution based on the chemical difference between “L meth”–found in certain nasal decongestant sprays–and “D meth,” which is found in illicit street drugs.

State v. Dustin J. VanderGalien, 2023AP890-CR, 12/29/23, District 4 (recommended for publication); case activity

VanderGalien pled no contest to three counts stemming from a fatal motor vehicle crash after a non-impairing cocaine metabolite (benzoylecgonine or “BE”) was detected in his blood hours after the incident. The court of appeals rejects his facial challenge to the statute, Wis. Stat. § 340.01(50m)(c), which includes BE as a restricted controlled substance under the motor vehicle code. The court of appeals explains that “the inclusion of cocaine or any of its metabolites in the definition of a restricted controlled substance for purposes of prosecution under the Wisconsin motor vehicle code bears a rational relationship to the purpose or objective of the statutory scheme,” which is to combat drugged driving. Op., ¶30.

State v. Terry L. Hibbard, 2022 WI App 53; case activity (including briefs)

In a decision that allows for a sweeping expansion of aiding and abetting prosecutions in Len Bias cases, the court of appeals holds that a person assisting only a buyer a drug transaction could also be prosecuted for reckless homicide if the buyer dies from using the drug because any act aiding the buyer in getting the drugs also necessarily aids the seller in making the delivery.

State v. Michael A. Keister, 2019 WI 26, 3/19/19, reversing a court of appeals order dismissing the appeal and vacating a circuit court order; case activity (including briefs)

The statute providing for grants to set up treatment courts, § 165.95, does not create a fundamental liberty interest for defendants to participate in treatment court and does not itself need to define the procedures for expulsion from treatment court.

State v. Michael A. Keister, 2017AP1618-CR, state’s petition for review granted 9/4/2018; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (based on the state’s petition for review )

1. Does a person have a fundamental liberty interest in participation in a treatment court funded by the state and county when he or she is charged with an offense involving violent conduct as defined in § 165.95(1)(a) (2015-16)?
2. Does § 165.95 (2015-16), the statute creating DOJ’s grant funding for treatment courts, violate procedural due process because it does not procedures for treatment courts to follow in expelling a participant?

Walker Whatley v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2534, 2016 WL 4269805, 8/15/16

The maximum penalty for Whatley’s drug possession conviction was dramatically increased—from 2-to-8 years to 20-to-50 years—under a now-repealed Indiana penalty enhancer for drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a “youth program center,” defined as a “building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs” for youth. (Sound familiar? Sure it does: see §§ 961.01(22) and 961.49(1m)(b)5.) On habeas review, the Seventh Circuit holds that the statute’s failure to provide an objective standard for determining what “regular” means makes the statute unconstitutionally vague, so Whatley is entitled to resentencing under the non-enhanced penalty scheme.

Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, on certification from the court of appeals, and affirming the circuit court’s orders for commitment and involuntary medication; majority opinion by Justice Gableman, concurrence/dissent by Justice Abrahamson; case activity

The provisions of ch. 51 allowing the involuntary mental health commitment of prison inmates without a finding of dangerousness does not violate substantive due process because the statute’s provisions are reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.

Racine County v. Renee D., 2012AP1974, District 2, 2/20/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Wis. Stat. § 48.415(5) is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate due process

As applied to Renee D., the two elements for the “child abuse” ground under § 48.415(5) are: 1) the parent has shown a pattern of physical or sexual abuse that is a substantial threat to the health of the child who is the subject of the petition;

State v. James W. Smith, 2010 WI 16, affirming 2009 WI App 16; for Smith: Shelley M. Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate

The § 301.45 reporting requirement applicable to any violation of false imprisonment of a minor not the defendant’s child is rationally related to a legitimate government interest in protecting the public, particularly children, ¶¶27-36.

Keep in mind that Smith challenged the statute as applied to him.