On Point: 14. Equal Protect., 14th Am.

State v. Walter L. Johnson, 2024AP79-CR, 2/13/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity

In a case resolving a hot issue for OWI litigators, COA rejects challenges to an RCS prosecution based on the chemical difference between “L meth”–found in certain nasal decongestant sprays–and “D meth,” which is found in illicit street drugs.

State v. Dustin J. VanderGalien, 2023AP890-CR, 12/29/23, District 4 (recommended for publication); case activity

VanderGalien pled no contest to three counts stemming from a fatal motor vehicle crash after a non-impairing cocaine metabolite (benzoylecgonine or “BE”) was detected in his blood hours after the incident. The court of appeals rejects his facial challenge to the statute, Wis. Stat. § 340.01(50m)(c), which includes BE as a restricted controlled substance under the motor vehicle code. The court of appeals explains that “the inclusion of cocaine or any of its metabolites in the definition of a restricted controlled substance for purposes of prosecution under the Wisconsin motor vehicle code bears a rational relationship to the purpose or objective of the statutory scheme,” which is to combat drugged driving. Op., ¶30.

State v. S.S.M., 2022AP524 & 2022AP525, District 1, 8/2/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 48.415(intro.), termination of parental rights to children subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requires, in addition to proof of one or more grounds for termination under subs. (1) to (10), proof of “active efforts,” as defined in § 48.028(4)(e)2., to prevent the breakup of the family as well as the unsuccess of those efforts. S.S.M., whose children are not subject to the ICWA, argues that the statute’s failure to require proof of active efforts in all TPR cases violates the right to equal protection the statute because it gives Indian parents greater protection from having their parental rights involuntarily terminated than it does non-Indian parents. The court of appeals rejects the claim.

Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2018AP1887, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 7/24/20; case activity

Issues presented:

1. Did the circuit court lose competency to conduct a recommitment hearing because the County did not file the evaluation of K.E.K. at least 21 days before the expiration of her commitment, as required by § 51.20(13)(g)2r.?
2. Is the recommitment standard in § 51.20(1)(am) facially unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment  because it violates the guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection of the law or abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens?
3. Is the recommitment standard in § 51.20(1)(am) unconstitutional as applied to K.E.K.?

Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, USSC No. 15-606, 2017 WL 855760 (March 6, 2017), reversing Peña-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287 (Colo. 2015); Scotusblog page

Every state and federal jurisdiction has some version of the “no-impeachment rule,” which, after a verdict is received, bars an aggrieved party from presenting testimony by jurors regarding the jury’s deliberations. SCOTUS has twice upheld such rules against constitutional challenge, while allowing that there could be certain cases in which refusing to permit such testimony would be too harmful to justice. The court now decides that the no-impeachment rule must give way to the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury where “a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant.”

State v. James D. Heidke, 2016 WI App 55; case activity (including briefs)

The state charged Heidke with one count of use of a computer to facilitate a child sex crime. Heidke moved to dismiss the penalty enhancer in §939.617(1) because it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments in that it has no rational basis to that crime and it is unconstitutional as applied to him.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from petition for review):

Does Wis. Stat. §19.356 preclude petitioners from seeking a declaratory judgment that the DOJ’s alias name policy violates Wisconsin’s public records law?

Don’t be misled by the bland statement of the first issue. Teague has asked SCOW to decide whether the DOJ should be allowed to hand out false criminal history records about innocent people in response to open records requests.

Dennis A. Teague v. J. B. Van Hollen, 2016 WI App 20, petition for review granted 6/15/16, reversed, 2017 WI 56 ; case activity (including briefs)

Dennis A. Teague has no criminal record. But somebody who once used his name, and a date of birth similar to his, does. The ironic result is that Teague, a likely victim of identity theft, is now suggested to be a criminal by the Department of Justice’s criminal history database. Teague, understandably, objects, but the court of appeals concludes it has no power to fix the problem.

State v. Colton M., 2015 WI App 94; case activity

Colton challenges his delinquency adjudication for repeated acts of sexual contact with a child under the age of 16 under § 948.025(1)(e), arguing that applying the statute to him violates due process because it provides insufficient standards for distinguishing him from D., the victim, as both were 15 years old and both engaged in sexual activity. Colton also argues that prosecuting him rather than D. violates equal protection. The court concludes that, under the facts of this case, the statute is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process and there was a rational basis for prosecuting Colton instead of D.

State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity

The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.