On Point blog, page 2 of 3
Counting out-of-state “zero tolerance” OWI violations as prior offenses doesn’t violate Equal Protection Clause
State v. Daniel M. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39; case activity
The equal protection clause isn’t violated by § 343.307(1)(d)‘s differing treatment of Wisconsin and out-of-state” zero tolerance” OWI offenses (which penalize drivers under the legal drinking age who drive with any alcohol concentration).
Hirsch had two prior driver’s license suspensions for violation Illinois’s zero tolerance law. Under § 343.307(1)(d),
SCOW: Six-person jury for involuntary mental commitment survives equal protection challenge
Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R., 2012AP958, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity
Majority opinion by Justice Crooks; concurrence by Chief Justice Abrahamson; additional concurrence by Justice Ziegler (joined by Justices Roggensack and Gableman)
The issues in this case spring from State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 318-319, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995)(“persons committed under Chapters 51 and 980 are similarly situated for purposes of equal protection comparison) and State v.
Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R., 2012AP958, petition for review granted, 2/11/13
Review of unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity
Issues (composed by On Point)
1. Whether there was sufficient proof that Mary F.-R. evidenced a “substantial probability of physical harm” to herself or others and was therefore dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)(2).
2. Whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) is an unconstitutional violation of equal protection because it provides for a jury of six in ch.
Ch. 51 Commitment – Sufficiency of Evidence -Jury of Six
Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R., 2012AP958, District 1, 10/2/12; court of appeals (1-judge, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 2/11/13; case activity
Ch. 51 Commitment – Sufficiency of Evidence
Evidence held sufficient to uphold commitment, on issue of “dangerousness,” State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752, (1990), applied:
¶12 Here,
Homicide of Unborn Child by Intoxicated Use of Motor Vehicle, §§ 939.75(2)(b)3, 940.09(1)(c): No Violation Equal Protection; Sentencing: Accurate Information – Can’t Show Impact
State v. Mark M. Benson, 2012 WI App 101 (recommended for publication); case activity
Equal Protection – Homicide of Unborn Child by Intoxicated Use of Motor Vehicle, §§ 939.75(2)(b)3, 940.09(1)(c)
Section § 939.75(2)(b)3 exempts from criminal liability any “act by a woman who is pregnant with an unborn child that results in the death of or great bodily harm, substantial bodily harm or bodily harm to that unborn child.”
Equal Protection – Rational Basis Test – Punishment Classification Scheme
State v. Gerald L. Lynch, Jr., 2006 WI App 231, PFR filed 11/6/06
For Lynch: David R. Karpe
Issue: Whether a higher level of scrutiny applies to an equal protection challenge to a prison early release program which categorically withholds eligibility from certain types of crimes.
Holding:
¶13 The State, on the other hand, argues that we should employ the lower level of scrutiny,
Equal Protection – Statutory Ineligibility for Earned Release Program
State v. Gerald L. Lynch, Jr., 2006 WI App 231, PFR filed 11/6/06
For Lynch: David R. Karpe
Issue: Whether statutory ineligibility for Earned Release, § 973.01(3g), for homicide by intoxicated use violates equal protection given eligibility for driving while intoxicated but not causing death or great bodily harm.
Holding:
¶18 Applying this standard, we conclude there is a rational basis for not allowing persons convicted of crimes under Wis.
Due Process – Sex Offender Registration Juvenile – Constitutionality
State v. Jeremy P., 2005 WI App 13
For Jeremy P.: Adam B. Stephens
Issue/Holding: Because mandatory sex offender registration for certain juvenile offenders, §§ 938.34(15m)(bm) and 301.45(1m), is not punishment it does not violate procedural due process, ¶¶8-15. The court’s retention of discretion in administering registration defeats a substantive due process claim, ¶22. An equal protection argument, based on claim of children-as-supsect-class, is also rejected, ¶¶23-29.
Enhancer — § 939.62(2m)(a), Persistent Repeater — Validity – Due Process
State v. Alan R. Radke, 2003 WI 7, affirming 2002 WI App 146
For Radke: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶5. The precise question raised, therefore, is whether the “two strikes” law violates the Due Process Clause of either the United States or Wisconsin Constitution because it requires a greater penalty to be imposed on an offender convicted of a second Class B non-fatal child sexual assault than the statutes require to be imposed on an offender convicted of a second Class A felony homicide offense.
OWI – Sentencing – Differential, County-Based Guidelines
State v. Roland Smart, 2002 WI App 240
For Smart: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether sentencing-guideline disparity for driving while intoxicated under guidelines adopted by local counties pursuant to § 346.65(2m) violates equal protection or due process.
Holding: Sentencing guideline disparities need be supported only by rational basis for equal protection purposes, as “(i)t is not a fundamental right to be free from deprivations of liberty as a result of arbitrary distinctions.”