On Point: 14. Equal Protect., 14th Am.

State v. Colton M., 2015 WI App 94; case activity

Colton challenges his delinquency adjudication for repeated acts of sexual contact with a child under the age of 16 under § 948.025(1)(e), arguing that applying the statute to him violates due process because it provides insufficient standards for distinguishing him from D., the victim, as both were 15 years old and both engaged in sexual activity. Colton also argues that prosecuting him rather than D. violates equal protection. The court concludes that, under the facts of this case, the statute is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process and there was a rational basis for prosecuting Colton instead of D.

State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity

The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.

State v. Daniel M. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39; case activity

The equal protection clause isn’t violated by § 343.307(1)(d)‘s differing treatment of Wisconsin and out-of-state” zero tolerance” OWI offenses (which penalize drivers under the legal drinking age who drive with any alcohol concentration).

Hirsch had two prior driver’s license suspensions for violation Illinois’s zero tolerance law. Under § 343.307(1)(d),

Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R., 2012AP958, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity

Majority opinion by Justice Crooks; concurrence by Chief Justice Abrahamson; additional concurrence by Justice Ziegler (joined by Justices Roggensack and Gableman)

The issues in this case spring from State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 318-319, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995)(“persons committed under Chapters 51 and 980 are similarly situated for purposes of equal protection comparison) and State v.

Review of unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. Whether there was sufficient proof that Mary F.-R. evidenced a “substantial probability of physical harm” to herself or others and was therefore dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)(2).

2. Whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) is an unconstitutional violation of equal protection because it provides for a jury of six in ch.

Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R., 2012AP958, District 1, 10/2/12; court of appeals (1-judge, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 2/11/13; case activity

Ch. 51 Commitment – Sufficiency of Evidence

Evidence held sufficient to uphold commitment, on issue of “dangerousness,” State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752, (1990), applied:

 ¶12      Here,

State v. Mark M. Benson, 2012 WI App 101 (recommended for publication); case activity

Equal Protection – Homicide of Unborn Child by Intoxicated Use of Motor Vehicle, §§ 939.75(2)(b)3, 940.09(1)(c) 

Section § 939.75(2)(b)3 exempts from criminal liability any “act by a woman who is pregnant with an unborn child that results in the death of or great bodily harm, substantial bodily harm or bodily harm to that unborn child.”

State v. Gerald L. Lynch, Jr., 2006 WI App 231, PFR filed 11/6/06
For Lynch: David R. Karpe

Issue: Whether a higher level of scrutiny applies to an equal protection challenge to a prison early release program which categorically withholds eligibility from certain types of crimes.

Holding:

¶13      The State, on the other hand, argues that we should employ the lower level of scrutiny,

State v. Gerald L. Lynch, Jr., 2006 WI App 231, PFR filed 11/6/06
For Lynch: David R. Karpe

Issue:  Whether statutory ineligibility for Earned Release, § 973.01(3g), for homicide by intoxicated use violates equal protection given eligibility for driving while intoxicated but not causing death or great bodily harm.

Holding:

¶18      Applying this standard, we conclude there is a rational basis for not allowing persons convicted of crimes under Wis.

State v. Jeremy P., 2005 WI App 13
For Jeremy P.: Adam B. Stephens

Issue/Holding: Because mandatory sex offender registration for certain juvenile offenders, §§ 938.34(15m)(bm) and 301.45(1m), is not punishment it does not violate procedural due process, ¶¶8-15. The court’s retention of discretion in administering registration defeats a substantive due process claim, ¶22. An equal protection argument, based on claim of children-as-supsect-class, is also rejected, ¶¶23-29.