On Point: C. Presumptions, Ch. 903

State v. David Robert Brown, 2016AP83-CR, 12/14/2016, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

David Brown was arrested for OWI; the breathalyzer that he took about two hours later showed a .11 BAC. At trial he adduced expert testimony that, given what Brown told the expert he had drunk and when, his BAC would have been .078, just below the legal limit, at the time he was driving. He objects on due process grounds to the court’s instructing the jury, in accord with Wis JI-Criminal 2669, that it could find he was driving under the influence on the basis of the BAC reading alone.

Oconto County v. Jonathan E. Van Ark, 2015AP1415, 8/23/16; District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Van Ark was sitting in his parked pickup truck when a deputy approached him, smelled alcohol, saw his glossy, blood-shot eyes, and observed his slow, slurred speech.  A subsequent hospital blood draw indicated that Van Ark had a .237 BAC. The State charged him with OWI and operating with a Prohibited Alcohol Concentration and moved for directed verdicts on both counts. The circuit court denied a directed verdict on the OWI charge, but granted it on the PAC charge. The court of appeals reversed based on WIS JI–CRIMINAL 2660A.

Little Chute Village Municipal Court v. Dennis M. Falkosky, 2015AP770, District 3, 9/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court didn’t err by refusing to modify the standard OWI jury instruction, Wis. J.I.—Criminal 2668, by taking out language giving blood alcohol test results prima facie effect as to the defendant’s BAC at the time of driving and replacing the language with the instruction addressing the blood alcohol curve, Wis. J.I.—Criminal 234.

County of Taylor v. Dean T. Woyak, 2104AP1463, 2/24/15, District 3 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for briefs

Woyak was convicted of OWI and PAC. He had driven into a ditch and was discovered with beer cans littering his car. He claimed that he drank the alcohol that resulted in a .222 BAC after the accident not before or during driving. Thus, the trial court should not have instructed the jury that it could find him intoxicated based on the results of an alcohol-concentration test performed within 3 hours of driving.

State v. Mark K. Schrick, 2013AP1166-CR, District 4, 12/27/13 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

Actually, this case concerns more than just dentures.  A jury convicted Schrick of operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of §346.63(1)(b). On appeal, Schrick challenged (1) the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for a directed verdict, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, and (3)  a jury instruction saying that by statute the administered breath test was considered accurate. 

State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31

For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger

Issue/Holding: Jury instructions on the elements of duty and intent under § 946.12(3) created mandatory conclusive presumptions:

¶10      Schultz contends that the following sentences in the jury instruction given by the trial court operated as mandatory conclusive presumptions on the issues of intent and duty: “The use of a state resource to promote a candidate in a political campaign or to raise money for a candidate provides to that candidate a dishonest advantage” (establishing the intent element);

State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; companion case: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2007 WI App 256; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger

Issue/Holding:

¶9        In State v. Kuntz,

State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31
For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger

Issue/Holding: Jury instructions on the elements of duty and intent under § 946.12(3) created mandatory conclusive presumptions:

¶10       Schultz contends that the following sentences in the jury instruction given by the trial court operated as mandatory conclusive presumptions on the issues of intent and duty: “The use of a state resource to promote a candidate in a political campaign or to raise money for a candidate provides to that candidate a dishonest advantage” (establishing the intent element);

State v. Henry W. Aufderhaar, 2004 WI App 208, PFR filed 11/16/04
For Aufderhaar: J. Paul Neumeier Jr.; Raymond E. Krek

Issue/Holding:

¶27                        Here, it is true that the delinquency petition, though filed in court, was never in Aufderhaar’s hands before the waiver hearing took place.  However, at the time of the hearing, Aufderhaar is presumed to have had notice that such a petition existed because the notice of waiver hearing was sent to his correct Montana address before the waiver hearing and that notice was never returned as undeliverable.