On Point: 4. Character, 904.04

State v. Charles A. Page, 2017AP165-CR, District 4, 10/12/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Page claims that the circuit court erred when it classified evidence he sought to introduce as “other acts” evidence and then excluded the evidence because Page hadn’t filed a timely pretrial motion to admit the evidence. He also contends the circuit court abandoned its role as a neutral magistrate in its questioning of Page at trial. The court of appeals rejects the claims.

State v. Shawn W. Forgue, 2016AP2414-CR, 5/11/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Forgue, convicted of misdemeanor battery and disorderly conduct, appealed the circuit court’s decision to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior violent conduct toward him (i.e. McMorris evidence) and her other bad acts. He also appealed an order setting restitution at $269.50 for the victim’s lost wages and $1,000 to the Crime Victim Compensation Program.

State v. Kyle Lee Monahan, 2014AP2187, 4/27/17, District 4 (not recommended for publication) review granted 11/13/17; Affirmed 6/29/18; case activity (including briefs)

Kyle Monahan was convicted of OWI homicide after a jury trial. The trial court excluded evidence offered to show that Monahan was not, in fact, driving the vehicle when it crashed. On appeal, the state agrees with Monahan that the evidence should have come in, but argues that its exclusion was harmless. The court of appeals agrees with the state.

State v. John A. Augoki, 2016AP231-CR, 4/25/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Augoki raises two claims on appeal of his jury-trial conviction of three sexual assaults: that the jury heard other-acts evidence it should hot have heard (raised here as plain error) and that the court unconstitutionally limited his cross-examination of a state expert. The court of appeals rejects both in a fact-intensive opinion.

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point based on the petition for review and the state’s response to petition for review)

Is the “greater latitude” rule created by case law regarding admission of other acts evidence in child sex cases codified by § 904.04(2)(b)1., which applies to admission of other acts evidence in cases involving an array of crimes in addition to child sex offenses?

Is evidence of a defendant’s criminal acts committed against a person other than the victim admissible under § 904.04(2)(b)1. to show a generalized motive or purpose by a defendant to “control” a person with whom he is in a relationship?

State v. Anton R. Dorsey, 2015AP648-CR, District 3, 12/6/16 (per curiam; not citable as precedent or for persuasive value), petition for review granted, 4/10/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 10; case activity (including briefs)

You may not cite this per curiam opinion as binding precedent or for persuasive value in any Wisconsin court, see § 809.23(3)(b), but On Point is telling you about it because the court of appeals concludes that the purported “greater latitude” rule in § 904.04(2)(b)1. is not a codification of the “greater latitude” rule created by case law regarding admission of other acts evidence in child sex cases. While you can’t cite this decision for authority, you may and should use the court’s reasoning for its conclusion to counter the claim of a prosecutor or circuit judge that § 904.04(2)(b)1. codifies a “greater latitude” rule.

State v. Rodell Thompson, 2015AP1764-CR, District 4, 8/4/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion in deciding to admit other-acts evidence in Thompson’s trial for sexual assault, false imprisonment, and battery, and Thompson’s IAC claims fail for want of prejudice.

State v. Luis Calderon-Encarnacion, Jr., 2014AP2252-CR, 04/12/2016 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Calderon was found guilty at trial of shooting up the house of his child’s mother. The evidence against him included the fact that he was pulled over 20 minutes after the shooting in a vehicle matching an eyewitness description of the shooter’s, with a silver-and-black revolver containing five spent casings concealed in the fuse panel.

State v. Tony Phillip Rogers, 2015AP921-CR, 4/12/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Though the complainant in Rogers’s child sexual assault prosecution made statements to her mother about “hearing voices” and needing mental health assistance, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to move for an in camera review of her treatment records because he could not have made the materiality showing needed under State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 608-09, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), and State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶¶32-34, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.

State v. Esequiel Morales-Pedrosa, 2016 WI App 38; case activity (including briefs)

The case law prohibiting vouching by one witness for the credibility of another witness didn’t clearly cover a forensic interviewer’s testimony that 90% of child sexual assault reports are true. Thus, trial counsel wasn’t deficient for failing to object to the testimony.