On Point: D. Relevance, Ch. 904

State v. Timothy E. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, 7/3/20, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP319; case activity (including briefs)

There’s really only one important holding here: despite adoption of the Daubert standard, Wisconsin continues to permit expert testimony in the form of “dissertation or exposition.” That is, an expert can educate the jury about the principles or findings of his or her field without talking about the facts of the case, and an expert who does so is not subject to the requirement that he or she “appl[y] the principles and methods” of that field “reliably to the facts of the case.” Though the court also decides a separate Miranda issue, the discussion is fact-intensive and breaks no legal ground. What’s notable (and regrettable) about the Miranda decision is a meandering three-justice concurrence that repeats the court’s error in State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906 N.W.2d 684, by grafting a third step onto the familiar two-part Miranda-custody inquiry.

State v. Alan M. Johnson, 2020 WI App 50, state’s petition for review granted, 9/16/20, affirmed in part, reversed in part, 2021 WI 61; case activity (including briefs)

Johnson killed his brother-in-law, K.M., while he was in K.M.’s house, uninvited, to look to see whether K.M. had child porn on his computer. The court of appeals orders a new trial for Johnson because the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s perfect self-defense instruction and lesser-included offense instruction and in excluding evidence that there was, in fact, child porn on K.M.’s computer.

County of Milwaukee v. Christann Spannraft, 2018AP1553 & 1554, 6/23/20, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including respondent’s brief)

This is a pro se appeal of an OWI-1st conviction. Spannraft raises three claims, all of which are rejected.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2020 WI 52, reversing in part a published court of appeals opinion, 6/3/20; case activity (including briefs)

In a 5-0 decision, SCOW affirms all parts of this published court of appeals decision but one. The court of appeals held that the circuit court erred in refusing to admit evidence that excluded Gutierrez as the source of male DNA in the underwear and around the mouth of a victim of child sexual assault. The assaults involved oral sex and attempted vaginal intercourse. SCOW reversed the court of appeals on that point.

State v. D.L., 2019AP2331, District 1, 3/10/20; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The State petitioned to terminate D.L.’s parental rights to Y.P.-T.  for failure to assume parental responsibility in January 2017 and lost at a jury trial. So when the State filed a new T.P.R. proceeding in October 2018, D.L. moved the circuit court to instruct the jury instructed that he had a substantial relationship with Y.P-T for the first 20 months of her life. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Ryan C. Diehl, 2020 WI App 16; case activity (including briefs)

At Diehl’s trial for operating with a blood-alcohol content exceeding .02, the state asked the arresting officer and Diehl himself multiple questions that invited the jury to infer he had multiple OWI convictions. Because these questions were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to them, and Diehl is entitled to a new trial.

State v. Andre David Nash, 2018AP1595-CR, 1/7/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).

Under Wisconsin law, once a defendant shows that an out-of-court identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive, the State has the burden of demonstrating that the identification was still reliable and should be admitted into evidence. Powell v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 51, 66 271 N.W.2d 610 (1978). In this case, the court of appeal held that the circuit court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the State, and so reversed.

Pennsylvania, like Wisconsin, has a statute permitting the prosecution at a drunk-driving trial to introduce evidence that a defendant refused a requested blood draw. Do such statutes comply with the Fourth Amendment where the defendant refused a warrantless blood draw and no constitutional exception applied? For an argument that they don’t, see the cert petition filed last month in Thomas Bell v. Pennsylvania.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2017AP2364-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/13/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (based on the State’s Petition for Review):

1. Did the court of appeals violate the standard of appellate review of trial court evidentiary rulings by holding the trial court erred in deciding to exclude evidence offered by the defendant that DNA from other men was found on the clothing of the complainant in a child sexual assault prosecution?

2. Did the court of appeals improperly apply Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), Wisconsin’s rape shield law, when it held the defendant was not offering the DNA evidence as evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual conduct?

State v. Jeffrey D. Lee, 2018AP1507-CR, 11/5/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At a jury trial for child sexual assault, the circuit court admitted “other acts” evidence that Lee had similarly assaulted 5 other children. The court of appeals called the “other acts” evidence of the 3rd, 4th and 5th children “textbook hearsay,” held that the circuit court erred in admitting it, but affirmed based on the harmless error doctrine.