On Point blog, page 3 of 5
Erroneous exclusion of expert testimony about false confession merits new trial
United States v. Antonio West, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 14-2514, 12/30/15
The trial court erroneously excluded expert evidence that West sought to admit regarding factors that made him susceptible to making an unreliable confession to a crime.
Retrograde extrapolation of blood alcohol concentration survives Daubert challenge
State v. Todd J. Giese, 2014 WI App 92; case activity
Expert testimony regarding retrograde extrapolation of Giese’s blood alcohol concentration is admissible under new version of § 907.02(1) despite the fact some experts doubt its reliability because it was the product of reliable principles and methods and based upon sufficient facts and data.
Right to a public trial. Lay testimony about events depicted on surveillance video.
State v. Amos L. Small, 2013 WI App 117; case activity
Right to a public trial
The circuit court appropriately excluded a person from the courtroom under State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, after the prosecutor asserted the had threatened a state’s witness after her testimony. (¶9). While Small’s lawyer objected to the exclusion of the person on the grounds it violated Small’s right to a public trial and was based on a hearsay statement,
OWI — foundation for expert testimony regarding BAC at time of driving
City of Port Washington v. David A. Thompson, 2012AP2500, District 2, 6/26/13; court of appeals opinion (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The trial court did not err in allowing Hackworthy, the state’s chemical test expert, to give her opinion that Thompson’s BAC at the time of driving was 0.15 based on average alcohol elimination rates and the results of a blood test taken about an hour after driving (with a result of 0.15) and a breath test taken about two hours after driving (with a result of 0.11).
Opinion & Expert Testimony – “Death Scene” Analysis
State v. Craig A. Swope, 2008 WI App 175
For Swope: Dianne M. Erickson
Issue: Whether “death scene” analysis from an FBI agent was admissible to establish cause of simultaneous death of two elderly individuals found dead in their home.
Holding:
¶25 The general field of crime scene analysis has been recognized as being a body of specialized knowledge. United State v.
Expert Testimony – Opinion as to Issue of Domestic Law
State v. Louis H. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, affirming 2007 WI App 116
For LaCount: T. Christopher Kelly
Issue: Whether the circuit court erroneously admitted an attorney’s expert opinion testimony that LaCount had engaged in a securities transaction.
Holding:
¶19 As noted previously, appellate courts use the deferential erroneous exercise of discretion standard when reviewing a circuit court’s decision to admit expert testimony.
Expert Opinion Testimony re: Truthfulness of Complainant, as to Signs of Coaching or Suggestion
State v. Bryan James Krueger, 2008 WI App 162
For Krueger: Bradley J. Lochowicz
Issue/Holding:
¶15 Here, Mason was asked whether she had formed an opinion as to whether or not S.B. “was the product of any suggestibility or any coaching.” … Signs of coaching or suggestion could fall into the realm of knowledge that is outside that of a lay-person jury. [10]
¶16 However,
Opinion & Expert Testimony – Eyewitness Identification – Sequential vs. Simultaneous Lineup
State v. Forest S. Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, affirming unpublished decision
For Shomberg: Charles W. Giesen; Morris D. Berman
Issue/Holding: Trial court’s refusal to admit expert testimony on factors influencing witness’s ability to identify a stranger during a lineup procedure, in particular the distorting effect of a simultaneous as opposed to sequential procedure, was not an erroneous exercise of discretion:
¶15 In 2002,
“Maday” Examination of Complainant Where State’s Expert Never Conducted Exam
State v. Lionel N. Anderson, 2005 WI App 238
For Anderson: Harry R. Hertel; Steven H. Gibbs
Issue/Holding: Where the State’s expert witness never interviewed the victim (nor viewed a videotape of the victim’s statement), the defendant wasn’t entitled to a psychological examination of the victim pursuant to State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 359-60, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993), ¶27.
Controlled Substance – Sufficiency of Evidence, Proof of Substance — Presumptive and Confirmatory Testing
State v. Sheldon C. Stank, 2005 WI App 236
For Stank: Dennis P. Coffey
Issue/Holding: Proof of the controlled substance is sufficient where a “presumptive” test is followed by a “confirmatory” one (State v. Dye, 215 Wis. 2d 281, 572 N.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1997), followed), with the PDR being used to establish the presumption:
¶42 Here,