On Point: 3. Impeachment

State v. Eric Dominique Lesueur, 2011AP1550-CR, District 3, 6/26/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

By not asserting a discovery violation, for the State’s failure to provide a CD of a witness interview, trial counsel waived any potential issue, and review is limited to counsel’s effectiveness, ¶5. Lesueur can’t meet his burden of IAC-prejudice:

¶8        Lesueur did not establish Strickland prejudice.  

State v. Britney M. Langlois, 2011AP166-CR, District 4/1, 3/6/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Langlois: Philip J. Brehm; case activity

The court  of appeals upholds a trial court finding that the prosecutor’s explanation for striking an African-American juror (recent conviction for disorderly conduct) was non-discriminatory:

¶33      After reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the trial court properly applied the Batson test.  

State v. Olu A. Rhodes, 2009AP25-CR, District 1, 11/22/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), on remand from, 2011 WI 73; for Rhodes: John J. Grau; case activity

Expert witness qualification rests in the sound discretion of the trial court; here, it was well within that discretion to allow the following testimony:

¶4        Marchant, who described herself as a “criminal intelligence analyst” working for the Department of Justice,

State v. Anthony M. Smith, 2009AP2867-CR, District 1/4, 3/3/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Smith: Rodney Cubbie, Syovata K. Edari; case activity

Trial court’s limitations on cross-examination with respect to State witness’s “prior mental condition” or use of medications (prescribed for his Bipolar Disorder and Attention Deficit Disorder) upheld as proper exercise of discretion. The witness was taking his medication at the time of the alleged offense,

State v. Thomas C. Burton, 2007 WI App 237
For Burton: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: Testimony by a “gang expert” as to the gang-affiliation of certain witnesses, in an effort to explain their motive to testify as they did, was irrelevant in the absence of any evidence that the defendant was himself a gang member:

¶14   Burton’s central argument on appeal is that Warmington’s testimony was squarely barred by State v.

State v. Caltone K. Cockrell, 2007 WI App 217, PFR filed
For Cockrell: Paul R. Nesson, Jr.

Issue/Holding:

¶14      Although Cockrell describes his challenge to the prosecutor’s use of his post- Miranda silence as a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the substance of his argument is the due process analysis employed in Doyle v. Ohio,

State v. Caltone K. Cockrell, 2007 WI App 217, PFR filed
For Cockrell: Paul R. Nesson, Jr.

Issue/Holding:

¶16      Building on footnote 11 in Doyle, courts have recognized situations in which it is not a violation of due process for the prosecutor to elicit on cross-examination the fact of the defendant’s post- Miranda silence for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s testimony about his or her interactions with the police after the arrest.

State v. Caltone K. Cockrell, 2007 WI App 217, PFR filed
For Cockrell: Paul R. Nesson, Jr.

Issue/Holding:

¶31      … (A)s long as the prosecutor does not ask the jury to make a direct inference of guilt from the defendant’s post-arrest silence, asking the jury to draw inferences that impeach the defendant’s volunteered testimony on that subject does not violate due process, even though the inferences,

State v. Walter T. Missouri, 2006 WI App 74
For Missouri: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue: Whether evidence of police officer Mucha’s mistreatment of a 3rd-party (Scull) in an otherwise unrelated but similar instance was admissible to further defendant Missouri’s claim that Mucha was untruthful in denying physical abuse against and planting evidence on Missouri.

Holding: This evidence satisfied the three-part test of  State v.

State v. Justin Yang, 2006 WI App 48
For Olson: John J. Grau

Issue/Holding: Defense cross-examination of a principal State’s witness was impermissibly curtailed when the trial court abruptly ended inquiry into whether the witness had threatened to cause the defendant (her ex-husband) “trouble” following his remarriage, where:

• The witness testified only with the aid of a translator and had obvious difficulty answering questions (“a witness’s comprehension affects our analysis of whether a trial court can cut-off cross-examination prematurely.