On Point: 15. Evidence

State v. Gary Abdullah Salaam, 2014AP2666-CR & 2667-CR, 9/13/2016, District 1 (Not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Salaam raises four claims challenging his convictions, at jury trial, of recklessly endangering safety, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and three counts of witness intimidation. The court affirms as to the first two counts but finds insufficient evidence as to the witness intimidation charges.

Oconto County v. Jonathan E. Van Ark, 2015AP1415, 8/23/16; District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Van Ark was sitting in his parked pickup truck when a deputy approached him, smelled alcohol, saw his glossy, blood-shot eyes, and observed his slow, slurred speech.  A subsequent hospital blood draw indicated that Van Ark had a .237 BAC. The State charged him with OWI and operating with a Prohibited Alcohol Concentration and moved for directed verdicts on both counts. The circuit court denied a directed verdict on the OWI charge, but granted it on the PAC charge. The court of appeals reversed based on WIS JI–CRIMINAL 2660A.

State v. D.L., 2016AP735 & 2016AP736, District 1, 8/18/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court didn’t err in admitting multiple hearsay statements made by D.L.’s children about her treatment of them or in admitting expert testimony about whether D.L. had a “strong bond” or “positive and healthy relationships” with her children.

State v. Mychael R. Hatcher, 2015AP297-CR, District 3, 8/16/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hatcher was convicted of sexually assaulting an intoxicated person, obstructing an officer, and bail-jumping. This 38-page court of appeals decision rejects claims that the trial court erred in refusing to accept Hatcher’s guilty plea, admitting expert testimony during the State’s rebuttal, admitting evidence of the victim’s flirting, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for suppression and for introducing into evidence a report showing the victim’s BAC.

Joseph J. Jordan v. Randall R. Hepp, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3613, 2016 WL 4119862, 8/3/16

Jordan claims the Wisconsin courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they held that he was not denied the right to represent himself and that his trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper vouching for a police witness’s credibility. The Seventh Circuit okays the state courts’ decision on self-representation but orders a hearing on Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim.

State v. Rodell Thompson, 2015AP1764-CR, District 4, 8/4/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion in deciding to admit other-acts evidence in Thompson’s trial for sexual assault, false imprisonment, and battery, and Thompson’s IAC claims fail for want of prejudice.

OLR v. John Kenyatta Riley, 2016 WI 70, 7/15/16; case activity (including briefs)

Leaving us with another splintered decision as the current term comes to its end, a majority of the supreme court votes to publicly reprimand an attorney for “offering” false testimony from his client and then failing to take reasonable measures to correct the testimony. The precedential value of the opinion is uncertain, and perhaps nil, as there’s no majority rationale for the decision and it involves a previous version of the relevant ethical rule; nonetheless, every lawyer who calls witnesses should be aware of it and contemplate what it might portend.

State v. Giancarlo Giacomantonio, 2016 WI App 62; case activity (including briefs)

This is Wisconsin’s first published decision about how parties are to authenticate photographs of text messages so that they are admissible at trial.  The answer is the same way they authenticate other kinds of evidence–via §909.01 and §909.015. Nothing more is required.

Unity Bayer v. Brian D. Dobbins, M.D., 2016 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)

We note this decision in a civil case because it involves the application of the Daubert test, a still relatively undeveloped area of law, and may assist practitioners in making arguments for (or against) the admission of expert evidence.

Birchfield v. North Dakota, USSC No. 14-1468, 2016 WL 3434398 (June 23, 2016), reversing State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 2015); vacating and remanding State v. Beylund, 861 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 2015); and affirming State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 2014); Scotusblog pages: Birchfield, Beylund, Bernard (include links to briefs and commentary)

Three years ago, in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the Court rejected a bright-line rule that police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have probable cause to believe is driving drunk, pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception. In these three cases, the Court adopts a bright-line rule that the police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have arrested for driving drunk, pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception. But they can only Conduct a test of the motorist’s breath, and not the motorist’s blood. Make sense?